Hoo-ah: Petraeus v. Obama: The Truth About the Surge

Vets for Freedom today released a new ad -- "Petraeus vs. Obama" -- fourth in a series asking for political leadership to acknowledge the truth about the surge.

The ad highlights Senator Obama's refusal to acknowledge that the surge in Iraq was successful, despite countless reports from General Petraeus that we have made significant progress.

The ad encourages Congress to support the current surge resolutions that give recognition to the strategy of the surge and honor our troops that have made that strategy a success.

Hoo-ah: No Cure For The Arab Curse?

In East Baghdad, and Shia cities throughout the south, the Mahdi Army is no more. The Iran supported group was taken apart by government security forces during the last two months. All that's left of radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr's private army are a few hundred die hard members who are, for the moment, keeping their heads down. And for good reason. While appreciated in 2006 -7 for keeping Sunni Arab terrorists out of Shia neighborhoods, the Mahdi Army quickly evolved into a collection of self-serving thugs. Once civilians realized that the army and police were stronger, and moving in to stay, the cell phones came out and the police were buried in tips about Mahdi Army safe houses and arms caches. Sadr has been hiding out in Iran through all this.

Sunni Arab terrorist diehards are undergoing the same experience up north, but with more violence. Around Mosul, U.S. Special Forces ODA's, which have been chasing al Qaeda leaders for years, are having enormous success. The surge offensive drove many al Qaeda, and Iraqi Sunni Arab terrorist leaders to the Mosul area, where a spectacular last stand was supposed to give the terrorists a badly needed victory. Didn't work out that way, and now the terrorist leaders are either hunkering down, or running for the border. Either way, they are getting caught. The combination of wide spread cell phone availability, and anti-terrorist Iraqis, is giving the police and Special Forces the tips they need.

The downside of all this is that U.S. troops are now regularly travelling to areas, long been labeled "extremely hostile", they have never been in before. While those Sunni Arab towns are generally considered safe and well policed for Iraqis, there are still scattered groups of terrorists about, capable of pulling off an impromptu ambush or suicide bombing against foreigners. The terrorists are also using more women as bombers, there having been an outbreak of Islamic feminism on the Internet, where the women demanded that they be allowed to participate and die for the cause. Since women suicide bombers have been, and still are, quite rare, their chances of evading security are better. The overall result of this new freedom-of-movement is a near doubling of American combat deaths (from the record low last month of 19).

Several terrorist groups are trying to negotiate some kind of amnesty deal, using kidnapping victims as trade bait. These hostages have, in some cases, been held for a long time. The most prominent of these, five British citizens, have been captives for a year (as terrorists demanded the release of nine pro-Iran killers). This has put the government in a difficult position, as hundreds of Iraqis are being held (some may actually be dead, but even getting "proof-of-life" requires giving the kidnappers something.) While most Iraqis want the hostages released, they also do not want to reward the terrorists.

The defeat of the major terrorist organizations is bringing the spotlight back to Iraq (and the Arab worlds) primary problem; corruption. With reconstruction money and police pouring into Sunni Arab towns for the first time in seven years, there's been some culture shock. The Sunni Arabs have long been accustomed to the old rules (which Saddam Hussein exploited artfully) whereby local strongmen were paid off, and then these tough guys did whatever it took (murder, kidnapping, mutilation, etc) to keep the locals quiet. The new Shia government is trying (with mixed success) to get away from the old ways. It isn't easy. Centuries of tradition don't willingly change overnight. There will be more violence, as corrupt locals decide old school customs are worth killing for. Actually, they always have been, which is why most Arab nations are police states, where murder, or the threat of it, is the final arbiter of disputes with the government. Meanwhile, reconstruction efforts are delayed, or derailed, by rampant theft, lies and deception supplied by local officials.

U.S. troops are back to their pre-surge strength of 15 brigades, although troop strength is a little higher (142,000 versus 135,000) because some additional support units are still around. The surge offensive that began in early 2007 has reduced Iraqi civilian casualties by 80 percent and lowered violence against U.S. troops to 2004 levels. But a lot of this security is held together by U.S. troops, who still advise and assist Iraqi troops and police. U.S. Commanders believe that it's only a matter of time before all Iraqi units are capable of doing their jobs on their own, but for now only about ten percent of Iraqi police and military units are in that category. It may take 5-10 years to get everyone able to operate on their own. Meanwhile, ten of Iraq's 18 provinces have their security provided by Iraqi security forces, with Iraqis in charge (and U.S. forces just on call.)

Hoo-ah: Mahdi Army Fades Away

After a month of fighting, the Mahdi Army has disappeared from the streets of Basra, the largest city in the south. The army and police are everywhere, and people are providing information on where Mahdi Army personnel are hiding out, and the locations of their weapons caches. Up north, in the Sadr City section of east Baghdad, the Mahdi Army is still fighting hard. But the army and police have the upper hand, and are pushing the Shia militiamen back block by block. Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al Sadr has responded by threatening to order his men to go after American troops if the government does not back off. That's won't work, because the Mahdi Army is not particularly skillful, and not very united either. He recently ordered his troops to stop fighting Iraqi soldiers and police, and concentrate on the Americans. The Iraqi security forces have not reciprocated, and continue coming after the Mahdi Army.

The dozen or so factions of the Mahdi Army vary in their loyalty to Sadr, or to political solutions. Several of the Mahdi Army factions are basically criminal gangs masquerading as religious zealots. Sadr denies he is a pawn of Iran, but as Mahdi Army houses are captured, more Iranian weapons and equipment show up, as well as religious propaganda from Iran. Iraqi president Maliki has told Sadr that the offensive would halt if the Mahdi Army surrenders all its weapons, stops attacking, or trying to infiltrate (by joining) the security forces, and hands over members wanted for crimes. So far, Sadr refuses, probably because many of his followers would turn on him if he tried. But Sadr also realizes that the Iraqi soldiers and police are capable, eventually, of grinding the Mahdi Army into nothingness. Another month or so of fighting and the Mahdi Army will be no more.

Al Sadr, and many of his followers, see all this violence against them as a plot by the Badr Organization to be the last major militia standing. The Badr Organization began as a Shia anti-Saddam exile group, in Iran, a quarter century ago. But the Badr "Brigade" renounced the use of force, formed a political party, and urged its Brigade members to join the army and police. This they did, and many believe these former militiamen are still loyal to their Badr Brigade bosses. But the Badr leaders insist that the Brigade is no more, and the Badr Organization is strictly political. In any event, the Badr people have been more cooperative with the government than the Sadr crew.

Meanwhile, Sunni Arab politicians have returned to the government. These Sunni Arab political parties had walked out of the government nine months ago, angry over the failure to guarantee their rights, safety and share of the oil revenue. Since then, the Sunni Arab terrorism effort has been shattered, with many of the Sunni Arab terror groups switched sides and joined the war against al Qaeda.

Iraq is trying to get its Arab neighbors to forgive some $65 billion in Saddam era debts, without much success. Most of the money was borrowed in the 1980s, when Iraq was at war with Iran. Iraq has already had some $65 billion in debts, mostly to Russia and European nations, forgiven. But the Arabs want their money. The other Arab states in the region see Shia dominated Iraq as a potential ally of Iran, and not "real" Arabs. Conservative Sunni Arab clerics regularly preach that Shia Moslems (like most Iraqis and nearly all Iranians) are heretics and not to be trusted.

The government is openly proclaiming the decline, if not complete destruction, of Sunni Arab terrorist group al Qaeda, at least in Iraq. There are far fewer suicide bomb attacks, and most of them are individuals wearing explosive belts, rather that more elaborate car or truck bombs. Moreover, the targets are all "soft" (easy to reach civilians). Al Qaeda is trying to be selective, going after the leaders of Sunni Arab groups that switched sides in the past few months. It is this kind of brutality that caused Sunni Arab groups to turn on al Qaeda, but that kind of logic is lost on the remaining terrorists.

Up north, Turkish warplanes and artillery continue to hit suspected PKK bases along the Iraqi border. The Kurdish government in the north protests, but quietly. No one in the region wants to get into a squabble with the Turks, especially not the Turkish army.

HOO-AH: Don't Short-Circuit the Surge

Iraq is one theater in the War against Islamic Extremism. Al Qaeda's two principal leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, have repeatedly called Iraq the "front line" in their war against Western civilization. We have no choice but to find the patience to give the military the time it needs to complete the job we asked them to do. The alternative, advocated by the liberal/progressive left wing and the Democratic Presidential candidates, is to admit defeat, surrender to al Qaeda in Iraq after so much sacrifice and battle an emboldened enemy in other theaters until we tire there as well.

Hat tip to Dan @ CALIFORNIA YANKEE

Don't Short-Circuit the Surge

By KIMBERLY KAGAN
January 26, 2008; Page A11

The Iraq debate in 2007 focused on whether the new strategy and troop increase could stem violence in Iraq. It did. The Iraq debate in 2008 will probably focus on how much the United States can reduce force levels in Iraq this year in the wake of its success.

Many in these discussions give troop numbers and brigade counts almost casually, without ever explaining how they derive the figures. That's a problem. Any realistic evaluation suggests that returning to pre-surge levels by July 2008, as some are suggesting, carries considerable risk.

Ethno-sectarian attacks and deaths in Baghdad security districts decreased more than 90% from January to December 2007. Iraqi civilian casualties have dropped 75% from their peak, and the number of IED attacks has fallen to the lowest level since October 2004. One brigade of U.S. troops returned home in December without replacement. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates believes that Gen. David Petraeus will recommend continuing the drawdown to 15 brigades.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, CENTCOM commander Adm. William Fallon, and Gen. Petraeus are now assessing whether to recommend in March a further reduction in troop levels later in 2008. Mr. Gates stated recently that he hopes conditions will permit the U.S. to reduce its combat forces in Iraq by a brigade a month from August to December 2008, leaving a footprint of 10 brigades at the end of the president's term -- the lowest American force level in the country since the 2003 invasion.

In contrast, Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, who commands combat forces for Gen. Petraeus, has stated that he is uncomfortable committing to any further reductions below 15 brigades before commanders can assess the effect of the decrease to that force-size. Gen. Petraeus recently said that March 2008 might be too soon to make that determination. War critics have insisted on reductions to 100,000 troops or fewer.

The brigade combat team, commanded by a colonel and consisting of around 3,500 soldiers (5,000 or so counting the support elements that normally deploy with it) is the building block of the U. S. Army (its equivalent, the Regimental Combat Team, is the building block of the Marine Corps). There are currently 42 BCTs in the active force. Those who speak of an absolute number of troops that they desire in Iraq show their ignorance of the military planning process.

American brigades in Iraq oversee combat, training, and governance missions in their sector, whether a quadrant of Baghdad or an entire outlying province. Each brigade oversees an area with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. Brigades plan and execute military operations that prevent extremists from returning to cleared areas. They also gather intelligence about enemy groups in their areas of operations, and thus determine where new threats are emerging.

Since the end of 2006, brigades have overseen the Military Transition Teams that train and advise the Iraqi security forces operating in their area, dramatically improving the coordination of Iraqi and American forces. Now, most American brigade headquarters are partnered with an Iraqi division headquarters, helping the Iraqis to plan and sustain increasingly complex operations.

Since spring 2007, the brigades have housed the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams that have jumpstarted local and provincial Iraqi government. The brigade helps these teams move through the area. The brigades have been instrumental in the Iraqi population's rejection of al Qaeda. Brigade commanders and their staffs and subordinates have negotiated ceasefires with leaders of tribes, villages and urban neighborhoods; identified Concerned Local Citizens; and integrated these Iraqi civilians with the Iraqi Security Forces. Brigade commanders in 2008 may distribute their own troops between combat and training missions, rather than relying on a centrally-directed policy untailored to local circumstances.

The brigade has thus become much more than a fighting unit. The development of the Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi civilian institutions, which has been a hallmark of Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy and a pillar of its success in 2007, rests upon the American brigade headquarters. Maintaining security essential to drawing down the American force levels requires the presence in Iraq of enough brigade headquarters to conduct the combat, training and governance missions essential to success.

The way to determine the number of brigade headquarters suitable for Iraq is by determining the number of brigade-sized missions in the country. This is a challenging but not insuperable task.

There were too few brigades in 2006 to monitor the enemy and oversee the new government institutions in poor security situations. There were enough brigades by mid- 2007 to perform those tasks, although not equally in all areas. The "surge" was never intended to secure all of Iraq -- only to stabilize Baghdad and Anbar. Its unexpected success has also placed unanticipated strains on U.S. forces. We won more than we had hoped, and now we may need to defend it more than we had planned.

The "surge" posture from June through December 2007 included five BCTs in Baghdad; four in the southern "belt" (from Mahmudiyah on the Euphrates to Nahrawan east of the capital); three in Anbar (including 2 Marine Regiments); four in the northern belt (Taji; Tarmiyah; and Diyala, where a Quick Reaction Force spent much of the summer along with the dedicated brigade); and one each in Salah-ad-Din, Kirkuk, Ninevah, and on convoy protection duty.

Gen. Odierno recently shifted two brigades within Iraq to conduct his third major offensive against al Qaeda, Operation Phantom Phoenix, to disrupt and pursue the enemy in northern Iraq. The December reduction to 19 BCTs has left only one brigade headquarters in Diyala. General Odierno intends to thin the headquarters and the troops on the ground in Anbar and Baghdad in order to achieve the remaining four-brigade reduction back to pre-surge levels by July.

The decision to draw down the surge is predicated not only on current security gains, but on the assumption that security will continue to improve in areas where the reductions are programmed to occur. Gen. Petraeus, testifying before Congress in September, attributed the downturn in violence, then 12 weeks old, to three factors: the summer offensives against al Qaeda and militias, the Iraqi population's rejection of extremists, and the slowly increasing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces.

"Based on all this and the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer, withdrawing one quarter of our combat brigades by that time without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve." Gen. Odierno confirmed in a November press conference that he had recommended that Gen. Petraeus reduce the force to 15 brigades by July, "because I believe that we will be able to continue to move forward with the progress."

Achieving the complement of 15 brigades by summer rests upon Gen. Odierno's judgment that he can withdraw not only the headquarters from Diyala, but also others from Anbar and parts of Baghdad this spring. His assumption is that security will continue to improve at about the rate our commanders think is feasible between now and July, and that the Iraqi Army will grow as predicted.

There is considerable risk in this assumption. Coalition and Iraqi forces have not finished clearing Ninevah province, Salah ad-Din and parts of Babil. Major operations continue against al Qaeda remnants in Ninevah, Salah-ad-Din, Diyala, Kirkuk and Wasit provinces. Fighting between Iraqi Security Forces (aided by coalition special forces and our Georgian, Polish and British allies) and Mahdi Army militias continues in the south.

The withdrawal to 15 brigades already assumes that these operations will be successful. It provides no cushion for unexpected developments or unforeseen enemy responses. There is thus no military basis at all at the present time to recommend additional reductions in 2008.

One year ago, Gen. Petraeus testified before Congress: "I was assured . . . by the secretary of Defense . . . that if we need additional assets, my job is to ask for them. If they're not provided in some case, my job is to tell my boss the risk involved in accomplishing the mission without the assets that are required. And at some point, of course, you may have to go back and say that you cannot accomplish the mission because of the assets that have not been provided."

By the best estimates now available, 15 brigades is the absolute minimum force required to accomplish the mission that has brought us success in 2007. Any further reductions -- even by a single brigade -- may make that mission impossible.

Ms. Kagan is an affiliate of Harvard's John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies and the president of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.