Why 21st Century Warfare Is Different

by James Dunnigan

After ten years of fighting, the war on terror has caused 51,600 American military casualties (6,200 dead and 45,400 wounded). This includes a small number of CIA, State Department and other agency personnel. Over 99 percent are Department of Defense. Not all the casualties were from combat, with 21 percent of the deaths from non-combat causes. In World War II that was 25 percent. Iraq fighting accounted for 71 percent of the deaths and 70 percent of the wounded. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, operations in dozens of other countries represented 2.5 percent of deaths, but about 71 percent of these were from non-combat causes. 

The first 21st century war was quite different than the 20th century conflicts. For one thing, far fewer Americans are being killed or wounded in combat. And fewer and fewer of those who are wounded die. It’s a continuing trend. Last year, eight percent of the wounded died, compared to eleven percent in 2009. There are several reasons for more troops surviving battle wounds (and injuries from accidents). An obvious cause is body armor. Improvements over the past decade, in terms of design and bullet resistance, account for about 20 percent of the decline in casualties. There's a down side to this, as the body armor is heavier and cumbersome. This reduces a soldier's mobility, and increases casualties a bit (and saves some enemy lives as well.)

Another major factor is medical care, which has gotten much better, quicker and faster. Not only are procedures more effective, but badly wounded soldiers get to the operating table more quickly. Medics now have capabilities that, during Vietnam, only surgeons possessed. Movement of casualties to an operating room is much faster now, partly because of better transportation, but also because of more efficient methods, and operating rooms that are placed closer to the battlefield.

Another major factor is the change in what caused casualties. Explosions (like roadside bombs) are less likely to cause fatal wounds. For example, currently 12.9 percent of bullet wounds are fatal, compared to 7.3 percent for bombs and 3.5 percent for RPGs (and grenades in general). The enemy in Afghanistan prefers to use roadside bombs, because U.S. troops are much superior in a gun battle. All this contributed to the changing the ratio of wounded-to-killed, that was 6-to-1 in Vietnam, to 10-1 now.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, there has also been a dramatic reduction in combat deaths compared to Vietnam, and previous 20th century wars. The death rate (adjusting for the number of troops involved) in Iraq was a third of what it was in Vietnam. It's even lower in Afghanistan. There was such a massive reduction in combat deaths that the percentage of deaths that were from non-combat causes actually went up. For example, there were 47,359 (81.4 percent) combat deaths in Vietnam, and 10,797 (18.6 percent) from non-combat causes. In Iraq it is 80 percent and 20 percent. In Afghanistan it is 70 percent and 30 percent. The ratio of dead to wounded is also different in Iraq (1 dead for 7.2 wounded) compared to Afghanistan (1 dead for 8.1 wounded)

There are also differences in the types of casualties. For example, in Vietnam, bullets caused 38 percent of the deaths. In Iraq, it was only 19 percent, and 27 percent in Afghanistan. The Iraqis are notoriously bad shots, even though the urban battle space in Iraq was very similar to Vietnam. There is more of a tradition of marksmanship in Afghanistan, despite (or probably because of) the frequently longer distances involved. The superior body armor has made life much harder for enemy marksmen, as chest shots are now frequently useless and fatal head shots are very difficult.

In Vietnam, 15.7 percent of U.S. combat deaths were caused by IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), while in Iraq and Afghanistan it peaked at about 60 percent, and then declined. Casualties were avoided, or made less severe with the development of special armored vehicles (MRAPs) that reduced the impact of the explosives. The roadside bomb is a much less effective weapon, a loser's weapon, because it kills more civilians than enemy troops and played a major role in turning the locals against the Iraqi terrorists and Afghan Taliban.

Aircraft related deaths (from crashes) were 14.6 percent of the combat fatalities in Vietnam, while it was only a few percent in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current helicopters were built with Vietnam experience in mind, and are more resistant to damage and safer to crash land in. Ground vehicle related deaths were two percent in Vietnam, but more than double that in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the ground vehicle deaths were non-combat related. That's because from World War II to the present, the U.S. armed forces put huge numbers of trucks and other vehicles on roads (often poorly maintained, or shot up), at all hours, in all weather and with drivers fighting fatigue. There being a war on, the vehicles often proceeded at unsafe speeds.

What made the experience so different today, versus past wars? It was a combination of things. The most important difference is that the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are fighting smarter. While the Vietnam era troops were representative of the general population, the post-Vietnam era army is all-volunteer and highly selective. The troops are smarter, healthier and better educated than the general population. During the last three decades, new attitudes have developed throughout the army (which always got most of the draftees). The army, so to speak, has become more like the marines (which was always all-volunteer, and more innovative as a result). This ability to quickly analyze and adapt gets recognized by military historians, and other armies, but not by the media. It also saves lives in combat.

This innovation has led to better training, tactics and leadership. Smarter troops means smarter and more capable leaders, from the sergeants leading fire teams (five men) to the generals running the whole show. Smarter troops leads to tactics constantly adapting to changes on the battlefield. The better tactics, and smarter fighting, has been the biggest reason for the lower death rate.

Better weapons and equipment have made U.S. troops less vulnerable to attack. GPS guided weapons have made the biggest difference. There are now GPS guided bombs, shells and rockets. This enables troops to hit a target with the first shot, and be closer to the explosion (the better to move right in and take care of armed enemy survivors). Another benefit is much fewer civilian casualties. In both Iraq and Vietnam, the enemy frequently used civilians as human shields, and the better trained American troops were able to cope with this in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And then there was night vision gear. This first appeared during Vietnam, but in four decades, the stuff has gotten better, lighter and cheaper. Every soldier has night vision now, as do most combat vehicles. There are also better radios, better uniforms, even better field rations. It all made a difference.

Then there was the Internet, which enabled the troops to get in touch with each other. This made a big difference. Not just for the grunts, but also for the NCOs and officers. Each community had different problems and solutions. With the Internet, they could easily discuss the problems, and quickly share the solutions. The troops did this by themselves, and it was up to the military to play catch up. Life-saving tips are passed around with unprecedented speed. This made a major difference in combat, where better tactics and techniques save lives.

Computers and video games had an impact as well. The draft ended about the same time that personal computers and video games began to show up. So there have been three decades of troops who grew up with both. It was the troops who led the effort to computerize many military activities, and video games evolved into highly realistic training simulators. The automation eliminated a lot of drudge work, while the simulators got troops up to speed before they hit the combat zone. Computers also made possible doing things with information, especially about the enemy, that was not possible before. A lot of troops understand operations research and statistical analysis, and they use it to good effect. Research has also shown that heavy use of video games trains the user to make decisions faster. That's a lifesaver in combat.

UAVs and Trackers took a lot of the fog out of war. For nearly a century, the troops on the ground depended on someone in an airplane or helicopter to help them sort out who was where. In the last decade, the guy in the air has been replaced by robots. UAVs, especially the hand held ones every infantry company has, now give the ground commander his own recon aircraft. He controls it, and it works only for him. Combat commanders now have a top-down view of his troops, and the enemy. This has made a huge difference, creating some fundamental changes in the way captains and colonels command their troops. For higher commanders, the GPS transponders carried by most combat vehicles, provides a tracking system that shows a real-time picture, on a laptop screen, of where all your troops are. This takes a lot of uncertainty out of command.

Living conditions enabled troops in combat to be more alert and effective. Some civilians think air-conditioned sleeping quarters for combat troops, and lots of other goodies in base camps, is indulgent. It is anything but. Getting a good night's sleep can be a life-saver for combat soldiers, and AC makes that possible. Showers, Internet links to home and good chow do wonders for morale, especially for guys getting shot at every day. Good morale means a more alert, and capable, soldier. The combat units often go weeks, or months, without these amenities, but the knowledge that these goodies are there, and eventually to be enjoyed, takes some of the sting out of all the combat stress. The rate of combat fatigue in Iraq has been much lower than in Vietnam, or any previous war.

The enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan was not as effective as the Vietnamese were. The Taliban are more effective than the Iraqis, but not by much. All this is partly this is due to cultural factors, partly because in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were sending trained soldiers south. The North Vietnamese also had commandos ("sappers"), who, while small in number, caused a lot of anxiety, and casualties, among U.S. troops. The irregular (Viet Cong) troops in South Vietnam, were largely gone after 1968 (as a result of the failed Tet Offensive), but even these fighters tended to be more deadly than the average Iraqi gunman or Afghan warrior. The Iraqi troops have had a dismal reputation for a long time, but they can still be deadly. Just not as deadly as their Vietnamese counterparts. The lower fighting capability of the Iraqis saved lots of American lives, but got far more Iraqis (including civilians) killed. The Afghans have a more fearsome reputation, but in practice they are no match for professional infantry. And conventional wisdom to the contrary, they have been beaten many times in the past. They are blessed, after a fashion, to live in the place that is not worth conquering. So whoever defeats them, soon leaves.

Finally, there is the data advantage. The military (especially the army, which has collected, since Vietnam, massive amounts of information on how each soldier died) has detailed records of soldier and marine casualties. The army, in particular, collects and analyzes this data, and then passes on to the troops new tactics and techniques derived from this analysis. The army restricts access to the data, as it can provide the enemy with useful information on how effective they are. Some basic data is made public, but the details will be a locked up for decade or more. Studying this data is a full time job for many people in the military, and there is a constant stream of suggestions resulting from this analysis, and those suggestions often turn into yet another small decline in combat deaths.

Rangers Do It With Less Dying

by James Dunnigan

The U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment’s motto is “Rangers lead the way” and the 3,500 members of the regiment have been in constant action over the last decade doing just that. During a decade of action, the regiment has suffered 412 combat casualties, including 32 dead. This is less than half the casualty rate suffered by non-SOCOM (Special Operations Command) combat units, and is the result of better training and leadership in the ranger battalions. In particular, the rangers developed more aggressive and effective techniques for treating combat casualties, which substantially reduced the death rate. The rest of the army has adopted many of these techniques.

The Rangers usually deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan for three months at a time, and serve as special muscle for important operations. The rangers, who belong to SOCOM, often act as backup for Special Forces or Navy SEALs, but also carry out a lot of operations on their own. During a typical three month tour, the Rangers might average 3-4 missions (patrols, raids, etc) a day, each one resulting in 3-4 enemy killed and 7-8 captured (along with large quantities of weapons and documents). Other deployments might be more, or less, intense. Often the Rangers are brought in to help Special Forces with searches for Islamic terrorists. In these cases the Rangers will spend most of their time patrolling, or on stakeout, noting everything and developing a web of information that will catch the bad guys.

Although a Ranger Battalion rarely has more than 600 troops, on a typical tour, 15-20 percent receive medals (mostly Bronze Star medals with V device), while most will receive either Combat Action Badges (to recognize non-infantry troops who have spent at least a month in combat) and Combat Infantryman’s Badges (for infantry who have spent at least a month in combat). For each tour, 30-40 percent of the troops are in combat for the first time. After one of these deployments, a Battalion will usually spend 3-6 months at their base in the United States, before heading off for another overseas deployment (usually to Afghanistan, or somewhere else.)

The three Battalions of Rangers are commandos in the classic (World War II) sense. They are light infantry who are trained to perform many of the missions the Special Forces normally take care of (raids, pilot and equipment recovery) plus something the Special Forces normally avoids; light infantry operations (using a several dozen or more troops for an operation.)

The Rangers are America's largest emergency response military unit (the smaller one is Delta Force) that is ready to fly off to an overseas trouble spot in less than 24 hours. In peacetime, one of the three Ranger battalions was always assigned to this duty (spending one month being ready go on 18 hours notice) and two months off (doing intensive training.)


The 75th Ranger Regiment headquarters is at Fort Benning, Georgia. The 1st Battalion of the 75th Regiment (1/75) is stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, the 2nd Battalion (2/75) is at Fort Lewis, Washington and the 3rd Battalion (3/75) is at Fort Benning, Georgia.

But "the Rangers" are more than the 75th Ranger Regiment. There is also the TRADOC (Training And Doctrine Command) Ranger Training Brigade, which consists of three more ranger battalions (the 4th, 5th and 6th) who train those who wish to join the ranger regiment as well those who are there just to become qualified as a ranger. This is an important distinction that is often misunderstood. 


There is a difference between those who are "tabbed Rangers" (authorized to wear the Ranger tab on their uniform) and those who are simply members of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Any physically fit infantryman (and troops in other job categories the Rangers need) can apply to join the 75th Ranger Regiment if they have already gone through parachute training ("jump school"). They will have to pass a physical fitness test first, as the standards at the 75th Ranger Regiment are very high and there's no point sending any volunteers if they are not up to the minimum requirements. Officers and NCOs in the Ranger Regiment, however, must have taken and passed ranger training.

The Rangers encourage promising new recruits to volunteer to try for Ranger duty from the beginning. That way, the new recruit goes to the two week jump school right after 14 weeks of basic and advanced infantry training and is ready to try out for the rangers. This involves eight week long RASP (Ranger Assessment and Selection Program). About half of the volunteers fail. Those who pass are now members of the 75th Ranger Regiment, but they are not "rangers." How can this be?

Simple, the Ranger training was always meant to identify and train the elite infantry leaders. The purpose of Ranger School, for its first 20 years (until the 1970s), was to try and provide one Ranger NCO per infantry platoon and one Ranger officer per infantry company. That goal proved impossible to attain. There just weren't enough qualified volunteers for the tough training. But young infantry officers, in particular, were encouraged to attend Ranger school. The Ranger tab helped one's promotion prospects enormously. Until the 1990s, Ranger School was open to anyone in the army who could pass the physical qualification test. In practice, the army wanted its hotshot infantry officers and NCOs to attend and eventually anyone not working in, or directly with, the infantry, was not allowed to try out for the school. 


Even so, about 20 percent of attendees are from other services (Marines, SEALs and Air Force Special Operations) and another 20 percent from foreign nations (many of which have their own Ranger schools, some of which are even harder to pass than the U.S. one.)

The Ranger School is a 61 day course designed to identify and train elite infantry leaders. The training goes on for about 19 hours a day, seven days a week. The attrition rate is about 60 percent. The school emphasizes mastery of basic infantry skills and the ability to lead troops under stressful conditions. Students for Ranger School arrive wearing uniforms devoid of rank insignia. Everyone is of equal rank during the 61 days of training, with everyone taking turns leading squad size units of their fellow students in various exercises. The Ranger School program emphasizes resourcefulness, physical toughness and the ability to think clearly while under extreme stress (and lack of sleep.)

Since its formation in 1974, up until September 11, 2001, the ranger regiment actually hadn't seen much action. But that has a lot to do with American political leaders’ reluctance to get involved in overseas military emergencies. And if such action is needed, using fewer troops (as in Delta Force, SEALs or Special Forces) is preferred. The rangers are seen as the ultimate strategic reserve. So when there is something really, really important that can only be taken care of with several hundred very well trained infantry, the rangers were ready to go. Thus in the last decade, the rangers have been heavily involved worldwide, carrying out counter-terror missions that need a bit more skill and daring than the average combat unit could provide.

Hoo-AH: National Airborne Day honors past, present paratroopers

I did not see any Presidential Proclamations
which are usually issued before the event,
and there’s nothing in today Federal Register.

On August 16, 1940, "The United States Army Infantry Board Airborne Test Platoon", performed the first official U.S. Army parachute jump and on August 16, 1942 the 82nd Infantry Division was the first airborne division designated and was renamed the 82nd Airborne Division.

Since then U.S. Airborne troops have played a vital role in World War II, Panama, Grenada, Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This year's event commemorated the 70th anniversary of the Army Parachute Test Platoon's first official jump and the 10th anniversary of the Special Operations Museum in downtown Fayetteville.

Lt. Gen. Dick Seitz, a World War II veteran who fought in the Battle of the Bulge in 1945 and earned a Silver Star, was the event's guest speaker.

In 1967, Seitz commanded the 82nd Airborne Division where he deployed troops to quell riots in Detroit and Washington, D.C. Within 36 hours of notification, he deployed the 3rd Brigade to Vietnam following the Tet Offensive.

Seitz's last assignment before retiring in 1975 was as the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg. He spoke Saturday of the service and sacrifice made by members of the military.

In his remarks, Seitz revisited the origin of today's Army paratrooper. The first jump from an aircraft in flight by members of the test platoon of Airborne infantry was made from a Douglas B-18 over Lawson Field at Fort Benning, Ga., on Aug. 16, 1940.

"Those members of the test platoon were the cream of our Army," Seitz said. "They set the standards. They laid the groundwork for the spirit, for the professionalism we have in our Army."

“Although the environment has changed, our soldiers are still the dedicated soldiers they have always been,” Seitz said.

Other special guests included Lt. Gen. Frank Helmick, the commander of Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps; and Gen. James J. Lindsay, a former commander of Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps.

"Airborne soldiers are a different breed of soldier," Helmick said. "When they take on a task, they go all the way."

In June, the original Iron Mike - the 2,500-pound statue of an 82nd Airborne Division paratrooper - was moved from storage on Fort Bragg and placed at the entrance to the Airborne museum.

On Saturday, Iron Mike's plaque was unveiled. It read:

"In honor of Airborne troopers whose courage, dedication, and traditions make them the world's finest fighting soldiers."

On August 14, 2002 President George W. Bush issued a proclamation to recognize August 16th as “National Airborne Day.”

In his proclamation President Bush states:

“During World War II, Airborne tactics were critical to the success of important missions, including the D-Day invasion at Normandy, the Battle of the Bulge, the invasion of Southern France, and many others.

In Korea and Vietnam, Airborne soldiers played a critical combat role, as well as in later conflicts and peacekeeping operations, including Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans.

Most recently, Airborne forces were vital to liberating the people of Afghanistan from the repressive and violent Taliban regime; and these soldiers con-tinue to serve proudly around the world in the global coalition against terrorism.

Airborne combat continues to be driven by the bravery and daring spirit of sky soldiers. Often called into action with little notice, these forces have earned an enduring reputation for dedication, excellence, and honor. As we face the challenges of a new era, I encourage all people to recognize the contributions of these courageous soldiers to our Nation and the world.”

Two hundred and thirty-five years ago...

Two hundred and thirty-five years ago, the United States Army was established to defend our Nation.

From the Revolutionary War to the current operations taking place around the world, our Soldiers remain Army Strong with a deep commitment to our core values and beliefs.

This 235th birthday commemorates America’s Army – Soldiers, Families and Civilians – who are achieving a level of excellence that is truly Army Strong. Being Army Strong goes beyond physical endurance and mental preparedness.

It encompasses an indomitable spirit, and high ethical and moral values. These are not only desirable traits in a person, but in a Nation that wishes to live up to the ideals and vision of its founders.

We are “America’s Army:
The Strength of the Nation."

Hoo-ah: The importance of social media in the Army

Commentary by Capt. Charles Barrett, 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID


FORT BENNING, Ga. — The Army was still on the sidelines stretching when the gun went off for the social media race.

The entire country was jumping on the Youtube, Facebook, and Twitter bandwagon while the Army “big brother” was just barely opening the razor-sharp jaws that have had a lockdown on internet freedom.

Last year over lunch, the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division’s public affairs team, began to throw out ideas on how to jump start the Army’s social media program. Lt. Col. James Carlisle, Staff Sgt. Natalie Hedrick, Spc. Ben Hutto and Pfc. Erik Anderson had a lot to answer; “How do we get the Directorate of Information Management to give us access to social media sites? Can a dot mil site adequately work as an official site and blog for a unit, or is a dot com the better way to go?

Who is responsible for managing the site once it’s up? What is the current Army policy on social media sites? Is there an Army policy on social media? What operational security considerations should be taken into account? Is this even a good idea?”

Two weeks, Carlisle’s own 100 dollars, and the internet savvyness of 3rd HBCT’s Sgt. Jeremy Gadd, the team was up and running with a unit website and blog, as well as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube accounts. The overwhelming realization came that it wasn’t just a good idea; it was a great idea. The question then became, “How do we take full advantage of everything social media has to offer?”

Capturing every detail of what social media has to offer is a daunting task. Just ask Pfc. Erik Anderson, public affairs specialist for the 3rd HBCT. Anderson is now responsible for maintaining, monitoring, and updating of the brigade’s social media sites. The distribution list for www.hammerpao.com is over 5,000 Soldiers, families and friends; there are close to 1,000 3rd HBCT Facebook fans, and 2,000 Twitter followers. Anderson wasn’t trained at the Defense Information School in Fort Meade, Md., to do this, and none of these new responsibilities are part of his job description as a journalist, yet his efforts are felt across the brigade, mostly by the family members.

The real key to social media sites is they allow for feedback; two-way communication between the command and the internal audience. The command is still putting out information to their internal audience as they have been; only the medium has changed. This new medium allows for the audience to more readily respond. If the command fails to take those responses into account then they’re not really taking advantage of social media.

This is the first major benefit. For the 3rd HBCT the responses received through the social media sites have been incredibly supportive. Unit leaders know they’re on the right track and just need to make a few adjustments. Anderson is the Soldier who collects all the feedback and reports responses to his chain of command. He does all of this on top of his normal duties.

The exchange of information assists the command and its internal audience to fill in some of those information gaps. Through online surveys and website analytics, the unit is now able to collect and track a wide range of data. This data can then be used to tailor to the audience’s needs better; something that never could have been done 10 years ago, or at least not without a lot of heartache. The Defense Information School explains the Army should take more of a “glass house” approach to telling the Army story. The 3rd HBCT PAO team now knows there is no better way to do that than through social media.

Once everyone’s on board with the “glass house” approach, public affairs can take on a whole new attitude with the media. There are companies who are praised for their stellar customer service. They don’t know how to say, “No.” All customer service should be like this, and that’s where public affairs customer service should be when working with the media. Building a relationship with this mindset will enhance the social media information exchange, and will lead to very positive and long-lasting effects.

A word of caution; at some point during the reading of this an intelligence officer cringed. It’s more crucial now than ever before that we as an organization maintain operational security. Social media gives us more opportunity to violate operational security and to a much larger audience. To solve this we don’t need to ban or create stricter policy on social media sites, we need to better enforce the already existing policies.

This security begins at the source, the individual Soldier who blogs at the end of every day in Iraq or Afghanistan. Just as important are the spouses of Soldiers who also have a duty to maintain the security of the unit. If you don’t know what is or is not part of operational security then it is your responsibility to find out before you discuss something on a social media site. There are also concerns of privacy, but a Soldier’s privacy has been and will always be a top priority of public affairs operators. Just because social media changes the way we send stories to our audience, it does not change the way we write or film those stories.

Social media is here to stay, whether anyone else wants it to or not. Networks are always vulnerable to attack. It should be the duty of all Soldiers to recognize the benefits of social media and then protect that resource, just as Soldiers would protect other valuable equipment and military systems.

So, where to go from here? It’s evident there must be a change in the way Public Affairs operates. Although not everything is listed for both sides, it seems evident the benefits of social media far outweigh the risks involved. There isn’t a need to create a military occupational specialty just yet for social media, but Soldiers at the Defense Information School should be getting some training on how to set up and operate these social media sites.

For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the tip of the spear has been held by many. So much improvement has been made in Iraq, despite the violence still present, and it is more crucial now to tell the Army’s story of success. Today, there are a handful of public affair operators, such as Anderson, who are the tip of the spear. If the 3rd HBCT PAO is ever asked, “Capt. Barrett, do you seriously think one Soldier can make a difference in this war?” With a smile and an overwhelming sense of pride for his fellow Soldier, he’ll say, “You bet, and his name is Pvt. 1st Class Erik Anderson.”

Cpt. Charles Barrett, PAO, 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID.

Army modernization project faces uncertain future

If the Army must be ready for both high-intensity combat and low-intensity counterinsurgency, what is to become of the service's main modernization program, the awkwardly named and hugely expensive Future Combat Systems?

With a new administration and a worsening economy, there is unprecedented pressure to trim the complex program -- originally envisioned as an integrated set of armored vehicles and aerial and ground robots, plus a mobile computer network with 95 million lines of code to coordinate their operations.

The idea was first outlined by then-Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki in 1999. The problem then to be solved was how the Army could deploy heavy forces in time to stop, say, Iraqi aggression in Kuwait in 1990 or Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, both situations in which hostile nation-states with Soviet-built tanks were able to move faster than the Pentagon could.

Gen. Shinseki sold the FCS as a rapidly deployable replacement for the Army's main battle tank, the M1 Abrams, which was too heavy to be flown in large numbers to a crisis spot.

The FCS would use advanced technology to cram all of the firepower and protection of 70-ton heavy tanks into 20-ton vehicles light enough to be airlifted en masse to trouble spots worldwide.

Slow, grinding wars against elusive guerrillas were not on the FCS agenda.

But the original vision got one critical part of the future right: Watching urban sprawl envelop the planet, Army planners predicted that the FCS would have to fight its battles in cities. So they outlined an FCS brigade structure that incorporated not only long-range precision weapons to kill enemy tanks but also additional foot soldiers to fight house-to-house, armored personnel carriers to get them to the target under fire, and abundant unmanned systems -- flying drones, crawling robots, and static sensors -- to scope out hidden enemies, with a computerized communications network to coordinate it all.

Those same four components -- armor, infantry, drones, and networks -- have proved vital in city fighting in Iraq. So it might seem that the FCS would be perfect for hybrid warriors.

The problem, however, is that for years the Army has played chicken with Congress over the $160 billion -- some say $200 billion -- FCS program. Capitol Hill chafed at the Army's insistence on treating the array as a single program: a single line item in its budget with a single contract. Lawmakers were also unhappy that the FCS was aimed not at modernizing existing Army units but at creating "FCS brigades" equipped for the most part with Future Combat Systems hardware.

The Army argued that the program's 17 components were too interdependent for legislators to pick and choose and that because the FCS made up so much of the Army's modernization budget, the service had no alternative plan. To put the Army's argument bluntly: Future Combat Systems is too big to fail and too tightly integrated to pick apart, so let us do what we want.

"If FCS were canceled, the Army does not really have a plan for the future, and it was so thoroughly integrated you couldn't kill any one piece of it because the whole thing would collapse," said Loren Thompson, a Lexington Institute analyst and a consultant for major defense firms. "That approach has turned from a form of protection to a liability. It simply isn't executable. I suspect the service will have to disentangle those elements."

Congress has proved increasingly willing to call the Army's bluff. In 2007, legislators forced the service to list one of the eight planned variants of the FCS's armored vehicles as a separate line item in its budget. Last year, the Army on its own announced it would accelerate some of the less ambitious robotics and buy them for existing light infantry units. In recent months, under pressure from Defense Secretary Robert Gates to control costs, the Army has hinted that it will cherry-pick the most promising of the eight FCS manned vehicles and use them to modernize existing heavy armored units. Instead of a "pure" FCS brigade, one congressional staffer said, "it sounds like they're headed for a future heavy brigade with a mix of FCS vehicles, current vehicles, and Strykers," an armored vehicle with huge tires that has been effective in Iraq.

As for the sprawling FCS program, it should be divided into three parts, like Gaul, the staffer said, voicing a sentiment not uncommon around Washington. "You could pursue the vehicle variants under one R&D program because you have a common chassis," he argued. "The [computer] network, I think, just needs to be a separate program. [And] the robots and such, those could be separate programs. If they end up being useful, great, buy them for the entire Army. I think they could stand or fail on their own."

As for the FCS's brigade design, applying it to current armored units would give them almost 20 percent more foot soldiers -- the truly decisive weapon in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"The Army's program makes sense in both the organization and the equipment," Frank Hoffman, a retired marine with no dog in the Army's fight, said of the Future Combat Systems. "I think the Army's right for the wrong reasons. They may have thought this thing was designed for high-end warfare, but it turns out to be the best posture for the medium."

Hoo-ah: Military Christmas from the U.S. Army

SSG Ron Henry,
a member of Transportation Express,
a Fort Eustis, Virginia singing group,
performs this holiday song honoring our Soliders.

Holiday Greetings from Army Secretary Geren

Secretary of the Army Pete Geren offers a Holiday message to our Troops around the world. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren offers a Holiday message to our Troops around the world.

Hoo-ah: Task Force Odin (The Math Machine) going to the 'Stan'

The U.S. Army is deploying the same kind of "math and missiles" unit that defeated roadside bombs in Iraq, to Afghanistan.

For the last two years, "Task Force Odin" has used of manned and UAV aerial reconnaissance aircraft, along with pattern analysis and data mining, to find IEDs (roadside bombs), and the people who plant them in Iraq.

Task Force Odin was reported in the "Old Media" mainly as aircraft and UAVs watching the roads for signs of IEDs, and UAVs, while helicopters and gunships opened fire on terrorists trying to set up roadside bombs. Explosions and dead bodies are more of mass media staple than massive use of math, no matter how critical the number crunching was to the undertaking.

Task Force Odin is really about two very different technologies. On the one hand there was the effort to provide Internet like access to live video feeds from aircraft and UAVs. The U.S. Air Force and SOCOM (Special Operations Command) have been particularly keen on this, and has shared the technology with the other services, and friendly nations.

The less publicized effort was Constant Hawk. This was a U.S. Army image analysis system that's basically just another pattern analysis system. However, it's been a very successful system when it comes to finding newly planted IEDs. Last year, the U.S. Army named Constant Hawk one of the top ten inventions of the year. The army does this to give some of the more obscure, yet very valuable, developments some well deserved recognition.

Pattern analysis is one of the fundamental tools Operations Research (OR) practitioners have been using since World War II (when the newly developed field of OR got its first big workout). Pattern analysis is widely used on Wall Street, by engineers, law enforcement, marketing specialists, and now, the military.

Constant Hawk uses a special video camera system to observe a locality and find useful patterns of behavior. Some of the Constant Hawk systems are mounted on light (C-12s, mainly) aircraft, others are mounted on ground structures. Special software compares photos from different times.

When changes are noted, they are checked more closely, which has resulted in the early detection of thousands of roadside bombs and terrorist ambushes. This has largely eliminated roadside bomb attacks on supply convoys, which travel the same routes all the time. But those routes are also watched by Constant Hawk. No matter what the enemy does, the Hawk will notice.

Eventually, the Hawk, and several other efforts, morphed into Task Force Odin. The Task Force Odin led to the death of over 3,000 terrorists caught in the act of setting up roadside bombs, or lying in wait to set them off and attack their victims with gunfire. Hundreds more terrorists were captured, and many thousands of roadside bombs were avoided or destroyed before they could go off.

All this geeekery works, and the troops like tools of this sort mainly because the systems retain photos of areas they have patrolled, and allows them to retrieve photos of a particular place on a particular day. Often, the troops returning from, or going out on a patrol, can use the pattern analysis skills we all have, to spot something suspicious, or potentially so.

A related math tool is predictive analysis. This has been widely used in Iraq to determine who the bombers are, where they are, and where they are most likely to place their bombs next.

This has enabled the geeks-with-guns (the Army OR specialists) to offer regular "weather reports" about expected IED activity. The troops take these reports very seriously, especially by those who run the hundreds of daily convoys that move people and supplies around Iraq.

If your route is predicted to be "hot", you pay extra attention that day, and often spot IEDs that, as predicted, were there. Usually, the predictions are used to send the engineers and EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams out to scout and clean the route. It's the feedback from these guys that has brought the geeks their reputation. If the geeks, and their tools (computers, aerial images, and math), say there is something bad out there, they are generally right. For the geeks, it's all pretty obvious. Given enough data, you can predict all sorts of things, or just about anything, really.

But to many people, including 'Old Media', it's all still magic. Task Force Odin is the latest name for an effort that has been going on for over four years, and traces its origins back to World War II, and the invention of Operations Research in the decade before that.

Afghanistan is different from Iraq, in terms of geography and the psychology of the enemy. But this doesn't matter to the math machine. It analyzes, it understands, and it tells you what the bad guys are up to and where they are.

Army creates organization to oversee civilian training

The Army this week announced it was standing up a civilian university to better manage employee education and training. With plans for a staff of 15, however, the university is less a physical entity than a governing headquarters that aims to better coordinate education programs.

The move is part of a broader plan to centrally manage career development for the Army's 250,000 civilian employees, about 60 percent of whom do not have established career paths. By centralizing management the service plans to level the playing field for all civilians and gain a better understanding of the skills it must develop to meet long-term needs.

Eventually, the service expects to create eight broad career tracks that will provide employees with a clear path for promotion and give them more visibility into opportunities elsewhere in the Army.

"We have a variety of subgroups of civilians that are well-managed, that have career programs and functional programs that provide for the developmental needs of portions of the workforce," said Jim Warner, the retired brigadier general tapped to lead the Army Civilian University. "What we don't have is a departmental system that analyzes the entire workforce and provides a level of standards and oversight for all of that."

That will be the university's responsibility, Warner said. In January, the university will assume oversight of the Army Management Staff College at Fort Belvoir, Va., where Warner and his staff will be located. The college runs the Civilian Education System -- a leadership development program -- but the system isn't linked to other functional education programs in the Army or to departmentwide initiatives aimed at the entire civilian workforce, Warner said. Part of the university's role will be to integrate those things across the service.

Warner said he will serve as an advocate for civilian education and training, which will almost certainly require more funding. "The Army's senior leadership has determined that the civilian workforce has a large and growing role in leadership and management of various important functions within the Army as an institution," he said.

One of the university head's near-term goals is to improve distance-learning programs offered through the college. Classroom training at the college is very good, Warner said, but the distance-learning program needs to be enhanced.

Other top priorities will include documenting the education and training requirements for civilians throughout the Army's major commands and organizations. "Requirements are what get funded," Warner said.

Rock Band Candlebox Tribute To U.S. Armed Forces

Hoo-ah: I am a Soldier

Hoo-ah: U.S. Army MI: Terrorist Twitter attacks?

A draft US Army intelligence report has identified the popular micro-blogging service Twitter, Global Positioning System maps and voice-changing software as potential terrorist tools.

The report by the 304th Military Intelligence Battalion, posted on the website of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), examines a number of mobile and web technologies and their potential uses by militants.

The posting of the report on the FAS site was reported Friday by Wired magazine contributing editor Noah Shachtman on his national security blog "Danger Room" at wired.com.

The report is not based on clandestine reporting but drawn from open source intelligence known as OSINT.

A chapter on "Potential for Terrorist Use of Twitter" notes that Twitter members sent out messages, known as "Tweets," reporting the July Los Angeles earthquake faster than news outlets and activists at the Republican National Convention in Minneapolis used it to provide information on police movements.

"Twitter has also become a social activism tool for socialists, human rights groups, communists, vegetarians, anarchists, religious communities, atheists, political enthusiasts, hacktivists and others to communicate with each other and to send messages to broader audiences," the report said.

Hacktivists refers to politically motivated computer hackers.

"Twitter is already used by some members to post and/or support extremist ideologies and perspectives," the report said.

"Extremist and terrorist use of Twitter could evolve over time to reflect tactics that are already evolving in use by hacktivists and activists for surveillance," it said. "This could theoretically be combined with targeting."

The report outlined scenarios in which militants could make use of Twitter, combined with such programs as Google Maps or cell phone pictures or video, to carry out an ambush or detonate explosives.

"Terrorists could theoretically use Twitter social networking in the US as an operation tool," it said. "However, it is unclear whether that same theoretical tool would be available to terrorists in other countries and to what extent."

Besides Twitter, the report examined the potential use by militants of Global Positioning Systems and other technologies.

"GPS cell phone service could be used by our adversaries for travel plans, surveillance and targeting," it said, noting that just such uses have been discussed in pro-Al-Qaeda forums along with the use of voice-changing software.

"Terrorists may or may not be using voice-changing software but it should be of open source interest that online terrorist and/or terrorist enthusiasts are discussing it," the report said.

Hoo-ah: Army's Knowledge Portal to Hit 1 Billion Mark

Army Knowledge Online, one of government's first knowledge portals and Web 2.0 projects (years before the term Web 2.0 was coined), plans to announce next week that the site will reach a major milestone: the 1 billionth log on.

The Army created AKO in 1998, and at the time Miriam Browning, then the director of information management in the Army's office of chief information officer, told Federal Computer Week that the site leverages the Army's "intellectual capital in a dynamic and collaborative way using the principles of knowledge management and Internet/intranet technologies.

Our goal with AKO is to enable the Army to achieve a strategic advantage in the networked, knowledge-based global community of the 21st century." In 2001, AKO offered soldiers a proprietary and secure instant messaging application.

According to an email Appian Corp., which built the AKO portal, sent out on Tuesday, the 1 billionth log on to the system "is a historic milestone. We're not aware that any other portal has ever hit the one billion mark - or even come close. To put it in perspective, if a typical user session is 12 minutes, AKO has been used for more than 22,000 man years. That's as if 100 soldiers had sat down after George Washington's victory at Yorktown (1781) and used the system nonstop until the present day."

Lessons From A Century Of Army Building

Iraq is not the first time the U.S. has helped a third world nation build a new army from scratch.

It was done earlier in Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, South Korea and the Philippines. All of these efforts resulted in more effective forces, and those nations acquired useful military traditions that persist to the present.

But none of them became close of the U.S. military in capability. The problem was that all of them were heavily influenced by the local culture, and usually not for the better.

All of the Latin American forces spent most of their time propping up military dictators. Same thing happened in the Philippines and South Korea, although in both those cases, there was an eventual transition to democracy. Only the South Koreans became a military force close to the U.S. in capabilities. The Philippines has some first rate units.

The lesson from all this is that building a new army for a country does not change any of the local customs that favor dictators over democracy. No one has yet come up with a perfect formula for installing democracy. You can encourage it, but you can't make it appear, and sustain itself. Building a better army is easy, compared to eliminating the social, economic and religious customs that work against the establishment of democracy.

All this is a big deal within the U.S. Army, where history is considered a valuable tool for trying to make nation building work. That has produced lots of new ideas, but few new solutions.

Russian Military displaying U.S. Military equipment from Georgia

Off a email, from a Buddy who is in Moscow, hope to have some pic soon

A Russian military museum in Moscow has been displaying American military equipment, taken from Georgia, and portraying military operations in Georgia as a victory over America.

The American gear was material provided to Georgia over the past few years as part of a training program for Georgian troops headed for peacekeeping duty in southern Iraq.

And this: Russia is cracking down on Western media appearing on Russian television. The government controls most of the mass broadcast media, and wants to remove "decadent" U.S. stuff like South Park and the Simpsons, and replace it with more patriotic shows.

Just like in the good old days of the Cold War, before the Soviet Union disappeared. The government has had some success in manipulating public opinion, usually by exploiting existing attitudes (anger at the loss of empire and hostility to the United States).

Patriots For Poland

As part of the recent agreement to allow U.S. THAAD anti-missile missiles to be based in Poland, is the stationing of an American Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery in Poland. Originally, Poland wanted to receive Patriot missile systems, with Polish crews running them. Sending an American battery instead was a compromise. That unit will arrive within the next four years.

The U.S. Army has ten of its Patriot anti-aircraft missile battalions. Each Patriot battalion has 12-24 launchers (3-6 batteries). Each battery is manned by about a hundred troops, and contains a radar, plus four launchers. A battery can fire two types of Patriot missile. The $3.3 million PAC 3 missile is smaller than the anti-aircraft version (PAC 2), thus a Patriot launcher can hold sixteen PAC 3 missiles, versus four PAC 2s. A PAC 2 missile weighs about a ton, a PAC 3 weighs about a third of that. The PAC 3 has a shorter range (about 20 kilometers) versus 70 kilometers for the anti-aircraft version.

While each Patriot launcher, loaded with PAC 3 missiles, can only defend against ballistic missiles approaching within 20 kilometers, the Patriot radar can detect targets out to a hundred kilometers. Two PAC 3 missiles are fired at each incoming ballistic missile, to increase the probability of a hit. The PAC 3 missile has its own radar, and uses it to track the incoming warhead, and execute a collision course.

Hoo-ah: KWTV: Portrait of a Soldier

Ken Younkin of Norman was looking for something to do when he came across an article, "Portrait Freedom Underway" in one of his woodcutting magazines.

"Portrait Freedom Underway" is made up of members of the MSN Scroll Saw Portraits group who are creating custom wooden portraits of every U.S. service member that has died during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The portraits are donated to their families.

There is no charge to the family requesting a portrait.

The Scroll Saw Portrait Freedom Project group includes scroll saw artists and hobbyists from across the U.S.

The finished portrait is posted on the Internet and once it is approved by a moderator, the cutter is notified that the portrait can be sent to the family. Several quality control measures ensure the family receiveshttp://www.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gif a quality product.

All labor, materials and shipping are donated.

Their biggest challenge right now is contacting family members and getting photographs to work with, he said.

Younkin was able to do one of Oklahoma Marine Scott Vincent. He has wanted to cut a portrait of an Oklahoman since he began the project. More than 750 portraits have been cut, but only 10 of the 62 deceased Oklahoma troops have been memorialized so far.

"This has been one of the most satisfying endeavors I have ever had the opportunity to do," Younkin said. "I believe that all the members of Portrait Freedom have a common interest in wanting to honor the memory our fallen military service members and recognize the sacrifice each soldier's family has made."

For more information, send an e-mail to PortraitFreedom@hotmail.com

http://groups.msn.com/PortraitFreedom/homepage

HOO-ah: An American Tradition

The war on terror, and especially the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, have brought back an old American battlefield tradition; tracking and stalking the enemy.

Even before the American revolution, colonial militias used the hunting skills of their members to develop uniquely American infantry tactics.

The generals never completely accepted or permanently adapted these skills. But in every war, and especially in World War II and subsequent conflicts, the tracking and stalking skills of troops were recognized, and utilized, on the battlefield.

During World War II, many divisions organized special scouting units, recruiting troops who were particularly skilled at tracking, and stalking game. These hunting skills are easily transferred to the battlefield. Indeed, the earliest armies made use of these skills, and primitive tribes still use "hunting parties" as "war bands" when the game is two-legged and able to fight back. The most successful army in history, that of the Medieval Mongols, was based on the hunting organization and tactics employed to survive on the great plains of Eurasia.

During the Korean War (1950-53), division commanders created "Ranger Companies," composed of their most skilled stalkers and scouts. These rangers were disbanded after Korea, but were revived in Vietnam, in the form of LRRPs (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols) and other specialized units. After Vietnam, the Ranger Regiment was created, but as a force of elite light infantry, not scouts. More of these ranger type skills were taught to all troops, but not in a concentrated enough way to make a difference.

But the U.S. Marine Corps noted that snipers, a development of the late 19th century smokeless powder (making it more difficult to spot a sniper who had just fired the more accurate and longer range rifles), also had to use stalking and tracking skills to be effective. So the marines established small "Scout-Sniper" units, and utilized both these skills to both find the enemy, and kill them if necessary.

In Iraq, policemen and detectives, serving there in large numbers as reservists, brought their concept of "street marts" to the growing bag of tricks developed for fighting in Iraq. Being able to spot who was a bad guy, dressed as a civilian and trying to stay undetected in the population, was something urban police are good at. In many infantry units, these skills were codified, and taught to troops. The marines took this a step farther, and developed a new stalking and tracking program for all marines.

The U.S. Army Special Forces, and commando troops world-wide, have long recognized the usefulness of these skills, and now the U.S. Army is trying to incorporate more of it into their regular training. After all, it's an old American tradition.

Hoo-ah: 741st Network Warfare Battalion, U.S. Army

The U.S. Army has activated its first Network Warfare Battalion (741st Network Warfare Battalion). The unit will not operate together, but mostly as many detachments, supporting combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, counter-terror operations throughout the world, as well as in joint Cyber War operations with other services and foreign countries. The battalion belongs to the 704th Military Intelligence Brigade, which is in turn subordinate to INSCOM (the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command).

All the services are making a major effort to develop defensive and offensive Cyber War weapons. The U.S. Air Force has established a major command (involving over 20,000 specialists) for this, and is attempting to become the lead for all Department of Defense Cyber War activities. The other services oppose this attempt to take over, although they appreciate air force efforts to develop new tools and capabilities. The army and navy both have thousands of troops, in many different units, working on Cyber War activities. Creating major units (battalions and larger) dedicated to Cyber War, is a new development.