Mundane Matters That 'Garet' Trooper and the Drive by Media Misses

The growing number of U.S. troops with operating experience in Afghanistan has led to a style of war that is not fully appreciated by the 'Garet' Trooper back home (or sitting in Kabul).

Thus we have silly situations where 'Garet' Trooper in Kabul and Washington insist that all U.S. troops (except, grudgingly, the Special Forces) be clean shaven.

But out in the hills, where American commanders on their second or third combat tour, now that Afghans are more comfortable dealing with bearded foreigners. It's just a cultural thing. So the captains and colonels ignore the beards, while their bosses don't.

In an unusual event in Afghan history, many Afghans want to work with the foreign soldiers, not kill and rob them.

The ROE (Rules of Engagement) and reconstruction efforts have impressed Afghans. The former spares the lives of Afghan civilians, and the latter makes their lives better.

Despite the Taliban skill at playing the media whenever an Afghan civilian is killed by foreign troops (usually while being used as a human shield by bandits or Taliban), most Afghans want peace and prosperity and to be left alone.

While peace and prosperity are nice, they have been rare events in Afghan history. Being left alone is a more immediate survival skill. This is why, out in the hills, so many people appear to live in little fortresses, carry weapons, and be quick to use them against outsiders (anyone from outside the valley or tribe).

The terrorists are having major problem trying to apply al Qaeda bombing tactics in Afghanistan. There is much more popular opposition to Islamic terrorism in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, you had Sunni Arabs (15-20 percent of the population) and many Shia Arabs (perhaps a fifth of the 60 percent of the population that is Shia) who would provide some form of support for the terrorists. That 20-25 percent of the population shrank as the terrorists had more success killing lots of Iraqis with their bombs.

The same pattern is playing out in Afghanistan, but with less than ten percent of the population supporting the terrorists, and that group is shrinking, Just like in Iraq.

Although the terrorists in Afghanistan are killing fewer people overall (and most of them are still civilians), the media loves to cover explosions.

While the drug gangs are doing well (it's a high profit business, so you can absorb a lot of setbacks), the Taliban are taking a beating. U.S./NATO forces are getting better at finding Taliban gunmen, and leaders, and killing or capturing them.

As usual, the U.S./NATO, with their helicopters and warm clothes, are operating in the Winter. This is the time when Afghans like to hunker down. Poverty, poor diet, lack of adequate clothing and little medical care makes being outside in the Winter a dangerous proposition.

Even though the Taliban is trying to supply it fighters with some modern winter gear and antibiotics, most of these guys head for the hills reluctantly, ill equipped, and with much foreboding. Nothing glorious about dying, shivering, of pneumonia in a cave, while U.S./NATO troops search for you (and often find you, even in caves.)

What U.S./NATO troops are searching for in Winter are weapons and terrorism gear (bomb materials, commo gear and laptops). With so many cell phone equipped civilians ready to give you up, it's hard to find somewhere to hide out in the Winter.

Most of the Taliban can just hide their gun and go home for the Winter. But your key people have to watch over things, and equipment. These are the Winter targets for U.S./NATO operations, and the pickings are richer in the cold weather.

So far this year, there have been 25 attacks on food relief convoys, resulting in nearly a million dollars worth of food being lost. The UN, which administers most of the aid, is not sure how many of the attacks are from bandits, or Taliban. Sometimes the same armed gangs are both. The Taliban are also active in preventing farmers from rebuilding irrigation systems and roads, believing this sort of thing will make the rural farmers more likely to support the government.

Another trouble spot is the growing number of refugees returning to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, as well as the thousands who are now fleeing the army offensive against the Taliban in Pakistan. Over five million refugees have returned since late 2001, and several hundred thousand a year are still coming back. Often, these refugees cannot resume their lives as marginal farmers and migrate to the cities. There they face lots of crime and not a lot of jobs.

The average Afghan is not worried that much about the Taliban (which make up a tiny proportion of the population and largely operate in the south), terrorists (even more rare than the Taliban) or the drug gangs (again, most of it is in a ten percent of the provinces, mainly Helmand).

What really bothers most Afghans is crime (as in robbery, theft and kidnapping) and government incompetence and corruption. The people want a crackdown on crime and corruption. That doesn't make exciting headlines for foreign journalists (except for lots of Afghans wanting to bring back public executions for criminals), but it's what Afghans worry about most of the time.

Sealing the Iraq borders vs Tradition

The Iraq war is moving to the borders, where support for radical groups enters the country from Iran (for Shia radicals), Syria (for Sunni radicals) and Turkey (for Kurdish radicals).

Sealing each of these borders requires a different approach.

The Iranians can be talked to, in addition to the growing number of border troops watching the frontier. The main problem is radical factions in the Iranian government, who are allowed to run their own terrorist operations in foreign countries.

The Iranian Al Quds Force (an intelligence and commando operation that supports Islamic terrorism overseas) always attracted very bright and able people, but also got personnel with a wide range of views on just what constituted an "Islamic Republic" or the proper role for the Quds Force itself.

One of the few things Quds officers could agree on was the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Many Quds officers actually warmed to the United States for doing the deed for them. Quds operatives were sent to Iraq in 2003 to see if they could establish another Islamic republic there.

But they quickly found that Iraq Shias were very divided on that subject.

This got many Quds officers disagreeing with their commanders back home. The feeling was that the officials back in Iran were living in a dream world.

This was reinforced by the debate over al Qaeda.

Even though this Sunni terrorist organization was violently anti-Shia, and had killed many Shia in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, some Quds officials backed supporting al Qaeda, because of a common enemy, the United States in particular, and the West in general.

The sort of thing can happen because the Iranian leadership is more a federation than a dictatorship. So Quds can keep being nice to al Qaeda as long as not too many other Iranian factions get mad at Quds. So the Iraq government negotiates with more moderate members of the Iranian government, on how they can cooperate to control Quds, and other Iranian radicals trying to stir up trouble inside Iraq.

The situations on the Syrian and Turkish borders are more straightforward.

The Syrians, while allies of Iran, are largely Sunni, and the country has become a base for Sunni terrorist groups like al Qaeda.

So Iran tolerates Syrian support for Sunni terrorists who go to Iraq, via Syria, to kill fellow Shia. Politics is a rough game in this part of the world. But that tolerance is wearing off, and the Syrians have been told by Iran, Iraq and the United States that support for Sunni terrorists must stop, or else. Syria is being told to behave like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have successfully sealed their borders to terrorists. Now it's time for Syria to join the "good neighbors" club.

The Turkish border is a little different, in that the terrorists (PKK, the Kurdish separatist group) hide out in Iraq, and launch attacks across the border in Turkey. The Kurds run their own affairs in northern Iraq, but are not willing to take out the PKK (who represent ideas, like an independent Kurdish state, that are popular with all Kurds).

So the Kurdish provincial, and Iraq national governments sort of look the other way while Turkish warplanes bomb PKK camps, and Turkish troops dash in to grab live PKK as prisoners, or examine dead ones for more intel on what the terrorist group is up to. Turkish military pressure has been pretty intense for the last few months, and the PKK is hurt. Not just by members killed or injured by the attacks, but by others who are demoralized and quit the organization. Recruitment is down and desertion is up. This is never a good sign. In the past month alone, at least a hundred PKK members have come out of the mountains near the border, and said they were quitting.

The Turks believe they may have destroyed a third of the PKK fighting power so far this year.

Most Iraq security forces are now focusing on protecting the voting centers that will be used in a few months for national elections.

These places will be, as usual, targets for the Sunni and Shia terrorists. Democracy is anathema to the religious terrorists (al Qaeda and their Iranian Shia counterparts), as the religious activists want a clerical dictatorship, not some alien Western import like democracy.

The religious terrorists are basically traditionalists, and the traditional government in this part of the world has always been a tyranny of one form or another. Thus support for tradition translates into support for some kind of dictator, hopefully a benevolent one.

Hoo-ah: Around In Syria

On October 26th, four helicopters crossed from Iraq into Syria. Two of the helicopters landed near the village of Sukariyya, and U.S. Special Forces troops engaged in a brief gun battle with members of the Abu Ghadiyahas network, who had been using the village as part of the smuggling network that brought money, weapons and suicide bombers into Iraq. Eight people died, two were taken captive, and the American soldiers left unharmed.

The timing of the strike is somewhat curious. President Assad of Syria had been moving to close off the border for terrorists, and was making other overtures, though slowly, probably trying to figure out how to stay in power regardless of who wins what.

A strike like this, with high potential fallout should have been vetted at the highest level. Was the guy the Special Forces were going after worth it? The fallout is serious, with most Arab states in the neighborhood, including Iraq, criticizing it. Iran was particularly angry, and upset. That's probably because Iran has also supported terrorists based in its territory, and allowing them to move men, money and weapons across the border. Shia radical leader Muqtada al Sadr is hiding out in Iran, where his followers are trained to be better terrorists, then sent back to Iraq.

U.S. officials offered international law as justification for this "invasion" of Syria. It goes like this. The United Nations Charter allows nations to defend themselves when under attack, and allows operations inside a foreign nation that cannot, or will not, stop attacks on a foreign country from within its borders. This clause was included to cover a common situation, where one nation will tolerate rebels from another taking refuge inside its borders. This is usually rebels or bandits who use that bases to conduct raids and banditry inside the neighboring nation. Often, the sanctuary nation is unable to clean out the hostile gunmen, or unwilling to do so because they support the goals of the gunmen, or simply want to weaken their neighbor by making it easier for the rebels or bandits to operate.

Afghanistan and Iraq would appear to meet these criteria. Afghan and Iraqi officials have long complained about terrorists crossing over from neighboring countries (Pakistan, Iraq and Iran), often with the assistance of border guards. Pakistan had something of an excuse, as they have never been able to control the tribes along the border, and have special laws that grant some autonomy to the border tribes, as long as they control cross-border raids. Pakistan has obviously not been controlling the Taliban and al Qaeda terrorists, so the U.S., as an ally of the Afghans, has been crossing the border, in compliance with the UN Charter, to strike at the hostile forces. This has been going on for nearly a year. Now the practice has spread to Syria, and the Iranians fear they are next.

It's this legal angle that has prevents any of the invaded countries from taking the U.S. before an international court. Syria, Pakistan and Iran know that there is a preponderance of evidence proving that terrorists are camping out in their territory, and operating across the border.

Even so, the reaction from the Syrians has been rather muted, almost pro forma – they could easily be a lot more vehement about it, let the "rioters" do lots of damage to US property, recall their ambassador, and so on. Could it be that they're not terribly unhappy the raid took place? Assad and his henchmen certainly must realize that al Qaeda ultimately is a threat to their own power, given that Syria is run by secular Shia nationalist socialists (the Baath party). Al Qaeda in Syria only holds back from attacking the government because Assad has been turning a blind eye to operations by Abu Ghadiyahas and his gang. As al Qaeda loses in Iraq, and as Iraq becomes increasingly able to handle its own security, the Abu Ghadiyahas net in Syria could pose a threat in several ways – turning against Assad directly would be the most serious, but also if they take actions that could involve risk to Syrian interests, such as trying to stir the pot in Iraq or Lebanon, or organize strikes against Israel. Going deeper, could the Americans have been tipped off by Assad to the presence of Abu Ghadiyahas with a wink and a nod, possibly through the Israelis, with whom Assad seems to be developing a covert relationship ?

Al Qaeda wants Republicans, Bush "humiliated"

An al Qaeda leader has called for President George W. Bush and the Republicans to be "humiliated," according to an Internet video posting.

"O God, humiliate Bush and his party, O Lord of the Worlds, degrade and defy him," Abu Yahya al-Libi said at the end of sermon marking the Muslim feast of Eid al-Fitr, in a video posted on the Internet.

Libi, a top al Qaeda commander believed to be living in Afghanistan or Pakistan, called for God's wrath to be brought against Bush equating him with past tyrants in history.

The remarks were the first from a leading al Qaeda figure referring, albeit indirectly, to the U.S. elections. Muslim clerics often end sermons by calling on God to guide and support Muslims and help defeat their enemies.

Terrorism monitor SITE Intelligence Group said in a report on Wednesday that militants on al Qaeda-linked websites have for months been debating the significance of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama or Republican John McCain.

Some posters have also argued over the merits of trying to attack the United States before the election or waiting until later, the report said.

In 2004 bin Laden issued his first video in more than a year just days before the U.S. elections. It derided Bush and warned of possible new September 11-style attacks.

Bin Laden made little mention of Bush's Democratic challenger, John Kerry, telling Americans: "Your security is not in the hands of Kerry or Bush or al Qaeda. Your security is in your own hands and each state which does not harm our security will remain safe."

Kerry has attributed his loss in part to the video's high-profile reminder of the terrorism issue.

In 2006, after Democrats captured Congress, Zawahri issued an audio message saying all Americans remained al Qaeda's enemies regardless of party, SITE said.

SITE said militant postings on al Qaeda-linked websites typically discuss Obama in terms of his race, or his religion and foreign policy. Some forecast a racial crisis dividing the United States if he wins. Others say his planned phased withdrawal from Iraq would be a boon to al Qaeda's affiliate and give it a base for Middle East expansion.

Republican presidential nominee John McCain has been portrayed as likely to allow "the continuation of Republican control and aggressive policies toward the Islamic world."

What the Drive by Media not telling you about Afghanistan

Banditry has always been a big problem in Afghanistan.

There has never been an effective national police force, and army operations merely caused the bandits to scatter back to their villages.

The basic problem is that there is not one Afghanistan, but hundreds. Each tribe and warlord has its own army which polices its neighborhood. Everything outside that area is considered potentially hostile territory. Men are free to go outside the tribal area and become bandits. Loot taken in battle (or armed robbery) has always been a big deal in Pushtun tribal culture.

So while most Afghans can understand the usefulness of keeping the main road from Kabul to Kandahar open, many of those same Afghans condone their kinsmen robbing people on that highway, as long as it's done to "strangers" (not from our tribe or, even better, foreigners.)

While a lot of Afghans, especially those living in urban areas, try to get away from these medieval attitudes, the majority of those in the countryside are more traditional in their attitudes. This is where a lot of the violence comes from.

Journalists tend to blame it all on the "Taliban," but in fact, most of it is just those gun totting country boys doing what they've always done. More are on the payroll of some drug gang, than a Taliban outfit.

Life would be so much easier, so the conventional wisdom goes, if peace could be obtained by just destroying the "Taliban." But the real enemy is a set of cultural attitudes that aid and abet the lawlessness. It's a much more elusive target.

Cities like Kabul have become very different parts of Afghanistan. You see lots of women without veils (even as Western media report "Taliban terror creeping into Kabul"), and men without beards. Videos and music are freely available, as are alcoholic drinks.

A lot of these city slickers are fresh from the country, where the restrictive lifestyle of "tradition" continues to drive the more adventurous away. This is the sort of thing that offends tribal and religious leaders. These guys don't want change, because it tends to mean less power and money for them. That's why the Taliban has such a following in the countryside, and not in the cities.

News reports about Pakistani troops exchanging fire with NATO and U.S. helicopters at the border appear to be more stories than news. Many of the border guards (a force recruited from local tribes) are pro-Taliban (or on the Taliban payroll), and quick to fire on aircraft and any armed men they are not familiar with.

That's been going on for decades, and was the cause of tension with the Russians in the 1980s.

Real violence between Pakistan and the United States is unlikely, because the U.S. is the major financial and military supplier for Pakistan. Thus without U.S. support, military upgrades don't happen and the economy tanks. Religion is one thing, defense and economics are something else (that is more important to more Pakistanis).

Meanwhile, the government makes the right noises about "defending Pakistan's borders" while doing nothing to actually interfere with American operations on either side of the border.

Over 20,000 Pushtuns have fled from Pakistan into Afghanistan to avoid the violence between Taliban gunmen and the Pakistani army.

The Pakistani Taliban are under attack in several areas (Waziristan, Swat Valley and Bajaur) and losing in all of them. The head of the Pakistani Taliban has just died, after being ill for several months, leaving behind a power struggle. The Pakistani Taliban is in disarray and falling apart. This is being felt in Afghanistan, where fewer "volunteers" are coming across to help out the Taliban there.

In the face of this, the Afghan Taliban say they will keep fighting throughout the Winter. NATO responds by announcing another Winter offensive. This will get interesting, because NATO forces are more mobile in Winter.

Traditionally, Afghans stay indoors during the Winter. Getting a chill can be fatal, and the rain, snow and ice make it difficult to get around.

The government has again openly called for Taliban leader Mullah Omar to come negotiate with the government. This comes in the wake of several years worth of successful negotiations with lower level Taliban leaders.

Many of these guys have left the Taliban as a result. There are also reports, denied by the government, that Saudi Arabia is sponsoring secret peace talks between the government and the Taliban.

One has to ask, why would the Taliban want to negotiate? Put simply, while the drug gangs are doing well (despite heroin production falling 20 percent from last year), the Taliban are on everyone's hit list, and are taking a lot of hits.

Now defeated al Qaeda operatives are moving in from Iraq and elsewhere, and blowing people up. That generates more hostility than support, and this hurts the Taliban as well.

Within the Taliban, a debate is on over how to deal with the lack of progress. The Taliban have been able to generate more violence, and dire headlines in the West, but not much else.

True believers are getting discouraged.

U.S. and NATO commanders believe they can largely shut down the Taliban and al Qaeda if they have some more troops. The U.S. has agreed to send three more brigades next year. NATO nations, urged on by France, are trying to muster more troops for Afghanistan.

By next year, changes in Pakistan, and growing attacks on Afghan drug gangs are expected to weaken the Taliban even more.

The new government in Pakistan is behind the recent army offensives against the Taliban, and has just replaced the head of their intelligence agency, the ISI, which originally invented the Taliban back in the 1990s.

The ISI has long been full of Islamic conservatives, but the new head is different. How different will become apparent by early next year.

Has the CIA become too PC ?

British SAS have a motto; "who dares, wins." An example of how this doesn't work can be found in the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).

Over the last three decades, the CIA has come under a lot of criticism for not being able to do their job. They have done that by not taking chances.

The most spectacular recent example was the failure to spot the terrorist operation that led to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

While much blame was justifiably heaped on the FBI, it was the CIA that had first detected the plotters, and was already under orders to stop al Qaeda attempts to make more attacks on the United States.

All this began a decade earlier, when al Qaeda damaged New York City's World Trade Center in 1993 bombing. The 2001 attacks did not come out of nowhere. But the CIA had problems at the top (where decisions about what leads to pursue, how, and to what extent all this is shared with the FBI), and at the bottom (and the inability to infiltrate al Qaeda.)

At the same time, other intelligence agencies, like Britain's MI-6 and the Israeli Mossad are much better at gathering information at ground level. They, like most nations, recognize that intelligence operations can get dirty. It's all a matter of how important the intelligence is.

The British attitude is that, if you need to do this, do it right. So Britain does have agents with a "license to kill" and, more importantly, laws protecting these men and women from any later prosecution for dirty deeds they were asked to do for Queen and Country.

But in the United States, the CIA was held to a higher moral standard, and still expected to get the job done. This approach did not work.

Despite all the post-911 talk about "more aggressive intelligence operations" to prevent more attacks, the atmosphere inside the CIA discouraged any such thing. All this was largely the result of the CIA being put into a sort of semi-hibernation in the late 1970s.

This was an after effect of the Church Committee, an investigative operation sponsored by Congress, that sought to reform the CIA. The reforms were mainly about eliminating CIA spying inside the United States, and doing stuff for the president that Congress did not approve of.

There was also a desire to avoid any CIA connection with foreign unpleasantness (like using unsavory people as spies or informants). This led to a growing list of restrictions on what the CIA could do overseas, and at home.

Congress was out to make sure no future president (the CIA works for the president) could use the CIA as had been done during the Vietnam war, and before.

The CIA interpreted this as "no more James Bond stuff," just use your spy satellites and write up your reports. The Church Committee insured that the CIA became a much less interesting place to work. A lot of the most capable people got out over the next two decades. Recruiting became difficult. Word got around that the daring need not apply.

But after September 11, 2001, the CIA was tossed a huge pile of money and told to staff up and get going. The Church Committee restrictions were largely, if not completely, discarded. Recruiting efforts were greatly expanded, and since September 11, 2001, several hundred thousand applications were received. The agency has had a hard time keeping up with that.

This created some interesting personnel problems, especially in the operations division (the people who go to foreign countries and, well, sometimes do James Bond stuff.) There were few people left in the agency that remembered how to do field ops the old school way.

By late 2001, many recently retired field ops guys were being lured back to active duty. You now had a situation where the field ops population was like a cross between a college fraternity and retirement community. There are few people in the middle, age and experience wise. It's almost as bad in the analysis division (where the data is studied and reports prepared.)

The area of the CIA that has flourished in the last three decades has been the geek side of things. These folks were always flush, thanks to a Congress that felt safer with spy satellites, than with spies on the ground.

But those days are over. Much of the new technology is going to the analysts (better computerized tools to dig quickly through information) and the field operatives (like Predator UAVs, at four million bucks each.) A lot of money is going into training (learning Arabic, Pushto, Farsi and Dari are encouraged, and sometimes demanded) and the use of consultants (often former CIA operatives who would not come back full time.)

But after a few years, the Church Committee atmosphere returned. The major issue was the use of torture to extract information from terrorist suspects. It suddenly became the conventional wisdom that torture didn't work. This was absurd, as a cursory glance at the history of World War II, and every war before or since, would reveal.

Pundits pointed out that tortured people will tell you anything. Again, this displayed an amazing ignorance of intelligence tradecraft. While some people will tell you anything when tortured, a lot of people will also provide useful information that can be double checked. It's not like the movies, where everything depends on the painful pronouncements of one tortured individual.

The reality was that using "vigorous interrogation" brought forth much useful information, always has, and always will. Intelligence is all about putting together lots of small pieces. That's why U.S. operatives are taught how to resist torture. Yes, there are individuals who can outsmart, or outlast, torture. But they are always a minority. It's a war of numbers, and something that doesn't make for exciting soundbites.

The new Church Committee like restrictions outlawed things like the use of contractors for interrogations (even if there were no other source of manpower to do the job in time), the use of foreign nations to provide the "vigorous interrogation", the detention of foreigners without giving them access to the U.S. criminal justice system, and many more items that most CIA officials know, from their own experience, will only get Americans killed.

So how does the United States gather needed intelligence? It does it in secret (from many in Congress and, most of all, the media). The other intelligence agencies, like the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) are being allowed to run with these operations. Of course, everyone understands that they could still be hung out to dry down the road.

But there are more bosses in the DIA (compared to the CIA) that are willing to back up their operatives (some of whom will get screwed down the road, which is accepted as a risk of the job).

Another solution is to outsource many intel operations. The men and women who work for contractors are working without a net (of full U.S. government backing, both diplomatically and militarily). Not all these operatives are even American, but they will do it for a combination of money, adventure, personal beliefs and some assurances that America will provide some support if things get nasty (if only to retrieve the information the agents have obtained.)

The CIA lost its soul, it's heart, and most of its guts, in the late 1970s. Lots of brains are left, with big budgets to buy all manner of neat technology. But the bosses live fear of grandstanding politicians and headline hungry journalists.

While the British, the Israelis, and most other nations, have managed to capture and retain the ability to do street level intelligence, the CIA has not. It now serves mainly to draw fire, while other organizations get the job done.

Taliban have embarked on what amounts to a large scale suicide strategy...

The Taliban have embarked on what amounts to a large scale suicide strategy. In addition to dozens of individual suicide bombers, they have dozens of field units, each of about a hundred gunmen, looking to score spectacular (from a media, not a military, standpoint) victories.

Such attacks are being deliberately made against foreign troops from specific countries. France and Canada are particular targets. Month by month, the Taliban lose far more troops than they kill, in going after specific national contingents, but they are heartened by news reports of political unrest back in these countries, and calls for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

The Taliban don't really understand how democracy works (since they consider democracy un-Islamic and sinful), and make more of the media and political ruckus these attacks generate, than is justified by the actual results. But the Taliban have found that their followers get a boost out of the foreign angst over the casualties.

The Taliban are depending more and more on terrorizing the population into compliance and cooperation. Battles between Taliban and villagers are more common, as are Taliban executions of those considered un-Islamic. This can include foreign aid workers, Afghans who work for the foreigners, teachers in girls schools plus religious and tribal leaders who don't agree with the Taliban.

But the new suicide tactics also incorporates the increasing use of human shields. Taliban are now stopping civilians from leaving combat zones, and forcing civilians to remain in villages and compounds the Taliban are using. The Taliban know that this discourages the use of smart bombs or artillery against them. And if these weapons are used, the Taliban denounce the deliberate slaughter of civilians by the foreign troops. No death goes unexploited.

But the widespread use of suicide bombers is very alien to Afghan culture (which very much believes in "he who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day.") It's telling that the Taliban have become the bogeyman that mothers now use to frighten small children. Scary monsters, indeed.

What the Taliban are overlooking is that they grabbed power fifteen years ago because five years of civil war had made the people eager for anyone who could stop the fighting and general lawlessness. But this time, the Taliban are the main source of unrest and destruction. The Taliban demand "taxes" to fight their holy war and freely kill civilians. The main pro-Taliban tribal chief in Pakistan boasts of collecting over $6 million a month in such taxes.

The cell phone has become the most powerful weapon used against the Taliban. The government has a nationwide media program promoting the quick use of the phone to report suicide bomber attacks. Tips are provided on how to spot a suicide bomber, and the number to call. So far this year, the Taliban and al Qaeda have set off nearly a thousand bombs, killing mostly civilians.

This, despite the fact that the target for most of the bombs are foreign troops. The Taliban make a big deal about infidel (non-Moslem) soldiers defiling a Moslem country, ignoring the fact that the Taliban are more feared and hated than the foreign troops. But the Taliban cannot cope with the foreign troops in head-to-head combat. Some 80 percent of foreign troops casualties are caused by suicide and roadside bombs.

The main problems in Afghanistan; corruption and the drug trade, are taking a back seat to counter-terrorism work. But the drug gangs are running their own terror ops. In particular, the drug lords are getting their leased politicians to go after crusading journalists. Media stories about corrupt politicians are popular, but they bring unwelcome heat on the drug kingpins, who like to fancy themselves latter day Robin Hoods, not warlords with a good cash flow. So more and more investigative reporters are being harassed by the police.

Where Al Qaeda Excels

The movement of al Qaeda's main effort from Iraq to Pakistan does not involve large numbers, and the numbers have declined since the terrorists began urging new recruits to head for Pakistan. For several years, about a hundred foreign volunteers (usually for suicide type attacks) entered Iraq each month, brought in via an al Qaeda network in some Arab and European countries. Money is collected there, often under the guise of an Islamic charity, to pay for airfare, fees (some of the operatives along the way are basically mercenaries) and bribes (to get past border controls of countries trying to stop this traffic).

Now, only a few dozen al Qaeda recruits are getting to Pakistan each month. It's more expensive to get to Pakistan, compared to Iraq, and the government does not make it easy. There's also been a decline in cash contributions. Al Qaeda was beaten in Iraq, after years of saying they were winning. Al Qaedas mass murder campaign in Iraq killed mostly Moslems, and this was unpopular among potential donors. The violence in Iraq used the idea of "al Qaeda" to unite many very different Islamic militant groups, and the same concept is being used in Pakistan. Here there are tribal militias, operating as vigilantes against real or imagined sins against Islam. In the cities there are many different groups. Some are at war with another Islamic faction, others simply wish to impose their religious beliefs and practices on all other Moslems. But many do not want to be associated with al Qaeda, because of the groups reputation of violence towards Moslem women and children.

Local politicians (in Pakistan and Afghanistan) would like to blame much of the unrest on outsiders, and al Qaeda certainly fits the bill. But al Qaeda is a relatively small operation, and most of the Islamic radicals in the area are locals. Using religion as a tool to gain political and military advantage is an old problem, especially in Moslem countries. In general, Moslems like to play down this aspect of their religion, preferring to call Islam, "the religion of peace." But too many Moslem clerics, and ambitious politicians, are all too willing to exploit the militant and violent aspects of Islam. This is especially true along the Pakistan-Afghan border. But al Qaeda is a much smaller player in the region than its media coverage wound indicate. Al Qaeda is much better at playing the press than it is at doing anything else.

Hoo-ah: The Kurds Show The Way

The sudden collapse of al Qaeda operations in western Iraq was largely due to tribal politics. There are only a few tribes, or major clans, in western Iraq (Anbar province), and once U.S. commanders had finally convinced the tribes to switch sides, it was like hitting a light switch. Discipline within the tribes is pretty good, and many tribesmen had been on bad terms with al Qaeda for years. The terrorists had killed several tribal leaders, in an effort to insure support for terrorist operations. This backfired, and the tribes went after al Qaeda, literally, with a vengeance.

Now the remaining al Qaeda member, and their Iraqi Sunni Arab allies, are making their last stand in northern Iraq (Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, Nineveh and Diyala provinces). This is a much more complex situation. While Anbar was almost exclusively Sunni Arab, the four provinces up north also have Kurds and Turks, as well as some Shia Arabs, Christians and other religious minorities. This is made even more complex by the presence of over a hundred tribal and clan organizations. No one-stop deal making here.

Many of the Sunni Arabs up north are some of Saddam's most enthusiastic supporters. That's because Saddam spent over a decade expelling Kurds from the area, and turning the Kurdish property over to poor Sunni Arabs from down south. All Saddam asked for was loyalty. Saddam's immigrants are still loyal, especially since many of the disposed Kurds returned after 2003, looking to get their property back.

The Iraqi Army and police are doing most of the fighting up north, which is bad news for al Qaeda. Iraqi security forces speak the language, and have a good understanding of the social dynamics. Many of the tribes and clans (including some of the Sunni Arab ones) up north are pro-government, and as the terrorist organizations get chewed up month after month, more and more locals decide that loyalty to Saddam just isn't worth it any more. The Iraqis know this process has long term benefits. All they have to do is look at northernmost Iraq, the autonomous Kurdish territory. There, several million Kurds have, for fifteen years, lived without Sunni Arab terrorists, and have prospered mightily. They still have the infamous Middle Eastern corruption and cronyism to worry about, but even those ancient curses are openly discussed and attacked.

Iraqis now have something they have not experienced for decades; hope.

Hoo-ah: Lessons Of The Iraq War

As the U.S. armed forces have done so many times before, they entered the uncertainty of a new war in 2001, and are now trying to figure out what they gained from it. Most of what went on during this war was unreported or misreported. This is nothing new. The important details, and lessons, of all past American wars were poorly reported, and what the military is trying to avoid is taking away the wrong lessons.

Throughout the current conflict, the military made no secret of what they were doing, and just kept focused on winning. They knew they would be dealing with an unusual enemy, a stateless force based on ideology and religion based hatred. This foe was weak, in the conventional military sense, but was armed with two powerful weapons. First, there was the suicide bomber, and terrorism in general. Against civilian populations, this was a very effective weapon. Against a professional and resourceful military foe, it was much less so. But the enemy had another weapon; the media and political opposition in their opponents homeland. The media is eager to report real or imagined disasters and mistakes. This is how the news business has stayed solvent since the mass media first appeared in the mid 19th century. Al Qaeda was run by people who were aware of this, and knew how to exploit it, both among friendly (Moslem) populations, and in nations they had declared their enemy. This they did by exploiting the proclivities of the political oppositions in the West.

Many in the West considered terrorism a police matter. But al Qaeda believed that if they could turn it into a military campaign, by getting Western nations to use military force, they would trigger an angry reaction among Moslems. Al Qaeda had long preached that the West was the enemy of Islam, and a Western invasion of Moslem nations would prove this. They also knew that many in the West would not approve of military action. These politicians, and their followers, would continue to insist on treating Islamic terrorism as a police matter. This would cause political turmoil in the West, and weaken counter-terror operations.

The invasion of Afghanistan, after September 11, 2001, did indeed enrage many Moslems, even though many of them admitted that the Taliban government there had provided bases for al Qaeda. But the Islamic terrorists also took advantage of the fact that Moslems did not use the same logic as Westerners. Even after the Taliban government quickly fell in late 2001, to an "invasion force" of only 300 NATO troops (U.S. Army special forces and CIA agents), many Moslems insisted this was an unwarranted attack on a Moslem nation. This despite the fact that most Afghans wanted to be rid of the Taliban. And then it got worse, as many Moslems insisted that al Qaeda did not carry out the September 11, 2001 attacks. Many Moslems(and some in the West) still believe that the Israelis were behind it, or that the Americans staged an attack on themselves to provide an excuse to make war on Islamic nations. Al Qaeda knew how to exploit fantasies and cultural biases, even while al Qaeda leaders were taking credit for the 911 attacks.

The invasion of Iraq was even more contentious. In hindsight, the Iraq operation was essential to the defeat of al Qaeda, and the shattering of their popular support in the Moslem world. Al Qaeda, true to its own beliefs and tactics, tried to use terror attacks against the Shia Arab majority in Iraq, after 2003, as a way to put the Sunni Arab minority back in control. All this did was kill thousands of Moslem civilians and deflate popular support for al Qaeda. This could be seen, year by year, as opinion polls in Moslem countries revealed declining al Qaeda popularity.

But al Qaeda still had a lot of Support in the West. The political opposition in the United States, true to form (as in all past American wars) found ways to criticize the Iraq operation without actually joining the enemy. The media in the West backed the opposition, as that's where the headlines, and the profits, were.

Out of all this, the American military found other lessons. Their professional and resourceful troops found ways to neutralize enemy weapons (suicide and roadside bombs) while keeping their casualty rate at less than half what it was in Vietnam and pervious wars. The generals got no credit, in the media, for that, but the troops sure appreciated it. This resulted in the volunteer military to maintain its strength in wartime, the first time the U.S. had accomplished that since the American Revolution.

The troops developed a wide array of new techniques for fighting "irregular wars" (where the opponent is not a regular army.) The military adapted many new technologies to this new kind of war (smart bombs, data mining, forensics, persistent surveillance and lots of modern police techniques). The new problem is transferring as much of this new knowledge to future conventional wars. And there will be a transference. Most other major military powers are also trying to figure that out, so they can also profit from the American success.

Finally, the continued hammering the military is taking, for "failing" in this new kind of war, at least makes it less likely that there will be a problem with the victory disease (where winning brings with it complacency and all the ills that follow believing your own press releases.)

The New Taliban Tactics Have a Catch

The Afghan government believes that key leaders in the Pakistani army and intelligence service (the ISI) are still making deals, some of them secret, with the Taliban and Islamic radical groups, to make it easier for Afghanistan to be attacked, while providing Pakistan some immunity from terrorism. This kind of cynical arrangement is a staple of politics, especially in the Moslem world.

Islamic radical groups will grant such immunity from attack in return for favors, then later resume attacks. So while the Afghan accusations may sound bizarre to Western ears, they make a lot of sense along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Behind the scenes, the U.S. is trying to get the Pakistani army and ISI to change their strategy, but that is not easy. The generals leading both organizations (and the current head of the Pakistani military used to head ISI) are more concerned with self-preservation in the long term, than in eliminating Taliban activity inside Afghanistan. To the Pakistani generals, the Taliban are just another in a long line of tribal troublemakers. And it's traditional to deal with these fellows using bluff and bluster, rather than anything more expensive (like bullets and soldiers lives). Ideally, you'd like to get the tribes fighting each other, which is exactly what is happening when the Taliban go to Afghanistan. This year, however, there is an additional complication. Several thousand al Qaeda terrorists (or recruits) have showed up, the aftereffect of the al Qaeda defeat in Iraq. It's not yet clear how many of the al Qaeda men will cross the border, or stay and try to take control of Pakistan. The ISI is negotiating, hoping to get most of these new thugs into Afghanistan. But al Qaeda needs Pakistan as a base, and NATO is leaning on Pakistan hard to not allow that.

The Taliban have developed more effective tactics this year. After a disastrous outing last year, the Taliban were under a lot of pressure to reduce their casualties this year, and they have. The Afghans have always been adaptable, especially when it is a matter of life and death, and there have been many small changes in Taliban tactics to counter the greater lethality of NATO forces (who use UAVs, smart bombs and better trained troops). Taliban forces now operate in smaller groups, keeping weapons (which can be identified from the air by UAV or aircraft cameras) hidden, and concentrate forces just before an attack. Cell phones and walkie-talkies make this easier. Taliban will also break off an attack quickly, knowing that the smart bombs are on the way. The Taliban will stay near the Pakistani border, because the Americans and NATO rarely pursue, although smart bombs are more frequently dropped on the Pakistani side. But once a group of armed Taliban have made it into Pakistan, they can melt into the civilian population. Which leads to another popular Taliban tactic, using civilians as human shields. It doesn't always work, and when it doesn't the Taliban are quick to claim another NATO atrocity. The Taliban have also been using a growing number of deceptions to try and get NATO smart bombs or artillery to hit friendly targets. A favorite one on the border is to fire mortar shells at NATO troops on one side of the border, and at nearby Pakistani border guards just across the frontier, to try and deceive NATO and Pakistani troops into believing they are firing at each other. NATO counter-fire radars have spotted the shells, and traced them all back to the same location. But such radars are not always available, and sometimes this trick works. Another deception is feed bad intel to the followers, and try and trigger a missile or smart bomb attack on civilians.

This year's Taliban tactics, however, are more disruptive and less concerned with taking permanent control of territory. The Taliban is trying to disrupt the Afghan government control (which was never very great to begin with), and wear down the foreign troops (and cause popular discontent back home that will lead to NATO forces being recalled). The Taliban are playing the long game, which is how things are done up in these hills, when you are dealing with a more powerful opponent. The Taliban have no doubt that their foe (the Afghan government and their foreign allies) are more powerful. The foreign troops in particular, are very deadly. The older Taliban, who fought the Russians in the 1980s, note that the NATO and U.S. troops are all equal to the small number of commandos the Russians used. Back then, the only Russians the Afghans feared were the few thousand paratroopers and Spetsnaz commandos they sometimes encountered. When that happened, the Afghans knew it was time to retreat, quickly. But now, even the Afghan Army troops are more lethal. They have been trained by the Westerners, and that has made a difference. But most of the opponents the Taliban face are anti-Taliban (or pro-government, there is a difference) tribal fighters. The "Taliban War" is basically a tribal conflict, just as it was back in the 1980s, against the Russians, and in the 1990s, when the Taliban captured Kabul, and almost took over the entire country (cut short by the U.S. invasion of late 2001.)

The Taliban are paying more attention to extortion and taking over business operations, on both sides of the border. The Taliban may be on a Mission From God, but God's children have expenses and must get paid. The more the better. The tribal areas are poor, and the Taliban attracts a better grade of roughneck if they can pay better. The Taliban leaders, in particular, want more reliable gunmen, if only to provide themselves with better personal security. NATO has stepped up efforts to track down and kill the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership. This is happening more often, and is disrupting Taliban operations in areas where key leaders are taken out. The American get more cooperation from Afghans in this, because the Taliban have increased their attacks on reconstruction projects. This year, more efforts are being made to kidnap foreign aid workers, and hold them for ransom. The Taliban could kill these guys, but the ransom routine has the same demoralizing effect on the aid workers, and raises badly needed cash as well. In the last week, two French aid workers were grabbed, and two Turkish ones were released, after ransom was paid, after being held a week.

The U.S. is doubling the number of MRAPs (armored trucks designed to deflect mine and roadside bomb explosions) in Afghanistan (to 1,600). These must be driven in from Pakistani ports. That will come in handy, because the Taliban are trying to take down the road based NATO supply line, that stretches from the Pakistani coast into Afghanistan. These trucks are protected by lucrative security arrangements made with tribes that "own" the roads. These guys don't like seeing this income threatened by a bunch of religious fanatics. Most of this fighting is taking place on the Pakistani side of the border, and NATO has quietly told the Pakistanis that if these supply lines cannot be protected, NATO would have to come in and do it. This, more than anything else, motivates the Pakistanis to tone down Taliban violence, at least on the Pakistani side of the border.

July 16, 2008: Despite new tactics, the Taliban still get chewed up pretty badly. A Taliban war band, of about 300 men, was spotted as it crossed over from Pakistan, and quickly jumped on by NATO troops and smart bombs. About half the Taliban were killed, and the rest wounded, captured, or scattered. It's catastrophes like this that force the Taliban to pay better, and to encourage their commanders to keep their fighters dispersed. But many of the Taliban big shots are traditionalists, and just love the feeling of leading a column of several armed men through the mountains. It's a tradition that's become an expensive luxury, one that often costs you your life.

Hoo-ah: Victory As A Matter Of Opinion

Because al Qaeda doesn't have any real estate to call its own, much less a capital city to capture, determining who wins, or is even winning, the war on terror has always been subject to interpretation.

Those (in the West, and especially the U.S.) who believe the war is being won point to the lack of anymore terrorist attacks in the United States, the killing or capture of most known al Qaeda leaders, and defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq. Here al Qaeda openly declared they were fighting a major war with their infidel enemies, and now just as openly admit they were beaten. Then there are the opinion surveys throughout the Moslem world showing the steady decline of al Qaedas popularity since 2003.

Those (again in the West) who believe the war isn't being won point to the continued existence of al Qaeda, thousands of pro-terrorist web sites, and the existence of pro-al Qaeda groups in Europe and the Moslem world. Al Qaeda and the Taliban still thrive in Pakistan, where government inaction has provided a sanctuary.

In the Moslem nations, particularly those which provide most of the al Qaeda manpower (Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq, plus North African nations like Algeria and Libya) also tend to have two views of who is winning. Those who believe al Qaeda are winning tend to be Islamic radicals who want to get involved, but usually don't (aside from Internet cheerleading, and occasional public demonstrations). Since al Qaeda is on a mission from God, belief in ultimate victory is a matter of faith. Facts have little to do with it. Those who see al Qaeda as defeated, or losing, are those appalled by the number of Moslems killed by al Qaeda attacks, and the intolerance (towards Islamic practices not recognized by Islamic conservatives) expressed by al Qaeda members.

Different perceptions of progress in a war, and how it is being prosecuted, is nothing new. In every American war, including the revolution, there were numerous, and vehement, critics of how things were being done, and the results of those efforts.

In Moslem, and especially Arab, countries, the support for al Qaeda was originally based on the initial al Qaeda efforts to overthrow the corrupt governments that run most of these nations. Al Qaedas turn towards Western targets in the 1990s was the result of the terrorists failure to overthrow those Arab tyrants. Those same tyrants had long supported the belief that economic and other problems in Arab countries were the result of what the West had done (colonialism, persistent interference and support for Israel), and not the local despots. With decades of this anti-West propaganda, and the inability to get rid of their own tyrants, it was easy to blame everything on the West. Still is. Hard to tell who is winning or losing in that department.

The debate over who won, and how, will go on long after al Qaeda has completely faded away. That's also nothing new. Books are still being written about who won, or lost, or should, and in what manner, during World War II.

Hoo-ah: NATO Cowards Called To Accoun

U.S., British, Canadian and Dutch diplomats are leaning hard on other NATO members to provide more meaningful support in Afghanistan. This is not the first time such complaints have been made, but because U.S., British, Canadian and Dutch troops are doing nearly all the fighting, while most of the 50,000 NATO troops (particularly the Germans and French) stay in the north, where there is very little action, tempers are getting short.

What particularly irritates the four "fighting nations" are the 70-80 "special instructions" the other NATO nations have attached to the use of their troops in Afghanistan.

This pressure has had some effect. France is moving some of its combat troops to eastern Afghanistan, where there has been an increase in the number of Pakistani Taliban crossing the border. Some nations have offered to send much needed helicopters and medical units, but even this will take time. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, most European nations have sharply cut their military spending (as a percentage of GDP), and just let their armed forces quietly fall apart. This has become embarrassingly obvious as they are now called on to step up help out in Afghanistan. Many politicians said yes, only to find themselves caught short by the realities of their decrepit armed forces.

The U.S. has been trying to supply more troops, but this is unpopular in the face of other NATO members shirking their responsibilities. Some 2,200 American marines are leaving in November, and the U.S. Army is reluctant to send another brigade to Afghanistan, after they just chased al Qaeda out of Iraq. Remnants of the terrorist organizations have fled to Pakistan, but the defeat in Iraq has hurt recruiting and fund raising worldwide. Even NATO politicians realize that this is an opportunity to deliver another crushing defeat to the Islamic terrorists, if only they have enough fighting troops in Afghanistan.

Hoo-ah: Afghanistan Becomes The Most Dangerous Place...for the Bad Guys LOL

Last month, two trends collided. It's now more dangerous for U.S. (and NATO) troops to be in Afghanistan, compared to Iraq.

In May, U.S. troops suffered 19 dead in Iraq. On an annualized basis, that's 1.6 troops per thousand (per year). Still dangerous, but not particularly scary.

In Afghanistan, U.S. and NATO troops suffered 29 dead in May. On an annualized basis, that's 5 troops per thousand (per year). There are about twice as many foreign troops in Iraq compared to Afghanistan. If the trends continue, this year will see Afghanistan being 2-3 times as dangerous for foreign troops, compared to Iraq.

Violence in Afghanistan is actually running at about half the level of last year, but NATO and Afghan troops are operating more aggressively this year. Unlike the past two years, there was no big "Taliban Spring Offensive" this year. Instead, government and foreign troops are attacking Taliban and drug gang control of parts of southern Afghanistan (where most of the world's terrorism currently comes from.)

It's a different kind of war in Afghanistan, with the enemy taking higher losses than their Iraqi counterparts. Al Qaeda has shifted its operations to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and is using the same tactics that caused it to be defeated in Iraq.

Yes, it sounds idiotic. But these are the same people who believe they get 72 virgins (to abuse for eternity) when they are killed in combat, and seriously believe that if they keep fighting long enough, the world will become one big Islamic religious dictatorship, where women will live very restricted lives and all the men will wear beards. If it weren't for all the innocents these maniacs kill, it would be comic. But they do, and it isn't.

Hoo-ah: Arab Nations Unite Against Al Qaeda

Most Arab nations have agreed on a new set of regulations to crack down on terrorist fund raising and money laundering in their countries. Until the recent defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, it was considered too politically risky to go after wealthy donors to Islamic radical groups. Money laundering was another untouchable area, because corruption was so common, and money laundering was part of that. But "reform" has become increasingly popular in the Arab world over the past few years, and these new counter-terrorism efforts are part of it.

It's no longer fashionable to rejoice whenever a Islamic terrorist bomb goes off in the West, or anywhere else for that matter. Since 2003, most of the al Qaeda violence has been against Arabs, and after a few years of this, public opinion turned on the Islamic terrorists. Public opinion wants these butchers shut down. This means that those who support Islamic radicalism are no longer as tolerated as they used to be.

Another aspect of the crack down on money laundering is the growing popularity of honesty is business and government. Lots of corruption is still tolerated, and many Arabs insist that corruption is "part of the culture." But the money laundering is seen as primarily criminal, a tool largely for gangsters and terrorists.

How successful these new agreements will be remains to be seen. It will be at least a year before one can tell with any certainty.

Hoo-ah: What you are NOT hearing about Iraq from the Media !

Al Qaeda web sites are making a lot of noise about "why we lost in Iraq."

Intelligence agencies are fascinated by the statistics being posted in several of these Arab language sites. Not the kind of stuff you read about in the Western media.

According to al Qaeda, their collapse in Iraq was steep and catastrophic. According to their stats, in late 2006, al Qaeda was responsible for 60 percent of the terrorist attacks, and nearly all the ones that involved killing a lot of civilians. The rest of the violence was carried out by Iraqi Sunni Arab groups, who were trying in vain to scare the Americans out of the country.

Today, al Qaeda has been shattered, with most of its leadership and foot soldiers dead, captured or moved from Iraq. As a result, al Qaeda attacks have declined more than 90 percent. Worse, most of their Iraqi Sunni Arab allies have turned on them, or simply quit. This "betrayal" is handled carefully on the terrorist web sites, for it is seen as both shameful, and perhaps recoverable.

This defeat was not as sudden as it appeared to be, and some Islamic terrorist web sites have been discussing the problem for several years. The primary cause has been Moslems killed as a side effect of attacks on infidel troops, Iraqi security forces and non-Sunnis. Al Qaeda plays down the impact of this, calling the Moslem victims "involuntary martyrs." But that's a minority opinion. Most Moslems, and many other Islamic terrorists, see this as a surefire way to turn the Moslem population against the Islamic radicals. That's what happened earlier in Algeria, Afghanistan, Egypt and many other places. It's really got nothing to do with religion. The phenomenon hits non-Islamic terrorists as well (like the Irish IRA and the Basque ETA).

The senior al Qaeda leadership saw the problem, and tried to convince the "Al Qaeda In Iraq" leadership to cool it. That didn't work. As early as 2004, some Sunni Arabs were turning on al Qaeda because of the "involuntary martyrs" problem. The many dead Shia Arab civilians led to a major terror campaign by the Shia majority. They controlled the government, had the Americans covering their backs, and soon half the Sunni Arab population were refugees.

Meanwhile, the "Al Qaeda In Iraq" leadership was out of control. Most of these guys are really out there, at least in terms of fanaticism and extremism. This led to another fatal error. They declared the establishment of the "Islamic State of Iraq" in late 2006. This was an act of bravado, and touted as the first step in the re-establishment of the caliphate (a global Islamic state, ruled over by God's representative on earth, the caliph.) The caliphate has been a fiction for over a thousand years. Early on, the Islamic world was split by ethnic and national differences, and the first caliphate fell apart after a few centuries. Various rulers have claimed the title over the centuries, but since 1924, when the Turks gave it up (after four centuries), no one of any stature has taken it up. So when al Qaeda "elected" a nobody as the emir of the "Islamic State of Iraq", and talked about this being the foundation of the new caliphate, even many pro-al Qaeda Moslems were aghast. When al Qaeda could not, in 2007, exercise any real control over the parts of Iraq they claimed as part of the new Islamic State, it was the last straw. The key supporters, battered by increasingly effective American and Iraqi attacks, dropped their support for al Qaeda, and the terrorist organization got stomped to bits by the "surge offensive" of last year. The final insult was delivered by the former Iraqi Sunni Arab allies, who quickly switched sides, and sometimes even worked with the Americans (more so than the Shia dominated Iraqi security forces) to hunt down and kill al Qaeda operators.

If you can read Arabic, you can easily find these pro-terrorism sites, and see for yourself how al Qaeda is trying to explain its own destruction to its remaining supporters. While it's common to assume the Information War has been going against the West, this was not the case when you checked with what was going on inside the enemy camp.

Internet fuels emergence of violent Islamist groups in the United States

Internet fuels emergence of violent
Islamist groups in the United States

By Katherine McIntire Peterskpeters@govexec.com

The violent Islamist terrorist threat has evolved and expanded since al Qaeda planned the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and radicalization of disaffected Muslims and recent converts to Islam is increasingly occurring here in the United States. Yet the federal government has "no cohesive and comprehensive outreach and communications strategy in place to confront this thread." Those are among the findings of a new report by the staff of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

The report, "Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat," is the first in a series of reports to be issued jointly by the majority and minority staff and is notable for its bipartisan conclusions.

The report points out that both Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and FBI Director Robert Mueller testified about the growing threat of "homegrown" extremists in February before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. According to McConnell, evidence suggested the radical and violent segment of the Muslim population in the West was growing, although the cells detected thus far in the United States have been less sophisticated than those in Europe or elsewhere overseas. Through Internet connections, however, these groups were bound to become more sophisticated and capable without having to travel overseas for training, he said.

The study examines al Qaeda's online media operation and identifies four highly sophisticated production centers that use cutting-edge technology to produce a range of products, including online magazines, official statements, news updates, white papers and even poetry.

Once content is created by one of the production centers, it is funneled to a clearinghouse before it is posted on the Internet. "One of the most active Internet clearinghouses today is the al-Fajr Media Center, which was established in January 2006. Like the production centers, al-Fajr is almost entirely virtual. The approval process for dissemination is unclear, but once approved, content is moved from al-Fajr to preapproved Web sites. On a daily basis, al-Fajr issues a host of material, including statements from violent Islamist groups taking credit for attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Algeria and elsewhere," the report stated.

The clearinghouses perform two key functions: They ensure the authenticity of the message, which is essential to maintaining the movement's strict interpretation of Islam and its long-term goal to destroy the West; and they facilitate the near-instantaneous dissemination of new propaganda, according to the report.

"The propaganda regularly produced by this process finds its way to literally thousands of violent Islamist Web sites across the Internet, many of which are either 'mirrored' versions of one another, or 'simply bulletin boards' that disseminate the same material created by the production houses," the report said.

Charles Allen, chief intelligence officer and undersecretary for intelligence and analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said in a May 6 speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that al Qaeda "has ratcheted up the speed and accuracy of translated statements openly marketed to U.S. and English-speaking audiences." Al Qaeda's objective, Allen said, "is to gain wide Muslim support, empathy, financing and future recruits."

The growing sophistication of al Qaeda's Internet campaign poses a serious threat and has the potential to erode the United States' cultural and community characteristics (especially the integration of Muslims into American society) that have thus far discouraged violent radicalization. Left unchallenged, al Qaeda's message espoused over the Internet will drive more individuals in the United States through the radicalization process and encourage them to conduct actual attacks, the Senate committee report noted.

Nonetheless, testimony the committee received showed that, "no federal agency has been tasked with developing or implementing a domestic communications strategy."

Perhaps the most significant outreach effort has come from Homeland Security's Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, which meets regularly with religious and ethnic community leaders in five major cities and tries to address the concerns of participants. Yet the effort is not part of a governmentwide outreach effort, nor does the office coordinate with the FBI, which has substantial contact with communities throughout the country via its 56 field offices. Neither the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties office's program nor the FBI's own outreach program is designed to counter violent Islamist ideology.

"Efforts that rely on relatively uncoordinated outreach to American-Muslim communities and fragmented communications strategies must be improved. Indeed, the most credible voices in isolating and rejecting violent Islamist ideology are those of Muslim community leaders, religious leaders and other nongovernmental actors who must play a more visible and vocal role in discrediting and providing alternatives to violent Islamist ideology," the committee concluded.

Hoo-ah: Mahdi Army Fades Away

After a month of fighting, the Mahdi Army has disappeared from the streets of Basra, the largest city in the south. The army and police are everywhere, and people are providing information on where Mahdi Army personnel are hiding out, and the locations of their weapons caches. Up north, in the Sadr City section of east Baghdad, the Mahdi Army is still fighting hard. But the army and police have the upper hand, and are pushing the Shia militiamen back block by block. Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al Sadr has responded by threatening to order his men to go after American troops if the government does not back off. That's won't work, because the Mahdi Army is not particularly skillful, and not very united either. He recently ordered his troops to stop fighting Iraqi soldiers and police, and concentrate on the Americans. The Iraqi security forces have not reciprocated, and continue coming after the Mahdi Army.

The dozen or so factions of the Mahdi Army vary in their loyalty to Sadr, or to political solutions. Several of the Mahdi Army factions are basically criminal gangs masquerading as religious zealots. Sadr denies he is a pawn of Iran, but as Mahdi Army houses are captured, more Iranian weapons and equipment show up, as well as religious propaganda from Iran. Iraqi president Maliki has told Sadr that the offensive would halt if the Mahdi Army surrenders all its weapons, stops attacking, or trying to infiltrate (by joining) the security forces, and hands over members wanted for crimes. So far, Sadr refuses, probably because many of his followers would turn on him if he tried. But Sadr also realizes that the Iraqi soldiers and police are capable, eventually, of grinding the Mahdi Army into nothingness. Another month or so of fighting and the Mahdi Army will be no more.

Al Sadr, and many of his followers, see all this violence against them as a plot by the Badr Organization to be the last major militia standing. The Badr Organization began as a Shia anti-Saddam exile group, in Iran, a quarter century ago. But the Badr "Brigade" renounced the use of force, formed a political party, and urged its Brigade members to join the army and police. This they did, and many believe these former militiamen are still loyal to their Badr Brigade bosses. But the Badr leaders insist that the Brigade is no more, and the Badr Organization is strictly political. In any event, the Badr people have been more cooperative with the government than the Sadr crew.

Meanwhile, Sunni Arab politicians have returned to the government. These Sunni Arab political parties had walked out of the government nine months ago, angry over the failure to guarantee their rights, safety and share of the oil revenue. Since then, the Sunni Arab terrorism effort has been shattered, with many of the Sunni Arab terror groups switched sides and joined the war against al Qaeda.

Iraq is trying to get its Arab neighbors to forgive some $65 billion in Saddam era debts, without much success. Most of the money was borrowed in the 1980s, when Iraq was at war with Iran. Iraq has already had some $65 billion in debts, mostly to Russia and European nations, forgiven. But the Arabs want their money. The other Arab states in the region see Shia dominated Iraq as a potential ally of Iran, and not "real" Arabs. Conservative Sunni Arab clerics regularly preach that Shia Moslems (like most Iraqis and nearly all Iranians) are heretics and not to be trusted.

The government is openly proclaiming the decline, if not complete destruction, of Sunni Arab terrorist group al Qaeda, at least in Iraq. There are far fewer suicide bomb attacks, and most of them are individuals wearing explosive belts, rather that more elaborate car or truck bombs. Moreover, the targets are all "soft" (easy to reach civilians). Al Qaeda is trying to be selective, going after the leaders of Sunni Arab groups that switched sides in the past few months. It is this kind of brutality that caused Sunni Arab groups to turn on al Qaeda, but that kind of logic is lost on the remaining terrorists.

Up north, Turkish warplanes and artillery continue to hit suspected PKK bases along the Iraqi border. The Kurdish government in the north protests, but quietly. No one in the region wants to get into a squabble with the Turks, especially not the Turkish army.

Intelligence officers call al Qaeda nuclear threat real

Intelligence officers call
al Qaeda nuclear threat real

By Michael Posner Congress Daily April 2, 2008

Two high-level government intelligence experts testified Wednesday that al Qaeda is intent on attacking the United States with a nuclear weapon but has not developed a nuclear device.

In a hearing, Charles Allen, chief intelligence officer for the Homeland Security Department, said there is no doubt that al Qaeda wants a nuclear weapon. But, he told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, "I do not believe that any terrorist organization currently has developed a nuclear device." He said, however, that this capability "could change drastically" with the recruitment of people with knowledge of nuclear materials and design.

His testimony was buttressed by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, director of the office of intelligence and counterintelligence of the Energy Department. Before Sept. 11, 2001, he said, many in the intelligence community believed it was too hard for terrorists to develop a nuclear bomb.

"We should not, however, assume that the technology of a nuclear weapon is beyond the capability of a terrorist group," Mowatt-Larssen said. "A terrorist group needs only to produce a nuclear yield once to change history.

"Both experts plan to testify before the committee later Wednesday to discuss classified material. "We do not yet know when and where they intend to strike us next," Mowatt-Larssen testified, "but past experience strongly suggests that they are seeking an attack more spectacular than 9/11.

"Mowatt-Larssen said a global effort must be undertaken to get nuclear materials off the black market and stop global trafficking in them. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Chairman Joseph Lieberman, I-Conn., summed up the testimony of both men as sobering.

Matthew Bunn, a nuclear exert at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, said that nuclear stockpile security in Russia "has improved dramatically in the past 15 years" but called for more global nuclear security. He too warned of the threat from a terrorist group.

"This is a real danger," he said. Homeland Security Department's Allen said any terrorist nuclear bomb would lack the sophistication of one developed by a country and be of unknown yield. But, he warned, "A nuclear device of any yield could produce thousands of casualties, significant damage to the infrastructure and render large areas uninhabitable."

Similarly, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs ranking member Susan Collins of Maine supported that assessment, saying that a 10-kiloton nuclear device in Manhattan's Times Square at noon would result immediately in the loss of half a million lives.

Analyst warns of third Islamic terrorist wave, enabled by Internet

Analyst warns of third Islamic terrorist wave, enabled by Internet

By Greg Grant ggrant@govexec.com

Al Qaeda is not the central planning, recruiting and organizing force for global terrorism it once was, but has become more of a brand name that leaderless terrorist groups around the world assume to gain recognition and notoriety, according to a leading terrorist expert.

The third wave of terrorists comprises mostly "terrorist wannabes," said Marc Sageman, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, who was a CIA case officer in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

They are a post-Iraq terrorist generation made up predominately of Muslims in Europe who feel shut out of the labor market, said Sageman, speaking in Washington on Feb. 20 at an event sponsored by the New America Foundation. They become increasingly radicalized by shared group discontent and join the terrorist jihad in a quest for glory and heroism, he added.

These dissidents typically don't associate face to face, rather their interaction has shifted to Internet chat rooms and online forums, which act as "echo chambers" where anger intensifies and participants become more radicalized, Sageman said. The virtual world enables the natural dynamic of "in-group love and out-group hate," in which jihadists become more withdrawn from society and associate only with radical and like-minded thinkers.

The Internet also is transforming the demographics of the modern terrorist threat, he said, as younger people, who constantly troll Web sites, and women, traditionally excluded from political participation because of religious reasons, are able to become involved in activism. While the post-Sept. 11 security environment is much more hostile toward terrorist aspirants, the Internet permits scattered groups to connect virtually.

Sageman said the first wave of terrorists were early companions of Osama bin Laden, who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight Soviet invaders. Called Afghan Arabs, most being Egyptian, they are the surviving leaders of al Qaeda. Bin Laden only trusts and has contact with this hard-core group of original al Qaeda members. The second wave joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s, he said, and is made up mostly of disenfranchised Muslims from Europe. Both groups, which number around 2,000, remain isolated and hidden in the lawless Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

The third wave sprung up organically, linking virtually with other networks, but because of the war on terror they have been unable to travel to this region for al Qaeda training and resources. Far more terrorist plots originate with this latest wave, Sageman said, but generally, they are poorly planned and the terrorists usually are arrested before they carry out an attack.

The latest terrorist wave is largely a self-limiting threat, Sageman said, because it's made up mostly of bored, unemployed young people with fantasies of glory and thrills. That profile lacks the ideological commitment to jihad that is typical of the older al Qaeda generation. Feeling shut out of the local labor market, they turn to crime and, in many cases, join gangs. They typically lead a life of crime for about a decade and then turn to religion as a salvation, he added, proceeding down a path of radicalization and violence sparked by moral outrage.

Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist who examined the cases of nearly 500 known terrorists in his book 'Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century' (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), found no single characteristic that explains why somebody becomes a terrorist. The most common trait among terrorists is shared relationship. More than two-thirds of the cases he examined were either friends who associated at the local mosque and then joined terrorist organizations collectively or were relatives who joined the family business.

"Most small groups of jihadists are trusted friends, who have spontaneously self-organized, with no top down al Qaeda recruitment program," Sageman said. This pattern also was identified by Islamic scholar Olivier Roy in his book 'Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah' (Columbia University Press, 2004). He labeled it franchising. Groups organize based on local solidarities, such as neighborhood, family or tribe and take on the al Qaeda label, but with no actual ties to the organization."

The pool of potential Mujaheddin is composed of small clusters of close friends, relatives, worshippers and disciples, who are connected through strong bonds," Sageman said. "This group becomes self-sufficient and closes in on itself. This social isolation protects the group.

"Since the Sept. 11 attacks, terrorist arrests in the United States have targeted 60 people, he said. During the same period in Europe, terrorist arrests totaled 2,400. More Muslims there turn to terrorism than in the United States because most European countries are built on a notion of national essence, Sageman said, which can shut out other cultures. Muslims in Europe also face a tough job market and high unemployment, he said, factors that foster disenfranchisement, anger and radicalization.

In the United States, the idea of a national melting pot and the American dream tend to weaken the appeal of jihadism among Muslim Americans. The ones who migrate to the United States typically are university professors, engineers, physicians and business professionals who more easily enter the labor force. The average Muslim family in America makes about $70,000 per year, compared with the national average of $48,000, Sageman said.

Many warn of al Qaeda and its jihadist appeal spreading throughout the Muslim world. But Sageman said in every instance al Qaeda has attempted to shift from terrorism to governing, it has been rejected. He cited Algeria in the 1990s, Afghanistan in 2001 and most recently, the Anbar province of Iraq.

The result is a Taliban-like regime, such as the one that arose in Afghanistan in the 1990s, he said. The Taliban was rejected for its harsh measures and piety when a stronger armed movement, the U.S. military, arrived in 2001.

The idea of establishing an al Qaeda regime is not the reason people become terrorists, Sageman said, rather it's about the process of trying to become heroes and finding something appealing in their unsatisfying and boring lives.