Why 21st Century Warfare Is Different

by James Dunnigan

After ten years of fighting, the war on terror has caused 51,600 American military casualties (6,200 dead and 45,400 wounded). This includes a small number of CIA, State Department and other agency personnel. Over 99 percent are Department of Defense. Not all the casualties were from combat, with 21 percent of the deaths from non-combat causes. In World War II that was 25 percent. Iraq fighting accounted for 71 percent of the deaths and 70 percent of the wounded. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, operations in dozens of other countries represented 2.5 percent of deaths, but about 71 percent of these were from non-combat causes. 

The first 21st century war was quite different than the 20th century conflicts. For one thing, far fewer Americans are being killed or wounded in combat. And fewer and fewer of those who are wounded die. It’s a continuing trend. Last year, eight percent of the wounded died, compared to eleven percent in 2009. There are several reasons for more troops surviving battle wounds (and injuries from accidents). An obvious cause is body armor. Improvements over the past decade, in terms of design and bullet resistance, account for about 20 percent of the decline in casualties. There's a down side to this, as the body armor is heavier and cumbersome. This reduces a soldier's mobility, and increases casualties a bit (and saves some enemy lives as well.)

Another major factor is medical care, which has gotten much better, quicker and faster. Not only are procedures more effective, but badly wounded soldiers get to the operating table more quickly. Medics now have capabilities that, during Vietnam, only surgeons possessed. Movement of casualties to an operating room is much faster now, partly because of better transportation, but also because of more efficient methods, and operating rooms that are placed closer to the battlefield.

Another major factor is the change in what caused casualties. Explosions (like roadside bombs) are less likely to cause fatal wounds. For example, currently 12.9 percent of bullet wounds are fatal, compared to 7.3 percent for bombs and 3.5 percent for RPGs (and grenades in general). The enemy in Afghanistan prefers to use roadside bombs, because U.S. troops are much superior in a gun battle. All this contributed to the changing the ratio of wounded-to-killed, that was 6-to-1 in Vietnam, to 10-1 now.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, there has also been a dramatic reduction in combat deaths compared to Vietnam, and previous 20th century wars. The death rate (adjusting for the number of troops involved) in Iraq was a third of what it was in Vietnam. It's even lower in Afghanistan. There was such a massive reduction in combat deaths that the percentage of deaths that were from non-combat causes actually went up. For example, there were 47,359 (81.4 percent) combat deaths in Vietnam, and 10,797 (18.6 percent) from non-combat causes. In Iraq it is 80 percent and 20 percent. In Afghanistan it is 70 percent and 30 percent. The ratio of dead to wounded is also different in Iraq (1 dead for 7.2 wounded) compared to Afghanistan (1 dead for 8.1 wounded)

There are also differences in the types of casualties. For example, in Vietnam, bullets caused 38 percent of the deaths. In Iraq, it was only 19 percent, and 27 percent in Afghanistan. The Iraqis are notoriously bad shots, even though the urban battle space in Iraq was very similar to Vietnam. There is more of a tradition of marksmanship in Afghanistan, despite (or probably because of) the frequently longer distances involved. The superior body armor has made life much harder for enemy marksmen, as chest shots are now frequently useless and fatal head shots are very difficult.

In Vietnam, 15.7 percent of U.S. combat deaths were caused by IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), while in Iraq and Afghanistan it peaked at about 60 percent, and then declined. Casualties were avoided, or made less severe with the development of special armored vehicles (MRAPs) that reduced the impact of the explosives. The roadside bomb is a much less effective weapon, a loser's weapon, because it kills more civilians than enemy troops and played a major role in turning the locals against the Iraqi terrorists and Afghan Taliban.

Aircraft related deaths (from crashes) were 14.6 percent of the combat fatalities in Vietnam, while it was only a few percent in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current helicopters were built with Vietnam experience in mind, and are more resistant to damage and safer to crash land in. Ground vehicle related deaths were two percent in Vietnam, but more than double that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the ground vehicle deaths were non-combat related. That's because from World War II to the present, the U.S. armed forces put huge numbers of trucks and other vehicles on roads (often poorly maintained, or shot up), at all hours, in all weather and with drivers fighting fatigue. There being a war on, the vehicles often proceeded at unsafe speeds.

What made the experience so different today, versus past wars? It was a combination of things. The most important difference is that the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are fighting smarter. While the Vietnam era troops were representative of the general population, the post-Vietnam era army is all-volunteer and highly selective. The troops are smarter, healthier and better educated than the general population. During the last three decades, new attitudes have developed throughout the army (which always got most of the draftees). The army, so to speak, has become more like the marines (which was always all-volunteer, and more innovative as a result). This ability to quickly analyze and adapt gets recognized by military historians, and other armies, but not by the media. It also saves lives in combat.

This innovation has led to better training, tactics and leadership. Smarter troops means smarter and more capable leaders, from the sergeants leading fire teams (five men) to the generals running the whole show. Smarter troops leads to tactics constantly adapting to changes on the battlefield. The better tactics, and smarter fighting, has been the biggest reason for the lower death rate.

Better weapons and equipment have made U.S. troops less vulnerable to attack. GPS guided weapons have made the biggest difference. There are now GPS guided bombs, shells and rockets. This enables troops to hit a target with the first shot, and be closer to the explosion (the better to move right in and take care of armed enemy survivors). Another benefit is much fewer civilian casualties. In both Iraq and Vietnam, the enemy frequently used civilians as human shields, and the better trained American troops were able to cope with this in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And then there was night vision gear. This first appeared during Vietnam, but in four decades, the stuff has gotten better, lighter and cheaper. Every soldier has night vision now, as do most combat vehicles. There are also better radios, better uniforms, even better field rations. It all made a difference.

Then there was the Internet, which enabled the troops to get in touch with each other. This made a big difference. Not just for the grunts, but also for the NCOs and officers. Each community had different problems and solutions. With the Internet, they could easily discuss the problems, and quickly share the solutions. The troops did this by themselves, and it was up to the military to play catch up. Life-saving tips are passed around with unprecedented speed. This made a major difference in combat, where better tactics and techniques save lives.

Computers and video games had an impact as well. The draft ended about the same time that personal computers and video games began to show up. So there have been three decades of troops who grew up with both. It was the troops who led the effort to computerize many military activities, and video games evolved into highly realistic training simulators. The automation eliminated a lot of drudge work, while the simulators got troops up to speed before they hit the combat zone. Computers also made possible doing things with information, especially about the enemy, that was not possible before. A lot of troops understand operations research and statistical analysis, and they use it to good effect. Research has also shown that heavy use of video games trains the user to make decisions faster. That's a lifesaver in combat.

UAVs and Trackers took a lot of the fog out of war. For nearly a century, the troops on the ground depended on someone in an airplane or helicopter to help them sort out who was where. In the last decade, the guy in the air has been replaced by robots. UAVs, especially the hand held ones every infantry company has, now give the ground commander his own recon aircraft. He controls it, and it works only for him. Combat commanders now have a top-down view of his troops, and the enemy. This has made a huge difference, creating some fundamental changes in the way captains and colonels command their troops. For higher commanders, the GPS transponders carried by most combat vehicles, provides a tracking system that shows a real-time picture, on a laptop screen, of where all your troops are. This takes a lot of uncertainty out of command.

Living conditions enabled troops in combat to be more alert and effective. Some civilians think air-conditioned sleeping quarters for combat troops, and lots of other goodies in base camps, is indulgent. It is anything but. Getting a good night's sleep can be a life-saver for combat soldiers, and AC makes that possible. Showers, Internet links to home and good chow do wonders for morale, especially for guys getting shot at every day. Good morale means a more alert, and capable, soldier. The combat units often go weeks, or months, without these amenities, but the knowledge that these goodies are there, and eventually to be enjoyed, takes some of the sting out of all the combat stress. The rate of combat fatigue in Iraq has been much lower than in Vietnam, or any previous war.

The enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan was not as effective as the Vietnamese were. The Taliban are more effective than the Iraqis, but not by much. All this is partly this is due to cultural factors, partly because in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were sending trained soldiers south. The North Vietnamese also had commandos ("sappers"), who, while small in number, caused a lot of anxiety, and casualties, among U.S. troops. The irregular (Viet Cong) troops in South Vietnam, were largely gone after 1968 (as a result of the failed Tet Offensive), but even these fighters tended to be more deadly than the average Iraqi gunman or Afghan warrior. The Iraqi troops have had a dismal reputation for a long time, but they can still be deadly. Just not as deadly as their Vietnamese counterparts. The lower fighting capability of the Iraqis saved lots of American lives, but got far more Iraqis (including civilians) killed. The Afghans have a more fearsome reputation, but in practice they are no match for professional infantry. And conventional wisdom to the contrary, they have been beaten many times in the past. They are blessed, after a fashion, to live in the place that is not worth conquering. So whoever defeats them, soon leaves.

Finally, there is the data advantage. The military (especially the army, which has collected, since Vietnam, massive amounts of information on how each soldier died) has detailed records of soldier and marine casualties. The army, in particular, collects and analyzes this data, and then passes on to the troops new tactics and techniques derived from this analysis. The army restricts access to the data, as it can provide the enemy with useful information on how effective they are. Some basic data is made public, but the details will be a locked up for decade or more. Studying this data is a full time job for many people in the military, and there is a constant stream of suggestions resulting from this analysis, and those suggestions often turn into yet another small decline in combat deaths.

Oklahoma National Guard officials to discuss deployment

Officials with the Oklahoma National Guard will discuss the possible deployment of thousands of troops with the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team to Afghanistan.

Maj. Gen. Myles Deering, the Adjutant General for Oklahoma, is scheduled to speak about the potential deployment Wednesday afternoon in Oklahoma City. A Guard spokesman could not immediately be reached for comment, and the governor's office would not confirm the deployment ahead of the 3 p.m. news conference.

The 45th IBCT is the state's largest National Guard element - about 2,600 soldiers from across the state.

The combat team was mobilized in 2007 for a 1-year deployment to Iraq. At the time, it was the largest deployment of state guard members since the Korean War.

HOO-AH to Steve Russell (Lt. Col., U.S. Army Ret.)

HOO-AH to Oklahoma State Senator
Steve Russell (Lt. Col., U.S. Army Ret.)
for taking a stand for us Vets !!

SENATOR PROPOSES RESOLUTION OPPOSING OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S POSITION ON ‘RIGHT WING’ EXTREMISTS AS POSSIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

Senators Take Exception to Characterization of Veterans, Pro-Lifers, etc. as ‘Right-Wing Extremists’

Responding to a report of the Obama administration’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS) characterizing returning veterans and others who uphold traditional American values as “right wing extremists” and a threat to American security.

The nine-page document from the DHS titled "Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment," has caused an outcry from veterans groups, Republican lawmakers and conservative activists.

"It may include groups and individuals that are dedicated to a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration," said the report, which also listed as suspect gun owners and veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

The outcry resulted in a demand from the head of the American Legion to meet with Ms. Napolitano, a request the DHS chief said she would honor next week when she returns to Washington from her current tour of the U.S.-Mexican border.

Sponsored by Senator Steve Russell, a retired Army Colonel and veteran of both Iraq and Afghanistan, Senate Resolution 42 demands that President Obama’s Administration ‘retract this report and apologize to America’s returning war veterans.’ “To suggest that we would terrorize the very nation we risked our lives for should give all Americans pause,” said Russell.

“Yesterday afternoon I participated in a rally with thousands of good, law-abiding, God-fearing Oklahomans who voiced their concerns about the Federal government’s expenditures of our hard-earned dollars,” said Russell, referring to the Tea Party rally that was held on the steps of the State Capitol. “According to the Department of Homeland Security report, these people would also be considered threats to the national security.

“It is vital that we take a stand and express, in our constitutional right to peaceful assembly and our extreme displeasure and disagreement with the Administration on this important matter,” Russell continued.

“Taken at face value, this report from our Department of Homeland Security would qualify the vast majority of Oklahomans as threats to our national security,” Russell added. “If upholding traditional American values such as the sanctity of life, the right to bear arms and defending your country is extremist, then I stand so accused,” Russell concluded.

Senate Resolution 42 further states that the Oklahoma State Senate supports America’s military veterans, who have risked their lives preserving the nation instead of attacking it, and believes that the traditional American values under attack by the Obama Administration should be respected and revered by the federal government.

The Resolution will likely be heard in the Senate on Wednesday.

U.S. Air Force to deploy turboprop aircraft in Iraq and the Stan

Air Force leaders on Friday said they would deploy the first of 37 C-12 class aircraft configured with full-motion video and signals intelligence capabilities to U.S. Central Command this spring for use in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The deployment, scheduled for April, will come one year after Defense Secretary Robert Gates established a departmental task force to explore ways to improve intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to support ground troops in those combat zones.

Gates has criticized the military services -- the Air Force in particular -- for not embracing the capabilities provided by unmanned aircraft quickly enough and for not exploring more options for using low-cost piloted aircraft to collect intelligence in places where U.S. air superiority isn't threatened.

The Air Force is adapting King Air 350 aircraft manufactured by Hawker Beechcraft for military needs with specialized electronics to supplement ongoing ISR operations on the battlefield. Many such operations use unmanned aerial vehicles.

"We always need to know more about [the battlefield], especially in the counterinsurgency environment," said Brig. Gen. Blair Hansen, director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for the Air Force. Hansen is also the service's leader on the Defense Department's ISR Task Force, established by Gates in April 2008.

The aircraft will have four-person crews -- two pilots and two sensor operators. During missions, the sensor operators will be in direct contact with ground forces and Air Force personnel involved in analyzing and disseminating information across the battlefield.

The Air Force estimates the overall program, including development and procurement, will cost about $950 million.

"This is a major weapons system, it's not just an add-on," Hansen told reporters during a Pentagon briefing. The Air Force plans to deploy three squadrons, or 37 aircraft, during the next two years. They will be organized under Air Combat Command.

John Pike, a defense expert and director of the Web site www.GlobalSecurity.org, is skeptical that the program will enhance ISR significantly. It is similar to the Army's decades-old Guardrail program, which uses C-12 class aircraft to conduct signals intelligence, he said. The Army is modernizing that program.

"It's puzzling that the Air Force is coming this late to the game," Pike said, noting that the Army and the Marine Corps have been using manned turboprop aircraft for years to gather intelligence to foil roadside bomb attacks in Iraq.

"This is significant in the sense that the Army's going to think that the Air Force is poaching on their turf," Pike said. "[The Air Force is] basically replicating, or would seem to be coming close to replicating, an existing Army capability."

Air Force officials were unable to respond to a request for information about how the program differs from or complements current programs in the Army and Marine Corps by Monday morning.

To signal the effort's urgency, the Air Force is calling it Project Liberty after the World War II Liberty ship program, under which more than 2,700 cargo ships were mass produced to meet wartime needs.

To Pike, the name indicates a level of hubris on the part of the Air Force. "Liberty is a really big name for the Air Force to be using for such a small program," he said. What's more, he added, the name suggests a misreading of history, since the Liberty ships did not have to be modified for military operations -- they simply carried military cargo.

"The Air Force should find another name," Pike said.

Iraq Is Safer than Mexico

This month, about 26 people a day are dying from criminal and terrorist violence a day in Iraq.

That's lower than the death toll in northern Mexico, which on a bad day (like last November 3rd) saw 58 people killed.

The police are generally helpless, hundreds of thousands of middle-class Mexicans have fled the border region, often to the United States.

Those without money must hunker down and wait for someone to win this war. The drug gangs show no signs of weakening, although the army believes that it can prevail in the next year or so.

Watch CBS Videos Online

Mundane Matters That 'Garet' Trooper and the Drive by Media Misses

The growing number of U.S. troops with operating experience in Afghanistan has led to a style of war that is not fully appreciated by the 'Garet' Trooper back home (or sitting in Kabul).

Thus we have silly situations where 'Garet' Trooper in Kabul and Washington insist that all U.S. troops (except, grudgingly, the Special Forces) be clean shaven.

But out in the hills, where American commanders on their second or third combat tour, now that Afghans are more comfortable dealing with bearded foreigners. It's just a cultural thing. So the captains and colonels ignore the beards, while their bosses don't.

In an unusual event in Afghan history, many Afghans want to work with the foreign soldiers, not kill and rob them.

The ROE (Rules of Engagement) and reconstruction efforts have impressed Afghans. The former spares the lives of Afghan civilians, and the latter makes their lives better.

Despite the Taliban skill at playing the media whenever an Afghan civilian is killed by foreign troops (usually while being used as a human shield by bandits or Taliban), most Afghans want peace and prosperity and to be left alone.

While peace and prosperity are nice, they have been rare events in Afghan history. Being left alone is a more immediate survival skill. This is why, out in the hills, so many people appear to live in little fortresses, carry weapons, and be quick to use them against outsiders (anyone from outside the valley or tribe).

The terrorists are having major problem trying to apply al Qaeda bombing tactics in Afghanistan. There is much more popular opposition to Islamic terrorism in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, you had Sunni Arabs (15-20 percent of the population) and many Shia Arabs (perhaps a fifth of the 60 percent of the population that is Shia) who would provide some form of support for the terrorists. That 20-25 percent of the population shrank as the terrorists had more success killing lots of Iraqis with their bombs.

The same pattern is playing out in Afghanistan, but with less than ten percent of the population supporting the terrorists, and that group is shrinking, Just like in Iraq.

Although the terrorists in Afghanistan are killing fewer people overall (and most of them are still civilians), the media loves to cover explosions.

While the drug gangs are doing well (it's a high profit business, so you can absorb a lot of setbacks), the Taliban are taking a beating. U.S./NATO forces are getting better at finding Taliban gunmen, and leaders, and killing or capturing them.

As usual, the U.S./NATO, with their helicopters and warm clothes, are operating in the Winter. This is the time when Afghans like to hunker down. Poverty, poor diet, lack of adequate clothing and little medical care makes being outside in the Winter a dangerous proposition.

Even though the Taliban is trying to supply it fighters with some modern winter gear and antibiotics, most of these guys head for the hills reluctantly, ill equipped, and with much foreboding. Nothing glorious about dying, shivering, of pneumonia in a cave, while U.S./NATO troops search for you (and often find you, even in caves.)

What U.S./NATO troops are searching for in Winter are weapons and terrorism gear (bomb materials, commo gear and laptops). With so many cell phone equipped civilians ready to give you up, it's hard to find somewhere to hide out in the Winter.

Most of the Taliban can just hide their gun and go home for the Winter. But your key people have to watch over things, and equipment. These are the Winter targets for U.S./NATO operations, and the pickings are richer in the cold weather.

So far this year, there have been 25 attacks on food relief convoys, resulting in nearly a million dollars worth of food being lost. The UN, which administers most of the aid, is not sure how many of the attacks are from bandits, or Taliban. Sometimes the same armed gangs are both. The Taliban are also active in preventing farmers from rebuilding irrigation systems and roads, believing this sort of thing will make the rural farmers more likely to support the government.

Another trouble spot is the growing number of refugees returning to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, as well as the thousands who are now fleeing the army offensive against the Taliban in Pakistan. Over five million refugees have returned since late 2001, and several hundred thousand a year are still coming back. Often, these refugees cannot resume their lives as marginal farmers and migrate to the cities. There they face lots of crime and not a lot of jobs.

The average Afghan is not worried that much about the Taliban (which make up a tiny proportion of the population and largely operate in the south), terrorists (even more rare than the Taliban) or the drug gangs (again, most of it is in a ten percent of the provinces, mainly Helmand).

What really bothers most Afghans is crime (as in robbery, theft and kidnapping) and government incompetence and corruption. The people want a crackdown on crime and corruption. That doesn't make exciting headlines for foreign journalists (except for lots of Afghans wanting to bring back public executions for criminals), but it's what Afghans worry about most of the time.

Iraqi Air Force Expansion

Over the next 18 months, Iraq plans to expand its air force to over 130 aircraft and 6,000 personnel.

Within seven years, it plans to have over 500 aircraft, most of them non-combat types.

Currently the air force has seven squadrons: (1 transport, 2 reconnaissance, 1 helicopter training, 1 helicopter transport, 1 utility/search and rescue, and 1 special operations). In seven years there will be about 35 squadrons (14 fighter, 5 attack helicopter, 5 armed scout helicopter, 2 transport, 2 reconnaissance, 1 fixed wing training, 1 helicopter training, 3 helicopter transport, 1 utility/search and rescue, and 1 special operations).

The Iraqis are seeking to buy F-16 fighters, noting that neighboring Turkey and Jordan have done well with this model.

Currently, the air force is flying, with some 80 aircraft, about 50 sorties a day, mostly transport and reconnaissance. The first combat aircraft will be in action next year, as Iraq equips its Cessna Caravan 208 aircraft with laser designators and Hellfire missiles. Mi-17 helicopters will be equipped to fire unguided rockets.

The biggest problem for the air force is finding Iraqis to serve as aircraft maintainers and mechanics and repair technicians in general. There is also a shortage, common throughout the entire armed forces, of mid-level NCOs officers to supervise all the work.

Earlier this year, the United States gave the Iraqi Air Force eleven training aircraft (eight Cessna 172s and three Cessna Caravan 208). The donated aircraft are worth nearly $10 million. The Cessna C172 is a single engine aircraft that costs about $600,000, and can also be used for reconnaissance. C-172s are cheaper than UAVs.

Many air forces use a militarized version, as the T-41 basic flight trainer. The C-172 is a 1.1 ton aircraft with a max speed of 228 kilometers an hour, and can stay in the air for about six hours per sortie. The aircraft is easy to fly, and can be equipped with all manner of night and day video cameras. The Iraqis have lots of unemployed pilots, who are happy to have anything to fly. But the existing pilots are getting on in years, and the Iraqis have established a military flight school up north, where the 172s are used for basic flight training.

The Cessna Caravan 208 is a larger, single engine, aircraft that can carry nine passengers or a ton of cargo. It can be rigged to carry electronic warfare gear (for picking up transmissions from the ground, or jamming.) The Caravan 208 costs several million dollars, and is also used to train pilots to handle larger aircraft.

Sealing the Iraq borders vs Tradition

The Iraq war is moving to the borders, where support for radical groups enters the country from Iran (for Shia radicals), Syria (for Sunni radicals) and Turkey (for Kurdish radicals).

Sealing each of these borders requires a different approach.

The Iranians can be talked to, in addition to the growing number of border troops watching the frontier. The main problem is radical factions in the Iranian government, who are allowed to run their own terrorist operations in foreign countries.

The Iranian Al Quds Force (an intelligence and commando operation that supports Islamic terrorism overseas) always attracted very bright and able people, but also got personnel with a wide range of views on just what constituted an "Islamic Republic" or the proper role for the Quds Force itself.

One of the few things Quds officers could agree on was the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Many Quds officers actually warmed to the United States for doing the deed for them. Quds operatives were sent to Iraq in 2003 to see if they could establish another Islamic republic there.

But they quickly found that Iraq Shias were very divided on that subject.

This got many Quds officers disagreeing with their commanders back home. The feeling was that the officials back in Iran were living in a dream world.

This was reinforced by the debate over al Qaeda.

Even though this Sunni terrorist organization was violently anti-Shia, and had killed many Shia in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, some Quds officials backed supporting al Qaeda, because of a common enemy, the United States in particular, and the West in general.

The sort of thing can happen because the Iranian leadership is more a federation than a dictatorship. So Quds can keep being nice to al Qaeda as long as not too many other Iranian factions get mad at Quds. So the Iraq government negotiates with more moderate members of the Iranian government, on how they can cooperate to control Quds, and other Iranian radicals trying to stir up trouble inside Iraq.

The situations on the Syrian and Turkish borders are more straightforward.

The Syrians, while allies of Iran, are largely Sunni, and the country has become a base for Sunni terrorist groups like al Qaeda.

So Iran tolerates Syrian support for Sunni terrorists who go to Iraq, via Syria, to kill fellow Shia. Politics is a rough game in this part of the world. But that tolerance is wearing off, and the Syrians have been told by Iran, Iraq and the United States that support for Sunni terrorists must stop, or else. Syria is being told to behave like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have successfully sealed their borders to terrorists. Now it's time for Syria to join the "good neighbors" club.

The Turkish border is a little different, in that the terrorists (PKK, the Kurdish separatist group) hide out in Iraq, and launch attacks across the border in Turkey. The Kurds run their own affairs in northern Iraq, but are not willing to take out the PKK (who represent ideas, like an independent Kurdish state, that are popular with all Kurds).

So the Kurdish provincial, and Iraq national governments sort of look the other way while Turkish warplanes bomb PKK camps, and Turkish troops dash in to grab live PKK as prisoners, or examine dead ones for more intel on what the terrorist group is up to. Turkish military pressure has been pretty intense for the last few months, and the PKK is hurt. Not just by members killed or injured by the attacks, but by others who are demoralized and quit the organization. Recruitment is down and desertion is up. This is never a good sign. In the past month alone, at least a hundred PKK members have come out of the mountains near the border, and said they were quitting.

The Turks believe they may have destroyed a third of the PKK fighting power so far this year.

Most Iraq security forces are now focusing on protecting the voting centers that will be used in a few months for national elections.

These places will be, as usual, targets for the Sunni and Shia terrorists. Democracy is anathema to the religious terrorists (al Qaeda and their Iranian Shia counterparts), as the religious activists want a clerical dictatorship, not some alien Western import like democracy.

The religious terrorists are basically traditionalists, and the traditional government in this part of the world has always been a tyranny of one form or another. Thus support for tradition translates into support for some kind of dictator, hopefully a benevolent one.

HOO-ah: What the Drive by Media is NOT saying about Iraq

Many Iraqis have become infatuated with the American military. Not just the efficiency with which they fight, but also how they go out of their way to avoid civilian casualties, and try to help Iraqis recover from decades of tyranny and terrorism. This doesn't get a lot of publicity, but it is changing Iraq on a fundamental level.

The new Iraqi Army wants to be just like their American counterparts. Iraqi military uniforms look very much like the U.S. ones. The weapons and vehicles are the same. And the Iraqis are emulating how U.S. troops move, as well as how they look. In combined operations, it's often difficult to tell, at a glance, who are the Americans, and who are the Iraqis. More than once, during a firefight, an American soldier dives for cover next to what he thinks is another G.I. But when he talks to the other "American", he comes face-to-face with an Iraqi face talking back to him in Arabic. Fortunately, both armies use the same hand signals. So the two will communicate with hand signs and get on with the battle.

Iraqis also noticed that the U.S. concept of "Civil Affairs" (soldiers trained to work with civilians in a war zone) worked. So now Iraq has its own civil affairs troops, who usually operate with their American counterparts. This has worked very well, especially in Sunni and Shia radical neighborhoods where anti-Americanism is still alive and well. Iraq is still divided by religious and political differences, and the Iraqi civil affairs specialists see themselves as having lots to do for a long time.

More importantly, many Iraqis are trying to emulate U.S. military bureaucracy. While these administrators get little respect from the combat troops, they are seen by Iraqis as paragons of modernity and efficiency. That they are, which is one reason the U.S. combat troops are so effective. The right supplies tend to get to the right place at the right time. In Iraq, that rarely happens, not in the civilian world, or the military. Iraqi commanders have noticed how the American military support organizations operate, and want to set up Iraqi equivalents. That's a difficult chore, mainly because of the corruption that is endemic to the region. But at least there's a trend, an effort to not just look like Western troops, but to administer the military organizations in the same way.

Hoo-ah: The Pentagon’s new ‘Media War Plan’ for Iraq

The Pentagon is stepping up its psychological operations program in Iraq over the next three years - spending $300 million to produce news stories, entertainment programs and public service announcements for the Iraqi media. It is being billed as a counterweight to radical Al-Qaeda-style propaganda and a way to “engage and inspire” Iraqis to support U.S. objectives.

The U.S. Defense Department awarded $300 million in contracts last week to four companies to expand the U.S. military’s psychological operations program in Iraq over the next three years, The Washington Post reported on Friday.

The companies – including the most prominent communications contractor in Iraq, Virginia-based SOS international [SOSi] – will continue the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency strategy of engaging in “critical military activities that don’t involve killing insurgents.”

The money will be used to bolster existing American-produced public service campaigns – on billboards, TV and radio – that have praised improvements in Iraq’s infrastructure and social services, as well as to produce news stories highlighting U.S. reconciliation efforts and the activities of the U.S.- trained Iraqi security services.

SOSi joined Washington DC-based the Lincoln Group, another Virginia-based media company, MPRI, and Los Angeles-based Leonie Industries in winning the DOD contracts. All have done previous work for the DOD.

General David Petraeus is on record as saying that winning the media war is crucial when dealing with a population hostile to U.S. objectives

Counterinsurgency 101

The three-year psy-ops campaign is right out of U.S. Central Command chief General David H. Petraeus’ counterinsurgency playbook. Petraeus, who in 2003 was the commander of the 101st Airborne Division in the northern Iraqi province of Nineveh, was instrumental in making sure that the media continued to operate there in the first months of the U.S. occupation.

Petraeus wrote in a 2006 Army counterinsurgency manual that became a blueprint for the DoD’s Media War Plan for Iraq, that winning the media war was crucial when dealing with a population hostile to U.S. objectives in Iraq.

The plan called for portraying “a new Iraq, offering hope of a prosperous and democratic future which would serve as a model for the Middle East.”
At the heart of the Pentagon campaign is an admittance by U.S. war strategists that they have been losing the propaganda campaign to Al-Qaeda-inspired militants who have put new technology and the Internet to good use – creating anti-western sentiment with professionally produced videos and slick websites in the years since the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003.

“We’re being out-communicated by a guy in a cave,” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates once remarked in reference to Osama bin Laden.

FCC probe

The DOD no doubt sees the 3-year project as a means of reversing what critics of the Bush administration have said was a concerted U.S. military campaign of broadcasting false information during the early stages of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.

In the new plan, the U.S. Joint Contracting Command in Iraq wrote, “The U.S. needs to communicate effectively with our strategic audiences (i.e. Iraqi, pan-Arabic, International, and U.S. audiences) to gain widespread acceptance of [U.S. and Iraqi government] core themes and messages.”

The announcement of this psy-ops campaign comes at a time when the United States’ media watchdog, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), has begun looking into allegations that the Pentagon trained retired military personnel to promote the war policies of the Bush administration in U.S. media outlets.

U.S. law, under the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, prohibits tax money being spent on directing propaganda at U.S. audiences.

The probe follows a May 2008 New York Times investigation which suggested that TV stations and networks in the U.S. may have violated two provisions of the 1934 Communications Act, which compels media outlets to identify any ties between its analysts and the Pentagon.

The Lincoln Group

Meanwhile, a 2006 probe by the Pentagon’s inspector general found that media work completed in Iraq by one of the new contract’s recipients – the Lincoln Group – during 2005 was “improperly supervised but legal.” Part of the contract with Lincoln Group was for placing “faux” news stories in Iraqi newspapers.

According to the inspector general, the Lincoln Group produced news items ignoring anything negative about the U.S. occupation, which they paid to be published in Iraqi media without sourcing.

Then Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told reporters that his initial reaction to the anonymous pay-to-publish program was, “Gee, that’s not what we ought to be doing.”

The U.S. military hid its involvement in the Lincoln Group, which in 2005 – under the name Iraqex – produced pro-U.S. military stories with headlines like “Iraqis Insist on Living Despite Terrorism.”

‘Information superiority’

The media group also promoted an aggressive advertising and PR campaign that included a bid to convince the Iraqi and U.S. public that Iraqi troops played a vital role in the 2004 effort to clear the insurgent stronghold of Fallujah.

A strategy document obtained by ABC News revealed the Lincoln Group was seeking to promote the “strength, integrity and reliability of Iraqi forces during the fight for Falujah.”

Military analysts suggest a small number of Iraqi troops present was only minimally involved in the fighting.

At the time of the 2006 probe into the Lincoln Group’s activities in Iraq, one PR consultant with experience in the private intelligence sector told The Independent, “Doctrinally, this is all part of what the military calls information superiority. It is part of the plan for what they call, rather upsettingly, full-spectrum dominance. The truth is that it is just propaganda. And there has always been propaganda in a war. And this is a war, so … thus runs the thinking.”

Officials maintain that placing news items in Iraqi newspapers are now a minor part of the operation, with public service announcements and media monitoring taing up the bulk of the media activities in the new Media War Plan.

But the Washington Post reported that on Aug. 21, the day before bids on the new contract were closed, the solicitation was reissued to replace repeated references to information and psychological operations with the term “media services.”

A lengthy list of “deliverables” under the new contract proposal includes “print columns, press statements, press releases, response-to-query, speeches and . . . opinion editorials”; radio broadcasts “in excess of 300 news stories” monthly and 150 each on sports and economic themes; and 30- and 60-minute broadcast documentary and entertainment series.
Other media consultants are being contracted to conduct polls and focus groups to monitor Iraqi attitudes under a separate 3-year $45 million contract.

The Iraqi government has little input on U.S. operations, although U.S. officials say they have encouraged Iraqis to be more aggressive in molding public support.

h/t: A PRIORI

What the Drive by Media not telling you about Afghanistan

Banditry has always been a big problem in Afghanistan.

There has never been an effective national police force, and army operations merely caused the bandits to scatter back to their villages.

The basic problem is that there is not one Afghanistan, but hundreds. Each tribe and warlord has its own army which polices its neighborhood. Everything outside that area is considered potentially hostile territory. Men are free to go outside the tribal area and become bandits. Loot taken in battle (or armed robbery) has always been a big deal in Pushtun tribal culture.

So while most Afghans can understand the usefulness of keeping the main road from Kabul to Kandahar open, many of those same Afghans condone their kinsmen robbing people on that highway, as long as it's done to "strangers" (not from our tribe or, even better, foreigners.)

While a lot of Afghans, especially those living in urban areas, try to get away from these medieval attitudes, the majority of those in the countryside are more traditional in their attitudes. This is where a lot of the violence comes from.

Journalists tend to blame it all on the "Taliban," but in fact, most of it is just those gun totting country boys doing what they've always done. More are on the payroll of some drug gang, than a Taliban outfit.

Life would be so much easier, so the conventional wisdom goes, if peace could be obtained by just destroying the "Taliban." But the real enemy is a set of cultural attitudes that aid and abet the lawlessness. It's a much more elusive target.

Cities like Kabul have become very different parts of Afghanistan. You see lots of women without veils (even as Western media report "Taliban terror creeping into Kabul"), and men without beards. Videos and music are freely available, as are alcoholic drinks.

A lot of these city slickers are fresh from the country, where the restrictive lifestyle of "tradition" continues to drive the more adventurous away. This is the sort of thing that offends tribal and religious leaders. These guys don't want change, because it tends to mean less power and money for them. That's why the Taliban has such a following in the countryside, and not in the cities.

News reports about Pakistani troops exchanging fire with NATO and U.S. helicopters at the border appear to be more stories than news. Many of the border guards (a force recruited from local tribes) are pro-Taliban (or on the Taliban payroll), and quick to fire on aircraft and any armed men they are not familiar with.

That's been going on for decades, and was the cause of tension with the Russians in the 1980s.

Real violence between Pakistan and the United States is unlikely, because the U.S. is the major financial and military supplier for Pakistan. Thus without U.S. support, military upgrades don't happen and the economy tanks. Religion is one thing, defense and economics are something else (that is more important to more Pakistanis).

Meanwhile, the government makes the right noises about "defending Pakistan's borders" while doing nothing to actually interfere with American operations on either side of the border.

Over 20,000 Pushtuns have fled from Pakistan into Afghanistan to avoid the violence between Taliban gunmen and the Pakistani army.

The Pakistani Taliban are under attack in several areas (Waziristan, Swat Valley and Bajaur) and losing in all of them. The head of the Pakistani Taliban has just died, after being ill for several months, leaving behind a power struggle. The Pakistani Taliban is in disarray and falling apart. This is being felt in Afghanistan, where fewer "volunteers" are coming across to help out the Taliban there.

In the face of this, the Afghan Taliban say they will keep fighting throughout the Winter. NATO responds by announcing another Winter offensive. This will get interesting, because NATO forces are more mobile in Winter.

Traditionally, Afghans stay indoors during the Winter. Getting a chill can be fatal, and the rain, snow and ice make it difficult to get around.

The government has again openly called for Taliban leader Mullah Omar to come negotiate with the government. This comes in the wake of several years worth of successful negotiations with lower level Taliban leaders.

Many of these guys have left the Taliban as a result. There are also reports, denied by the government, that Saudi Arabia is sponsoring secret peace talks between the government and the Taliban.

One has to ask, why would the Taliban want to negotiate? Put simply, while the drug gangs are doing well (despite heroin production falling 20 percent from last year), the Taliban are on everyone's hit list, and are taking a lot of hits.

Now defeated al Qaeda operatives are moving in from Iraq and elsewhere, and blowing people up. That generates more hostility than support, and this hurts the Taliban as well.

Within the Taliban, a debate is on over how to deal with the lack of progress. The Taliban have been able to generate more violence, and dire headlines in the West, but not much else.

True believers are getting discouraged.

U.S. and NATO commanders believe they can largely shut down the Taliban and al Qaeda if they have some more troops. The U.S. has agreed to send three more brigades next year. NATO nations, urged on by France, are trying to muster more troops for Afghanistan.

By next year, changes in Pakistan, and growing attacks on Afghan drug gangs are expected to weaken the Taliban even more.

The new government in Pakistan is behind the recent army offensives against the Taliban, and has just replaced the head of their intelligence agency, the ISI, which originally invented the Taliban back in the 1990s.

The ISI has long been full of Islamic conservatives, but the new head is different. How different will become apparent by early next year.

Lessons From A Century Of Army Building

Iraq is not the first time the U.S. has helped a third world nation build a new army from scratch.

It was done earlier in Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, South Korea and the Philippines. All of these efforts resulted in more effective forces, and those nations acquired useful military traditions that persist to the present.

But none of them became close of the U.S. military in capability. The problem was that all of them were heavily influenced by the local culture, and usually not for the better.

All of the Latin American forces spent most of their time propping up military dictators. Same thing happened in the Philippines and South Korea, although in both those cases, there was an eventual transition to democracy. Only the South Koreans became a military force close to the U.S. in capabilities. The Philippines has some first rate units.

The lesson from all this is that building a new army for a country does not change any of the local customs that favor dictators over democracy. No one has yet come up with a perfect formula for installing democracy. You can encourage it, but you can't make it appear, and sustain itself. Building a better army is easy, compared to eliminating the social, economic and religious customs that work against the establishment of democracy.

All this is a big deal within the U.S. Army, where history is considered a valuable tool for trying to make nation building work. That has produced lots of new ideas, but few new solutions.

Hoo-ah: Petraeus v. Obama: The Truth About the Surge

Vets for Freedom today released a new ad -- "Petraeus vs. Obama" -- fourth in a series asking for political leadership to acknowledge the truth about the surge.

The ad highlights Senator Obama's refusal to acknowledge that the surge in Iraq was successful, despite countless reports from General Petraeus that we have made significant progress.

The ad encourages Congress to support the current surge resolutions that give recognition to the strategy of the surge and honor our troops that have made that strategy a success.

Obama discourages troop negotiations for personal political

Obama attempted to interfere against the interests of the United States. He can ask all the questions he wants, but when Obama started pressing IRAQ officials to stop negotiations with the executive branch — in other words, break one level of diplomatic contact and freeze a military alliance in time of war — that crossed a line and clearly violated the Logan Act !

It also makes clear that Obama would do anything to get elected, even harm diplomatic relations between the US and an ally.

September 15, 2008

CONTACT: communications@mafpac.org

PRO-TROOP PAC CONDEMNS OBAMA ATTEMPTS
TO STOP U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

DISGRACEFUL ACTION TAKEN IN IRAQ FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE!

(SACRAMENTO) -- Move America Forwards political action committee, MAF Freedom PAC, today condemned Barack Obama for putting his own political objectives ahead of the safety of U.S. military personnel in Iraq.

Iraqi government sources have revealed to the New York Post that Presidential candidate Barack Obama demanded Iraqi officials stop negotiations with the Bush Administration to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. Fearful that the success in Iraq would harm his political aspirations, Obama sought to keep U.S. troops in Iraq so he can continue attacking the Bush Administration for not imposing a timetable for withdrawal.

If these allegations prove to be true, it should be the end of the Obama campaign, asserted MAF Freedom PAC Chairman, Melanie Morgan.

Obama should have the decency to recognize that he lacks the moral character to serve as Commander-in-Chief, and he should withdraw from the ticket. I have never heard of any candidate deliberately trying to get Americans killed to prove their point.

According to the New York Post story, not only did Obama seek to get the Iraqis to stop negotiating with Americans on the troop drawdown, he also tried to bully General David Petraeus to agree to a hard withdrawal date.

The hypocrisy of Barack Obama to say in the United States that he wants a speedier troop withdrawal date, while telling the Iraqis to stop negotiating is appalling. Even supporters of a quicker U.S. withdrawal must be sickened by his conduct in Iraq. If there was ever a candidate who has demonstrated the lack of character and leadership to represent the United States in foreign affairs, it is Barack Obama, Morgan concluded.

MAF Freedom PAC is the political action arm of Move America Forward , the nations largest pro-troop organization. The patriotic group is led by San Francisco pro-troop activist and renowned radio & television personality, Melanie Morgan.

HOO-ah: Curse Of Competent Officers

Eight years of efforts to create new armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq has reminded American military and civilian leaders that culture makes a big difference in determining the military capabilities of a nation.

This not a politically correct, which is why decades of U.S. Army Special Forces experience pointing this out, never took root in the Pentagon. But now the truth of this unpleasant reality has to be confronted.

As Special Forces operators have noted for decades, while they trained soldiers in foreign countries, not every culture absorbed their lessons the same way.

The Special Forces are a unique organization. A large part of their training is learning all about foreign cultures. The Special Forces training services provides these Special Forces operators with valuable immersion in the cultures they study.

What the Special Forces have learned is that military effectiveness tends to vary according to the economic success of a culture.

In other words, those nations that have a thriving economy, tend to be capable of absorbing the Special Forces training and becoming very effective soldiers.

The critical factor, though, is not temperament of the troops, but the abilities of the NCOs (sergeants) and officers. As the old saying goes, "there are no bad troops, only bad officers."

This was demonstrated in the 18th and 19th centuries, as European nations established colonial empires in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Everywhere they went, they created local military forces. They trained the troops they same way they trained their own, but using European officers and NCOs.

Eventually, they developed local NCOs and officers, but this took years. You can train an illiterate local guy to be a competent infantryman in a few months. But you can't create effective military units with these guys unless you have good NCOs and officers.

Since the local leadership tended to be corrupt, obsessed with social status (rather than performance) or simply not interested in the working that hard (and long) to become a Western quality officer or NCO, the Europeans provided their own people to do the job, until some of the local worthies could be persuaded to accept the Western way of doing things.

So the Special Forces have long known that training the low level troops is easy, it's developing equally competent officers and NCOs that is really difficult.

If the local leadership were as dedicated and civic minded as in the West, the local economy would be prosperous, and the government would be competent and effective. And even when effective officers and NCOs are selected and trained, you have another problem.

These military leaders soon realize that they are the only competent and effective leaders in the country.

Unless the rest of the culture shapes up, you start down the road of alternating military dictatorship (as the officers take over the government, "for the good of the country") and chaotic civilian rule (which screws things up and triggers another military takeover).

This goes on until the civilian leaders realize that the ancient customs of tribalism, corruption and, well, you know the rest, won't work in the modern world.

Even the royal family in Saudi Arabia (and several other surviving monarchies) recognize this, and are trying to reform their cultures to create a population capable of providing effective leadership for the economy, government and military. These aristocrats know that, at best, they will get a constitutional monarchy (as found in several European nations, like Britain, Spain, Sweden and many others).

At worse, they will get a republic or dictatorship, and a monarchy in exile.

But the alternative is falling behind economically, and eventually becoming a poverty stricken backwater.

HOO-AH: Airport 'grandmas' help MND-B Soldiers 'kiss' their EML goodbye

The trouble with any vacation is that for all the build up, for all the anticipation, for all the excitement, it is over almost as soon as it begins.

For service members, this reality is even more apparent and, in most cases, even more difficult. In fact, going on environmental morale leave presents one of the biggest contradictions deployed troops can face.

On the one hand, troops have the joy of going home to see their loved ones; and on the other hand, they have the sad day that comes 15 to 18 days later with their departure.

Two wonderful constants for the troops transitioning back home on leave or returning to the Middle East are the smiling faces and warm hugs of Connie and Linda, who are there to greet the traveling Soldiers as they pass through the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. Thanks to their unbridled enthusiasm, the trip back to the desert isn't completely cheerless.

"Linda and I try to have fun with them at send-off as they just left their loved ones and need some cheering up," said Constance "Connie" Carman, a native of Bedford, Texas. "We listen to their problems as some go back with heavy hearts," she added.

Carman and her friend, Linda Tinnerman, a native of Grand Prairie, Texas, have been welcoming and saying goodbye to troops passing through the DFW International Airport for the past three and a half years.

"We call ourselves the 'Official Huggin' and Kissin' Grandmas,'" Tinnerman said.

"This is because the troops have a tendency to call us grandma, and I love each and every one of them like my very own grandchildren," Carman added.

The two got involved at the airport after watching a video on the leave program and after the terminal's director informed them about the "Welcome Home Our Heroes Program." Since that time, and nearly every day for the last four years, the ladies have volunteered their time, their devotion and their hearts to the serving men and women they have encountered. They leave an indelible mark on most, if not all of them.

"I met them on my EML last deployment," said Sgt. 1st Class Michael Miles, a native of Belleville, Ill., who serves as plans and operations noncommissioned officer, division chaplain's office, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division - Baghdad. "You can see it on the faces of the Soldiers as they go in and out of the airport either going on leave or to return to their battle space," he added, speaking on the positive impact the ladies have on troops.

Initially, the ladies were only allowed to greet the troops as they arrived on the "Freedom" flights. Our Soldiers quickly came to expect an amazing reception of thanks and gratitude that the "grannies" spearheaded.

"Linda and I are the geriatric cheerleaders, greeting them with pom poms," Carman said.

Receiving the troops as they came in on leave, however, was not completely satisfying for the two. As a result, Carman and Tinnerman made the choice to join the United Service Organizations and are now able to not only welcome the troops home, but are also able to be with them in the secure departure terminal while they wait to return to the Middle East.

"We joined the USO, and this enables us to be with them on the secure side prior to their leaving," said Carman. "We are assigned to load our carts with goodies, such as food stuffs, water, toiletries, books, pillows, cell phones, and we get a chance to really visit and take our pictures," she added.

As the War on Terrorism has gone on, the "grannies" have remained steadfast and loyal in their support of all the troops and have remained in constant contact with a lot of them.

"I have been in touch with them for over three years, and they always meet me at the airport," said Master Sgt. Billy Arnold, a native of Turlock, Calif., who serves as the noncommissioned officer in charge, division chaplain's office, 4th Inf. Div. "They are very loving and caring ladies," he added.

The love that these ladies show keeps Soldiers smiling and helps them cope with their return to their missions.

"Whether you are for the war or against the war, Democrat or Republican, whatever, it doesn't make any difference as these young men are there sacrificing their lives for us. They are giving up more than people realize," Carman said.

"One doesn't have to support the war to support our troops. They are doing their job, and we need to show our support to them and thank them every day of our lives for what they do for us," Tinnerman added.

This constant show of support and thanks is something that neither of the two ladies seem intent on stopping anytime in the foreseeable future.

"I will do it until the last one comes home or I am no longer physically able to," Carman said.

"I will support these troops and keep thanking them forever for their service and sacrifice. I am very proud of them and appreciate what they do, and there has not been a time when I thought about giving up on them," added Tinnerman.

While some people may come and visit troops seeking notoriety or other means of popularity, the benefit these two ladies get from serving is purely from the heart.

"So many of my 'adopted' grandkids tell me they feel like movie stars or very special because of the wonderful treatment they have gotten here. It is almost unbelievable to them that a total stranger could come up to them and give them a hug and tell them that they are loved," said Carman.

"I just love being around the troops. I love to talk and joke with them and laugh. Laughter is good medicine, and I like to send them off with a smile on their faces," Tinnerman added.

The connection the ladies share with the troops is apparent and impossible to fake. Both of them come from military backgrounds and both of their deceased husbands served in the Army. It is likely that this connection continues to draw them to serve.

"I have had so many memorable experiences, and I look through my pictures periodically and go down memory lane. Just being with them is a memorable experience," said Carman.

"I wish that I could have touched more troops as I know that there are plenty out there that don't have family support, and I want them to know that they are loved and appreciated," Tinnerman added.

Their commitment and dedication will continue to be appreciated by the servicemembers, and their efforts will definitely not fall on deaf hearts or blind minds.

"I want to thank (Carman and Tinnerman) for (their) love and dedication in supporting us. (They) touch the heart of many men and women who flow in and out of Dallas International Airport. I know. I was one of them," Miles said.

Though returning from leave can be taxing on the emotions of troops, the ladies are making it at the very least more bearable. Their message to the service members they have met, and even those they haven't, is poignant in its degree of sincerity.

"I will never forget how much we owe our troops - so many lives lost, so many lives interrupted, never to be the same again," Tinnerman said. "I do love them with all my heart. I will continue to support them in all their efforts wherever they are, and I am proud of their dedication and commitment," she added.

"I hope you will soon be home in the arms of your loved ones, and I am sending you a great big bunch of hugs," Carman added. "Do you feel them?"

It is certain that they do, and it is certain that the grannies' dedication to the Soldiers' welfare makes their environment, their morale and their leave easier to embrace.

Iraq Army Buys LAV 25

Iraq is buying 392 LAV (Light Armor Vehicle) 25s. These are the same eight wheeled vehicles used by the U.S. Marine Corps. The LAV series are a licensed version of the Swiss MOWAG Piranha. This model is in use by many other countries. The Canadian version, the LAV III, was the basis of the U.S. Stryker armored vehicle, which has been used heavily in Iraq, and apparently has impressed the Iraqis.

The LAV 25 is a 13 ton vehicle equipped with a turret mounted 25mm automatic cannon and a coaxial 7.62mm machine-gun. On top of the turret is another machine-gun. The 25mm cannon has a range of 3,000 meters, and has proved very useful in combat. Some of the Iraqi LAV-25s will be the turretless command or ambulance models, but 90 percent will be the infantry carrier version (crew of three, plus seats for six passengers). Top speed is 100 kilometers an hour. These vehicles cost about a million dollars each.

Pentagon mounts 2.2 billion dollar push for war zone surveillance

The Pentagon is mounting a 2.2 billion dollar effort to dramatically expand surveillance of Iraq and Afghanistan by manned and unmanned spy planes, Pentagon officials said Thursday.

Congress has approved the reprogramming of 1.2 billion dollars in defense funds to rapidly enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection in the war zones, said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.

"This funding is required and been requested to increase and enhance the ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities in Centcom," he said referring to the US Central Command, which is responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan.

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates also has signed off on a follow-on package worth another billion dollars that will add analysts and infrastructure to sustain the expansion, as well as additional ISR assets, Whitman and other officials said.

Gates created a special task force in April to come up with ways to meet an exploding demand from commanders for drones and aircraft capable of providing real time, full motion video coverage of the battlefield.

He complained at the time that he had been wrestling for months to get more assets to the theater, but "because people were stuck in old ways of doing business, it's been like pulling teeth."

The aim is reported to be to increase the number of 24-hour-a-day surveillance patrols from about a dozen a day a year ago to 44.

A Pentagon official said combat air patrols by MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft currently number 27 a day, and the goal is to have 33 a day by the end of the year.

But it turns out that the quickest way to increase coverage has been to outfit manned C-12 aircraft, a twin engine turbo prop built by Beechcraft, with advanced surveillance sensors that provide full motion video.

The Pentagon will field 21 of the aircraft in fiscal 2008, and plans to acquire 30 more in 2009, Pentagon officials said.

The reprogrammed monies also "will assist our efforts to grow the UAV capability in such platforms as Shadow, Predator, Reaper, Raven and Hunter," Whitman said, referring to drones operated by the army, air force and marines.

"It will allow us to buy additional ScanEagle detachments, funding contractors to be able to have additional orbits of various platforms, infrastructure improvements to be able to operate some of these things," he said.

A Pentagon official said ScanEagle, a small surveillance drone operated by the marines, will be the only new unmanned aircraft bought with the reprogrammed money.

But manning is being increased to maximize the use of drones like Predator and Reaper, and contractors are being hired to operate more Shadows, a low flying unmanned aircraft used by the army, he said.

Where Al Qaeda Excels

The movement of al Qaeda's main effort from Iraq to Pakistan does not involve large numbers, and the numbers have declined since the terrorists began urging new recruits to head for Pakistan. For several years, about a hundred foreign volunteers (usually for suicide type attacks) entered Iraq each month, brought in via an al Qaeda network in some Arab and European countries. Money is collected there, often under the guise of an Islamic charity, to pay for airfare, fees (some of the operatives along the way are basically mercenaries) and bribes (to get past border controls of countries trying to stop this traffic).

Now, only a few dozen al Qaeda recruits are getting to Pakistan each month. It's more expensive to get to Pakistan, compared to Iraq, and the government does not make it easy. There's also been a decline in cash contributions. Al Qaeda was beaten in Iraq, after years of saying they were winning. Al Qaedas mass murder campaign in Iraq killed mostly Moslems, and this was unpopular among potential donors. The violence in Iraq used the idea of "al Qaeda" to unite many very different Islamic militant groups, and the same concept is being used in Pakistan. Here there are tribal militias, operating as vigilantes against real or imagined sins against Islam. In the cities there are many different groups. Some are at war with another Islamic faction, others simply wish to impose their religious beliefs and practices on all other Moslems. But many do not want to be associated with al Qaeda, because of the groups reputation of violence towards Moslem women and children.

Local politicians (in Pakistan and Afghanistan) would like to blame much of the unrest on outsiders, and al Qaeda certainly fits the bill. But al Qaeda is a relatively small operation, and most of the Islamic radicals in the area are locals. Using religion as a tool to gain political and military advantage is an old problem, especially in Moslem countries. In general, Moslems like to play down this aspect of their religion, preferring to call Islam, "the religion of peace." But too many Moslem clerics, and ambitious politicians, are all too willing to exploit the militant and violent aspects of Islam. This is especially true along the Pakistan-Afghan border. But al Qaeda is a much smaller player in the region than its media coverage wound indicate. Al Qaeda is much better at playing the press than it is at doing anything else.