Tank Warfare In The Gaza Battlefield

The tactical success of the Israeli military incursion into Gaza over the past week confirms a lesson I noted after the five-day Russian conquest of one-third of Georgia in the Caucasus last August: Main Battle Tanks still rule ground war, whatever the high-tech, guerrilla-war and minimum-army enthusiasts say to the contrary.

In the first four days of its ground forces' incursion into Gaza, Israel inflicted an estimated 500 military fatalities on the forces of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement. But the Israeli army forces involved suffered only five or six fatalities.

This obviously reflected the extremely poor military performance of Hamas so far. Hamas' military weakness has been in striking contrast to the very impressive performance against the Israelis of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite Party of God, in the mini-war in southern Lebanon in July 2006. On that occasion, Hezbollah forces were well dug in and they used improvised explosive devices very effectively against Israel's much vaunted, homemade Merkava (Chariot) Main Battle Tanks.

Hamas had had plenty of time to equip itself with IEDs and to train its cadres how to use them. Also, the densely populated urban maze of Gaza City should have provided plenty of opportunities to inflict significant casualties on the Israeli Main Battle Tanks. But so far Hamas forces have had negligible impact on them.

Part of the contrast obviously reflects the renewed emphasis on training, unit cohesion and sheer disciplinary toughness that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his highly respected Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi have had upon the Israel Defense Forces -- Zahal.

But there is another factor as well: While tanks have many vulnerabilities in different aspects of modern ground and guerrilla war, it is impossible to conquer a country, win a full-scale battle or hold occupied hostile territory without them.

The striking success of Russian Main Battle Tanks in the five-day conflict with Georgia last August, like the current fighting in Gaza, proves once again how crucial tanks remain to the conduct of modern war.

In the former Soviet republic of Georgia, Russia used a concentration of its state-of-the-art T-90 Main Battle Tanks, which also have been sold in large numbers -- 657 in all -- to India, backed up by significant numbers of older, supposedly obsolete but still highly effective models, especially the more than a quarter-century-old T-72.

The failure of Hamas so far to come up with any tactical solution to the Israeli deployment of its venerable but still effective Merkavas. The Merkavas, like the old Soviet-era T-72 Main Battle Tanks the Russians used to such effect in Georgia, proved that masses of tanks don't have to be state-of-the-art technological wonders to be highly effective war winners. Concentrations of older models kept running through effective maintenance can get the job done quickly and cheaply.

Russian Military displaying U.S. Military equipment from Georgia

Off a email, from a Buddy who is in Moscow, hope to have some pic soon

A Russian military museum in Moscow has been displaying American military equipment, taken from Georgia, and portraying military operations in Georgia as a victory over America.

The American gear was material provided to Georgia over the past few years as part of a training program for Georgian troops headed for peacekeeping duty in southern Iraq.

And this: Russia is cracking down on Western media appearing on Russian television. The government controls most of the mass broadcast media, and wants to remove "decadent" U.S. stuff like South Park and the Simpsons, and replace it with more patriotic shows.

Just like in the good old days of the Cold War, before the Soviet Union disappeared. The government has had some success in manipulating public opinion, usually by exploiting existing attitudes (anger at the loss of empire and hostility to the United States).

Russians Troops got Lost in Georgia and was Blind

For Background see Russian military demonstrated great resourcefulness, Russia moves SS-21 missiles into Georgia and Georgia Hidden Victories - What the Drive by Press did NOT tell you

More information is coming out of Russia describing the problems troops encountered when they invaded Georgia last month.

It turns out that the Russians lost twentyfive aircraft (ten Su-25s, five Su-24s, two Tu-22s, and eight Mi-24s "HIND" helicopter.) The Russian pilots were not prepared to deal with the three batteries of SA-11 anti-aircraft missile systems the Georgians had bought from Ukraine last year.

There is now more work being done on countermeasures, and training pilots to cope.

Another unanticipated problem was the unreliability of the Russian navigation satellites. Russia's answer to GPS, GLONASS, was at full strength (24 satellites) shortly after the Cold War ended (1995).

But the end of the Cold War meant the end of the regular financing for GLONASS. Maintaining the system meant launching replacement satellites every 5-7 years. By the end of 2002, only seven GLONASS birds were still operational.

However, a series of launches in 2003 increased the number of active satellites to twelve, and that went to 18 by the end of 2007. Russia plans to put eight more GLONASS satellites in orbit this year. That would expand the system to 24 navigation satellites.

Russia plans to have the system fully operational next year. Right now, it is active for most of Russia, but not, it turned out, in Georgia.

Aircraft and ground forces got lost, and that led to more losses.

The GLONASS problems also prevented use of Russian smart bombs with much effectiveness. The government is already planning to replace the current GLONASS satellites with 30 second generation birds by 2011.

Georgia Joins The NATO Grid

Although Georgia has not been able to join NATO, it has been able to link it's air defense radars with NATOs air defense system.

NATO engineers and technicians recently devised ways to link the signals from the Russian made radars used in Georgia, to the monitoring systems used by the NATO air defense network.

The signals from Georgia are sent by satellite to Europe, where NATO air defense controllers can see, in real time, what is going on over Georgia.

This makes it more difficult for the Russians to violate Georgian air space, then lie about it.

NATO nations are also sending Georgia new weapons, including portable anti-aircraft missiles. The Russians are not happy about this, and are using a loophole in the ceasefire agreement negotiated in France last month, to raid Georgian bases and continue destroying equipment.

Another Rhineland...

Russia has announced that it will, in effect, annex the Georgian separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

No one is willing to face down the Russians on this issue, which many of Russias neighbors see as the first of many such annexations.

There is a precedent for this sort of thing, and it all began on the French-German border in 1936.

Some historians see the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 as the real beginning of World War II.

As part of the treaty that ended World War I, Germany agreed to keep troops out of the Rhineland (a German region on the French border). Going back in was a huge gamble for the Germans, who were in the midst of rebuilding their military, and, in 1936, much weaker than France or Britain.

But neither of these countries were willing to risk the violence that might occur if they went after the 32,000 troops and police Germany sent into the Rhineland. This convinced Hitler that he could bully the Western allies, and grab neighboring countries with impunity.

This worked for Austria and Czechoslovakia, but triggered World War II when Germany and Russia (by prior agreement) carved up Poland in 1939.

Russia may not have its sights on Poland this time around, but Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic States and a few of the Central Asian "stans" would be nice. Would, or could, anyone stop them?

Hitler didn't have nuclear weapons, nor was Germany the supplier of a quarter of Europe's energy needs. Hitler also didn't have the support of the German people for such military adventures, the current Russian government does. Russia also still has its secret police apparatus.

Perhaps not as large as when the Soviet Union was still around, but it's still there. Credit Cards, the Internet and cell phones make it easier to keep track of people. There are still KGB old timers around who remember how to run a prison camps.

Absorbing the nations of the "near abroad" (as Russia calls its neighbors), would mean having to deal with a lot of dissidents. That's what the Gulag (the Russian acronym for the prison camp system, or "The Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies") was created for. It gets the troublemakers off the streets, permanently, as needed. Puts the fear of Moscow into the newly acquired citizens of the Russian State. It worked before, it can work again. So did taking over the Rhineland.

Jackie Mason '08 Vlog 48 The Russian Georgia Conflict

I love Jackie MasonAs a new Hitler emerges in Russia in the form of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the world is in a serious crisis. Stop Russia from invading Georgia like we should have done when Hitler rolled into Poland and Chekslovakia, or allow Russia to rebuild it's Asian and European Empire once again and thus leading to world war.

At this time in history, can we as a nation afford to have an inexperienced President like Barack Obama?

For the sake of our nation and the world, we must elect John McCain, someone who at least understands this this threat better, and can lead our nation against this and the countless other threats in our future.

Implications of Russian Cyber Battles

Implications of
Russian Cyber Battles
By Colin Clark

When the history of the Russian invasion of Georgia is written, one of the most revealing discussions may center on the role of cyber warfare.

Some questions that will need answering: Just when did Russian hackers begin their attacks on the Georgian websites. Just what role did NATO — especially Estonian and American — cyber warriors have in guiding the Georgian response. Was the enormous three-week attack on Estonia last April from Russia a practice run for the Georgian attack?

When the Russians crippled Estonia’s cyber infrastructure, NATO dispatched top cyber war experts to investigate and to improve the Estonians’ electronic defenses.

It seems reasonable that, in the event of a true combined operation against the Georgians, NATO dispatched cyber experts to help though I haven’t confirmed that yet. There are numerous reports that Estonia has sent cyber warriors to help the Georgians combat both countries historic nemesis.

Official and unofficial Pentagon spokesmen refused to comment on whether the US might or might not be assisting the Georgians in their efforts to protect their Internet infrastructure.

However, one source said that if any US agency would be helping the Georgians it would be the Department of Homeland Security. The reason: if the Russians were to learn the Pentagon was assisting the Georgians they could claim the US was waging cyber war against them.

And US policy is that attacks on our computer systems can be considered an act of war, a logic the Russians would be sure to follow. If DHS is assisting the Georgians then we can make it very clear that US efforts are purely defensive. Also, DHS is home to the Computer Emergency Response Team.

All this raises questions about the US approach to cyber warfare — not defensive and security measures, but the willingness to use the web to attack an enemy to blunt or cripple their offensive capabilities.

As one of my wittier sources put it earlier today: Are the Georgians really more afraid of a cyber attack than of all those missiles raining down on their heads. The global World Wide Web may be incredibly resilient, but local web connections can be seriously disrupted by those old timey capabilities known as kinetics. Destroy phone or cable connections –easily done with artillery or bombs — and you’ve made it a lot harder to rebuild and reconnect than would a denial of service attack. On top of the destruction, an enemy can send a much clearer and simpler signal than can be done through cyber attacks. On the other hand, it is the very ambiguity of a cyber attack that can make it such a powerful tool in the times before a conflict erupts. Ask the Russians and the Estonians.

Russian military demonstrated great resourcefulness

The Russian military demonstrated great resourcefulness and innovation during its recent campaign in Georgia.

This includes the strategic planning, because the war was a set up. Russia used two Airborne Division and parts of two other, two Tank Divisions, parts of three Motorized Rifle Division, a lot of Special Operation troops, Chechen Special Operation units and North Ossetian militia groups for the invasion, and had been holding FTX's since July.

The increased border violence by South Ossetian forces caused the Georgians think they could retake the lost (in 1991) province. Less than a day after the Georgian forces entered South Ossetia, the Russian force came in.

The Georgians were not prepared for this, even though the Russians had been making a lot of noise, for weeks, on the Internet about the growing "crises" in South Ossetia.

By August 8th, the Russian Cyber War preparations became evident, as most Georgian media and government web sites were shut down by Russian attacks. It was the Internet version of the blitzkrieg, and a blow to military and civilian morale in Georgia.

But on the ground, the combat experience of the Russian troops quickly translated in defeats for inexperienced Georgian troops. Despite several years of training under the supervision of Israeli and American combat veterans, the Georgians were still not as effective as the Russians (who have been fighting in Chechnya for over a decade).

Although the Georgian anti-aircraft units brought down some Russian jets, the Russians basically ruled the skies and used that to constantly pick apart Georgian units.
(see Georgia Hidden Victories)

It was Russian air power the prevented the Georgians from mounting an effective defense.

Russia told the UN that it would veto any UN attempt to pass resolutions urging Russia to hurry up and get out of Georgia. The Russian success in Georgia was very popular inside Russia, where there has been growing unhappiness over Russias loss of empire and superpower status in the early 1990s. Nationalist politicians are talking about rebuilding the empire.

This could get tricky, and is one reason the Russians get so excited when another of their neighbors talks about joining NATO. That organization is designed for mutual defense. You attack one NATO member, you attack them all.

Russia moves SS-21 missiles into Georgia

Russia has moved short-range SS-21 missile launchers into South Ossetia since fighting there halted, and has yet to give any sign of a significant pullback of its troops from Georgia.

Instead, there were indications that Russia was adding ground troops and equipment to its force in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, strengthening its hold over the breakaway Georgian regions.

"We are seeing evidence of SS-21 missiles in South Ossetia," a DoD official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The SS-21's 70 to 120 kilometer range (43 to 75 miles) should put them within striking distance of Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, officials said.

Later Monday, another DoD official said, "While we are still monitoring the situation and it is probably a little early, we have not seen any significant Russian movement out of Georgia today."

The White House would not comment on the status of the Russian forces in the Caucasus country Monday.

"But let me be clear: If it rolled in after August 6th, it needs to roll out," said White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe.

"That would be in keeping with the Russian commitment on withdrawal," he said, as US President George W. Bush spent time on his Texas ranch.

Without confirming that a Russian buildup was underway in the enclaves, a Pentagon spokesman said: "Anything such as that or any other military equipment that was moved in would be in violation of the ceasefire and should be removed immediately."

"The only forces that are permitted to remain under the ceasefire agreement are the forces that were in there at the August 6th timeframe" before the conflict erupted, said spokesman Bryan Whitman.

In Moscow, a Russian general denied that SS-21s had been deployed in South Ossetia.

"There was no need for it," General Anatoly Nogovitsyn said at a briefing for journalists.

But the US defense official said several SS-21 launchers and associated equipment entered the enclave after the fighting came to a halt last week.

The New York Times, which first reported on the move, said they entered South Ossetia on Friday.

"We're seeing them solidify their positions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia," said the official, adding that "more troops and more equipment" were evident in the enclaves.

The official said at least 10 battalions of Russian troops were in the enclaves and in Georgia, putting the number of Russian troops at close to 15,000.

It was unclear whether the SS-21s which allegedly arrived Friday were the first to enter Georgia.

Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Jeffrey said a week ago that President George W. Bush, in Beijing at the time for the Olympic Games, was immediately notified August 8 "when we received news of the first two SS-21 Russian missile launchers into Georgian territory."

Bush then immediately met with Russian President Vladimir Putin about it at the Great Hall of the People, Jeffrey said.

Russia has launched about two dozen short-range missiles during the course of the conflict, which erupted August 7 with a Georgian military incursion into South Ossetia and escalated with an all-out Russian offensive two days later, a senior US defense official said last week.

The SS-21 is the NATO designation for what the Russians call the "9K79-1 Tochka-U," which Nogovitsyn said was "widely used" by Russian forces.

A tactical ballistic missile, the SS-21 can carry conventional, chemical or tactical nuclear warheads.

US officials have made no suggestion that nuclear armed missiles have been deployed in this conflict.



The SS-21 SCARAB (9K79 Tochka) single-stage, short-range, tactical-ballistic missile is transported and fired from the 9P129 6x6 wheeled transporter erector launcher.

It is supported by a tactical transloader (9T218) and a 9T238 missile transporter trailer towed by a ZIL-131 truck. The 9P129 TEL crew compartment is in the forward section and the missile compartment behind. During transport the missile is enclosed with the warhead in a temperature-controlled casing.

The SS-21 SCARAB missile (9M79) has a maximum range of 70 km and a CEP of 160 meters, while the improved composite propellant 9M79-1 (Tochka-U) has a maximum range of 120 km.

The basic warhead is the 9N123F HE-Frag warhead which has 120 kg of high explosives. The 9N123K submunition warhead can probably carry either bomblets or mines. The SS-21 can also carry the AA60 tactical nuclear warhead. Other warheads are believed to include chemical, terminally guided warhead, and a smart-munition bomblet warhead.

In 1981, the SS-21, a guided missile (providing improvement in both range and accuracy), began replacing the FROG in forward-deployed divisions, and 140 are were deployed as of 1988. Division-level SS-21 battalions were being consolidated into brigades in Soviet armies in East Germany.

On 21 October 1999 US satellites tracked two Russian short-range ballistic missile launched from the Russian city of Mozdok some 60 miles northeast of Grozny. The missiles slammed into a crowded Grozny marketplace and a maternity ward, killing at least 143 persons, according to reports from the region. The missiles are believed by intelligence analysts to have been SS-21s.

Ukraine offers satellite defence co-operation

Ukraine offers satellite defence
co-operation
with Europe and US

Ukraine inflamed mounting East-West tensions
yesterday by offering up a Soviet-built satellite facility
as part of the European missile defence system.

By Damien McElroy in Tbilisi

The proposal, made amid growing outrage among Russia's neighbours over its military campaign in Georgia, could see Ukraine added to Moscow's nuclear hitlist. A Russian general declared Poland a target for its arsenal after Warsaw signed a deal with Washington to host interceptor missiles for America's anti-nuclear shield.

The move came as the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, signed a cease-fire deal that sets the stage for a Russian troop withdrawal after more than a week of warfare with its neighbour Georgia.

The deal calls for both Russian and Georgian forces to pull back to positions they held before fighting erupted on August 8. As of last night, though, there was little apparent evidence of a Russian pull-out from the Georgian town of Gori, which Russian tanks and troops took last weekend. Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, insisted a broader withdrawal would be contingent on further security measures.

Just hours before Mr Medvedev put his signature to the ceasefire deal, Russian forces blew up a Georgian railway bridge on the main line west of the capital, Tbilisi, an act that critics interpreted as a malacious attempt to cripple the country's infrastructure. Moscow at first issued a denial, but television footage shot by the Reuters news agency clearly showed the bridge's twisted remains.

Ukraine said it was ready to give both Europe and America access to its missile warning systems after Russia earlier annulled a 1992 cooperation agreement involving two satellite tracking stations. Previously, the stations were part of Russia's early-warning system for missiles coming from Europe.

"The fact that Ukraine is no longer a party to the 1992 agreement allows it to launch active cooperation with European countries to integrate its information," a statement from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said.

It follows a declaration earlier this week from Ukraine's pro-Western president, Viktor Yushchenko, that the Russian naval lease of the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Sebastopol would be scrapped if any vessels joined the conflict in Georgia.

The crisis over Russia's display of military might in Georgia has alarmed ex-Soviet satellites states in a broad arc from the Baltics to Central Asia. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, all of which harbour bitter memories of Soviet occupation, have expressed solidarity with the Georgian position.

Yesterday President George W. Bush hailed what he saw as progress in resolving the Georgia crisis, describing the ceasefire agreement as "a hopeful step."

He reiterated, though, that the disputed regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained part of Georgia, despite Moscow's insistence that they should now be allowed to become part of Russia. "There's no room for debate on this matter," said Mr Bush. "The international community is clear that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are part of Georgia and the US fully recognises this reality."

Meanwhile, disturbing reports of abuse of ethnic Georgians in captured parts of the disputed region emerged. A group of captive soldiers were paraded in the streets of the South Ossetian capital, Tskinvali, and the bodies of at least 40 dead troops rotted in the sun.

Teams of ethnic Georgians, some under armed guard, were forced to clean the streets. It was the first apparent evidence of humiliation or abuse of Georgians in the Russian-controlled breakaway republic.

Georgia Hidden Victories - What the Drive by Press did NOT tell you

Russian troops beat the Georgians on the ground, not so much because of superior numbers, but because the Russians had more troops with combat experience, and very recent experience in fighting this kind of war.

The Russians got this way by fighting a successful campaign just across the border, in Chechnya. There, several hundred thousand Russians and pro-Russian Chechens have gotten valuable combat experience. The Chechen rebels (a mixture of nationalists, gangsters and Islamic radicals) have been reduced to a few hundred hard core fighters.

The Russians basically use Chechnya as a training ground where their "contract soldiers" (volunteers, who are much more effective than conscripts) can get some combat experience. These volunteers are particularly common in paratrooper and commando units. Both were apparently used in the ground operations that pushed the Georgians out of South Ossetia, and conquered key areas elsewhere in Georgia. Some of the "Russian" troops were apparently Chechen paramilitary units.

The Georgian troops had received training and weapons from the U.S. and Israel over the last few years. But the U.S. training was mainly for peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was of limited use against experienced Russian counter-terrorism troops. A small number of Georgians received special operations training, but not enough of these troops were available to defeat the Russian advance.

The Georgians did better in the air and at sea, even though they were greatly outnumbered there as well. Georgian warplanes shot up the Russians pretty badly (killing the commander of Russian ground forces, for example) before the Russians were able to shut down the Georgian air force. But in the process Russia lost at least 25 aircraft destroyed, and a number of others badly damaged.

At sea, Georgian missile boats hit several Russian warships, which had not been equipped with equipment, or crews, that were capable of dealing with this kind of threat. Six Russian warships were damaged sufficiently that they had to withdraw from the area.

The Russians ran a large scale Information War campaign, shutting down Georgian access to the Internet for several days, and blanketing the world media, and Internet, with Russian spin on what was going on in Georgia and why.

The Russians apparently wanted to intimidate the Georgians into electing a less pro-West government. There are some Georgians who are more inclined to do whatever the Russians want, but it's unclear if this faction has a majority of the votes yet. Some Georgians believe that the Russians are still angry about Josef Stalin, a Georgian who killed more Russians than Adolf Hitler. Stalin is still a hero to Georgians.

Russia has now shown itself to be a bully. Russia has been trying to annex two parts of Georgia that border Russia, and this war was all about showing Georgians that Russia would rather fight than give up this land grab. The UN was created to deal with this sort of thing, but Russia is doing well, so far, intimidating the UN into inactivity.

It's not a clear win for the Russians, but, short-term, many things appear to be going their way. Long term, things are rather more murky. Europeans have been reminded that the Russian bully they have feared and despised, for so many centuries, is back in town. That could have interesting consequences down the road.

The Empire Struggles Back

The Russian empire is being rebuilt. The Russian people demand it. Russian politicians are using this popular attitude to placate the people, and distract them from the fact that Russia is turning into a dictatorship. And so Russia is pressuring its neighbors to do what they are told by Moscow. In support of this, the Russian government has re-established control over key industries, as well as all the major mass media.

While the 1917 revolution destroyed the ancient Russian monarchy and simultaneously rejected democracy and the market economy, the 1917 revolution didn't work. The overbearing and inept czarist aristocracy eventually returned in the form of overbearing and inept Communist Party officials and state-appointed industrial managers. The second revolution in 1991 was less bloody than that of 1917, but the huge Communist bureaucracy was not dismissed, only reduced.

Unlike the 1917 revolution, 1991 one saw the dismemberment of the czarist empire, something even the 1917 Reds were not willing to tolerate. Territories that had been Russia's for centuries, like Ukraine and Belarus, plus others that had only been conquered in the 19th century (Central Asia and the Caucasus), were suddenly independent once more.

But not completely free. The Russians called their new neighbors the "Near Abroad" and treated them more like prodigal children than sovereign nations. In the early 1990s, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed by Russia. The CIS was sort of a successor of the Soviet Union. But after he 1990s, the CIS began to fall apart. Some members, especially Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkmenistan, drifted away. Or at least tried to. Apparently you could join the CIS, but not leave it.

The New Russia of the 1990s faced serious economic and political problems internally, as well as unrest on its new borders with these new neighbors. Russia sought to solve all these problems to its advantage, Thus the Near Abroad nations are increasingly hostile to Russian interference. During all this, Russians grew increasingly nostalgic for the old empire. Russian politicians played on this by talking of rebuilding the empire.

There were other considerations. For over a thousand years, Russians have lived in fear of invasion. Thus it has always been popular to absorb or subdue neighbors, to provide a buffer zone between the core Russian (mainly Slavic) territories, and potential invaders. The Golden Age was the post World War II period, when Russia still had all the czarist conquests, while Eastern Europe, Mongolia and North Korea were run by communist governments that were basically satellites of Russia. Memory here has been selective. The empire was expensive, in terms of cash, diplomatic ill-will and poor public relations. But only the good things are now remembered, which is how nationalistic memories usually work.

Ironically, the Russian military industries were saved in the last decade by India and China. These two nations kept Russian weapons manufacturers alive with large orders. More importantly, the booming economies in China and India drove up the price of oil, of which Russia is a major exporter. The billions in oil wealth propped up the Russian economy and allowed the armed forces to be rebuilt. Now Russia talks openly of reclaiming its status as a superpower and dictating the fate of its neighbors. But Russia remains a second rate military power, with a second rate arms industry and a collection of very hostile, and fearful, neighbors.

The war in Georgia comes on the heels of threats (of violence) made to Ukraine. Before that, Russia cut off energy supplies to Ukraine to show who was really in charge. Russia makes more threats to the Baltic States and East European countries over membership in NATO and the construction of a U.S. anti-missile system. The bear is back in a fighting mood, and the world wonders how far this reassertion of empire will go.

Western Europe is paralyzed by fear of losing a quarter of its natural gas supplies. When Russia set up those gas pipelines during the Cold War, somber pledges were made that gas deliveries would never be used for political purposes. After seeing what happened to Ukraine, and other East European customers, no one can be sure anymore. After Georgia, no one can feel safe from Russian violence anymore either.

Georgian Conflict

Russia Takes A Beating Over Georgia

While Georgian ground forces have been pushed around by the recent Russian invasion, Georgian air defenses have been noticeably more effective. The Russians have admitted to losing four aircraft (three Su-25 ground attack bombers and a Tu-22 bomber flying a reconnaissance mission.) Most, or all, appear to have been brought down by the SA-11 BukM1 surface-to-air missile systems (obtained from Ukraine).

The SA-11 is the successor to the SA-6, which did so much damage to the Israeli Air Force during the 1973 war. The SA-11 launchers are self-propelled and carry four 1,500 pound missiles. The missiles have a 30 kilometer range, and can hit aircraft at up to 72,000 feet. The missiles move at about 2,900 kilometers an hour. The battery radar, which is also self-propelled, can detect aircraft at up to 85 kilometers away. The system can be set up and ready to fire in five minutes. The missile has a 150 pound warhead, that is triggered by a radar proximity fuze.

The Georgians also have some Tor-M1 systems, also obtained from Ukraine. Also known to NATO as the SA-15 Gauntlet, it has a maximum range of 12 kilometers. It is only effective up to 6,000 meters altitude. The system was designed as a successor to the SA-N-8 Gecko. Each launcher carries eight missiles, and it is claimed to be capable of engaging two targets simultaneously. The system was designed to be a tactical battlefield air-defense system, designed to take out close-air-support planes like the A-10 or tactical fighter-bombers like the F-4, F-16, and F-18.

Georgia claims to have downed ten Russian aircraft as of August 11th, and the true air losses won't be known until photos appear of all the aircraft wreckage. It is interesting that Russia was unable to come up with effective countermeasures against missile systems they had designed. The Russians knew of Ukrainian arms exports to Georgia, and the presence of the SA-11s and SA-15s. This is another mystery that will only be explained over time.

HOO-AH: POLAND TAKES THE SHIELD - TELL KREMLIN UP YOUR !

A top Russian general said Friday that Poland's agreement to accept a U.S. missile interceptor base exposes the ex-communist nation to attack, possibly by nuclear weapons, the Interfax news agency reported.

The statement by Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn is the strongest threat that Russia has issued against the plans to put missile defense elements in former Soviet satellite nations.

Poland and the United States on Thursday signed a deal for Poland to accept a missile interceptor base as part of a system the United States says is aimed at blocking attacks by rogue nations. Moscow, however, feels it is aimed at Russia's missile force.

"Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself to a strike—100 percent," Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of staff, was quoted as saying.

He added, in clear reference to the agreement, that Russia's military doctrine sanctions the use of nuclear weapons "against the allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them." Nogovitsyn that would include elements of strategic deterrence systems, he said, according to Interfax.

At a news conference earlier Friday, Nogovitsyn had reiterated Russia's frequently stated warning that placing missile-defense elements in Poland and the Czech Republic would bring an unspecified military response. But his subsequent reported statement substantially stepped up a war of words.

U.S. officials have said the timing of the deal was not meant to antagonize Russian leaders at a time when relations already are strained over the recent fighting between Russia and Georgia over the separatist Georgian region of South Ossetia.

Russian forces went deep into Georgia in the fighting, raising wide concerns that Russia could be seeking to occupy parts of its small, pro-U.S. neighbor, which has vigorously lobbied to join NATO, or even to force its government to collapse.

"I think the Russian behavior over the last several days is generally concerning not only to the United States but to all of our European allies," said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, when asked about Russian threats against Poland as a result of the missile defense agreement.

He also suggested that earlier U.S. offers for broad cooperation with Moscow on the missile defense program may be reevaluated considering the latest developments.

Under the agreement that Warsaw and Washington reached Thursday, Poland will accept a U.S. missile interceptor base.

Washington says the planned system, which is not yet operational, is needed to protect the U.S. and Europe from possible attacks by missile-armed "rogue states" like Iran. The Kremlin, however, feels it is aimed at Russia's missile force and warns it will worsen tensions.

In an interview on Poland's news channel TVN24, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said the United States agreed to help augment Poland's defenses with Patriot missiles in exchange for placing 10 missile defense interceptors in the Eastern European country.

He said the deal also includes a "mutual commitment" between the two nations to come to each other's assistance "in case of trouble."

That clause appeared to be a direct reference to Russia.

Poland has all along been guided by fears of a newly resurgent Russia, an anxiety that has intensified with Russia's offensive in Georgia. In past days, Polish leaders said that fighting justified Poland's demands that it get additional security guarantees from Washington in exchange for allowing the anti-missile base on its soil.

"Simply the existence of this installation increases Poland's security," Polish President Lech Kaczynski said Friday.

How they compare ... Russia vs Georgia

Why Georgia Lost The War

To no one's surprise, the Russians drove back a Georgian attempt to regain control of South Ossetia. There were several hundred military and civilian casualties. The fighting apparently began when some South Ossetia militiamen fired across the border at Georgian troops. This escalated to a Georgian invasion, and a Russian reinforcement of its peacekeepers, and the expulsion of the Georgian troops. All in the space of a week. The fighting continues, with Russian warplanes bombing civilians and military targets in Georgia and moving more troops into another breakaway Georgian region, Abkhazia. Georgia has asked for a ceasefire, but the Russians have not responded.

Since the early 1990s, Russia and Georgia have argued over who should control South Ossetia, a Georgian province on the Russian border. Just to the north of South Ossetia, is the Russian territory of North Ossetia. The Soviets often split ethnic groups between two provinces (or "Autonomous Republics") to make it more difficult for the people to unite in opposition to the Soviet Union. This, among many similar measures, worked. Since the Russians moved in their peacekeepers in the early 1990s, they have issued Russian passports to the South Ossetians and, in effect, annexed the region.

The Ossertians are a different ethnic group from the ethnic Georgians, as are the Abkhazians. This sort of ethnic mélange is common throughout the Caucasus. During the last years of the Soviet Union (1989-1991), ethnic tensions increased throughout the Soviet Union, as long dormant (and suppressed by a brutal police state) aspirations stirred once more. While the Soviet politicians pulled off an astonishing feat by dissolving the empire without bloodshed (and creating fourteen new countries from portions of the empire that decided not to stay with the new Russia), there were lots of smaller groups that still had separatist grievances. Two of these groups were in Georgia, and occupied the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The populations rebelled against the Georgian government and drove out Georgian officials, troops and ethnic Georgians. Thousands of ethnic Abkhazians and Ossetians fled to the new statelets. Since both of these areas were on the Russian border, Russia saw an opportunity to quiet things down (they did not want an ethnic based guerilla war going on along their border). So Russia offered its services as mediator and peacekeeper in the early 1990s, and peace was restored. The UN agreed all this, and a reluctant Georgia went along. But after that, the Russians refused to leave, or encourage the Abkhazians and Ossetians to work out a deal to become part of Georgia once more. Abkhazians and Ossetians wanted to be independent, and declared themselves so. No one else recognized this. In 2004, Georgia began cracking down on the smuggling and other criminal activity that was keeping the economy in South Ossetia going. This led to more and more gunfire along the border between Georgia and South Ossetia.

Two years ago, Georgia began a major expansion of its armed forces. Officially, the active forces were then about 26,000 troops, already up from about 12,000-14,000 just a couple few years before that. Unofficially, the government has raised strength to about 28,000. This was done by adding more professional troops and increasing the order-of-battle by two battalions of conscripts. The government goal is to increase the active force to about 35,000. In addition, Georgia began building a reserve force.

Until a few years ago the "reserves" constituted the entire body of conscripts discharged over the past 15 years. But this pool, of about 250,000 men, was just that, a pool. The "reservists" were not subject to periodic refresher training, and so no more than perhaps 10 percent of them could be considered useful in the event of activation. Beginning four years ago, Georgia instituted a more rigorous reserve training program. An active reserve has been created, which apparently numbers over 10,000 men, and is expected to grow to as many as 100,000 over the next few years, as conscripts (drafted at 18 to 18-24 months) leave active service, and enter 5-10 years of reserve duty.

While Georgia doesn't have the money for modern equipment (it's stuff is mostly Russian Cold War vintage), it does have enough professional soldiers from the old Red Army, and a military tradition going back centuries. Much to the discomfort of Russia, the United States has been supplying Georgia with military trainers and some equipment. Partly, this is in response to Georgian help in Iraq. Georgia first sent 800 peacekeepers to Iraq, and began increasing that force. Currently there are 2,000 Georgian troops in Iraq, where they obtain useful operational experience.

The principal reason for the military build-up is the secessionist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgians wanted the option of trying for a military solution. There are also some Russian troops, leftovers from Soviet Union era garrisons, still in the country. Georgia has been trying get all the Russian soldiers out since the Soviet Union collapsed (and Georgia became independent once more) in 1991. But the Russians have come up with a long string of excuses for delaying a final pullout. To make matters worse, several thousand of those troops are "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To most Georgians, the Russian peacekeepers are there mainly to keep the rebel regions free of Georgian control.

It's not yet clear what the Georgian government was thinking when they allowed the border skirmishing to escalate to a military effort to restore government control over South Ossetia. It didn't work, as the Russians promptly counterattacked and drove the Georgian troops out of South Ossetia. The Georgians can try a guerilla war, and hope that their new relationship with the United States and the European Union will add some measure of protection. That's a false hope. The Russians have made it clear during the last few years that any real, or imagined, Western influence or interference in nations that border Russia (what the Russians call the "near-abroad") will be opposed with lots of noise, followed by some firepower. The recent events in Georgia are an example of that, an example the Russians hope the West takes seriously, even if the Georgians don't.

Russian politicians have been playing the nationalism card, catering to widespread feelings that the Soviet Union should be restored. Most Russians never cared for the communist dictatorship, but they did like being a superpower. The Russians also feel that those fourteen nations that split off when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, left Russia surrounded by a lot of unstable and vulnerable nations. This sounds paternalistic and paranoid to Westerners, but not to Russians. And the Russians are willing to use force to back up these attitudes, as the Georgians just discovered. Russia still has nukes, and some Cold War attitudes that make for a potentially very dangerous situation.