Cost of Operation Cast Lead

Israel has put a price on their recent Operation Cast Lead. This was the 22 day campaign in Gaza, and the Israelis are spending $590 million to replace damaged or destroyed equipment and supplies used, and restore troops to their pre campaign readiness.

The Israelis expended over a thousand smart bombs and missiles, and used vast quantities of fuel and spare parts to operate the aircraft and vehicles.

Reserve troops had to be paid and casualties (several hundred, although only 13 dead) taken care of. The $590 million is not the total cost of Cast Lead, but it is the bulk of it.

Tank Warfare In The Gaza Battlefield

The tactical success of the Israeli military incursion into Gaza over the past week confirms a lesson I noted after the five-day Russian conquest of one-third of Georgia in the Caucasus last August: Main Battle Tanks still rule ground war, whatever the high-tech, guerrilla-war and minimum-army enthusiasts say to the contrary.

In the first four days of its ground forces' incursion into Gaza, Israel inflicted an estimated 500 military fatalities on the forces of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement. But the Israeli army forces involved suffered only five or six fatalities.

This obviously reflected the extremely poor military performance of Hamas so far. Hamas' military weakness has been in striking contrast to the very impressive performance against the Israelis of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite Party of God, in the mini-war in southern Lebanon in July 2006. On that occasion, Hezbollah forces were well dug in and they used improvised explosive devices very effectively against Israel's much vaunted, homemade Merkava (Chariot) Main Battle Tanks.

Hamas had had plenty of time to equip itself with IEDs and to train its cadres how to use them. Also, the densely populated urban maze of Gaza City should have provided plenty of opportunities to inflict significant casualties on the Israeli Main Battle Tanks. But so far Hamas forces have had negligible impact on them.

Part of the contrast obviously reflects the renewed emphasis on training, unit cohesion and sheer disciplinary toughness that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his highly respected Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi have had upon the Israel Defense Forces -- Zahal.

But there is another factor as well: While tanks have many vulnerabilities in different aspects of modern ground and guerrilla war, it is impossible to conquer a country, win a full-scale battle or hold occupied hostile territory without them.

The striking success of Russian Main Battle Tanks in the five-day conflict with Georgia last August, like the current fighting in Gaza, proves once again how crucial tanks remain to the conduct of modern war.

In the former Soviet republic of Georgia, Russia used a concentration of its state-of-the-art T-90 Main Battle Tanks, which also have been sold in large numbers -- 657 in all -- to India, backed up by significant numbers of older, supposedly obsolete but still highly effective models, especially the more than a quarter-century-old T-72.

The failure of Hamas so far to come up with any tactical solution to the Israeli deployment of its venerable but still effective Merkavas. The Merkavas, like the old Soviet-era T-72 Main Battle Tanks the Russians used to such effect in Georgia, proved that masses of tanks don't have to be state-of-the-art technological wonders to be highly effective war winners. Concentrations of older models kept running through effective maintenance can get the job done quickly and cheaply.

Israeli Air Force Lessons Learned

The Israeli Air Force learned its lesson from the 2006 campaign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

Before 2006, the air force had convinced the government that it was on top of Hezbollah military preparations in southern Lebanon, and could take down the terrorist rocket stockpiles with air attacks.

Ground troops would not be necessary, or would have little to do if sent in. The Israeli generals were wrong. In the first ten days of the 2006 operations, the air force took out 150 known targets. But it turned out that Hezbollah had a lot more down on, and under, the ground than the air force intelligence knew about. The air force had a hard time finding those additional rocket stockpiles, and bunkers full of Hezbollah fighters. The army had to be hastily mobilized and sent into a battle they were not prepared for.

Thirty months later, the Israeli Air Force had cleaned up its act, or so it appears. We won't know for sure until the Gaza operation is over.

But in the first ten days of fighting in Gaza, the air force destroyed over 500 targets, using 555 fighter and 125 attack helicopter sorties. More importantly, a new intelligence approach, and new sensors, have made it possible for the air force to keep finding new targets. Part of this was due to the air force forming a tighter link with the other intel organizations (Army, Mossad, Shin Bet and foreign nations), and increasing the speed at which intel is collected, processed, and passed back to the combat aircraft in the form of target information.

The Israelis are using more high resolution targeting pods, including some using high rez (SAR) radar for all-weather ground surveillance. This gave them more information, more quickly. This was aided by greater use, than ever before, of UAVs. The Gaza battle areas have been under intense UAV surveillance 24/7 since operations began. This explains how the air force is now able to generate a constant supply of new targets.

Hamas is suitably shocked, or so it appears from what Arab language reporters are broadcasting from within Gaza.

There's a higher than expected use of faked bomb victim stories, which is largely attributable to the greater precision with which the air force is identifying and hitting targets.

Hamas appears to be in disarray, having been hit with a more devastating attack than their Hezbollah advisors had endured. As a result, Hezbollah is getting nervous about what a second round of fighting in southern Lebanon might do to them.

The U.S. has supplied Israel with just about every smart bomb in the American arsenal. Not just to help out an ally, but so that American and Israeli air force planners can compare notes after this is all over.

Twitter, Facebook users show solidarity with QassamCount

See my Blog Post 'Israel armed with New Media savvy' for more background...

Twitter, Facebook users show
solidarity with QassamCount

By STEPHANIE RUBENSTEIN,
JPOST CORRESPONDENT IN CHICAGO

As soon as Operation Cast Lead began to take shape just over a week ago, Dan Peguine started the program QassamCount, a system that updates users' statuses on Facebook with the number of Kassams that hit Israel.

Within the first three days, 10,000 people had donated their statuses to the cause.

Peguine first started a program counting Kassams about a week before the operation in Gaza began. He used Twitter, which sends users' statuses to all their "followers," to help people understand how often rockets hit the South.

"When you live in Tel Aviv and you read at the end of the day, '20 Kassams hit Sderot, Ashkelon,' you do not really understand what it means to live through this," Peguine told The Jerusalem Post. "So by having a feed that pops up every time a Kassam hits, I thought it would be a good way to convey this."

After recognizing the quick success of the Twitter program, to which 600 followers had subscribed in three days, Peguine decided to apply the same form to a larger social network. He partnered with Arik Fraimovich and set up the application on Facebook.

"I think that the Internet is a medium that needs to be used to reach audiences that are not usually aware of the situation in Israel," Peguine said.

"We hope to bring to the world's attention the fact that Hamas fires rockets at Israel daily," he said.

The Jewish Internet Defense Force (JIDF) is another group that has been active in fighting anti-Semitism and terrorism throughout the Internet.

"When it comes to bias against Israel, it's very easy for our enemies to be on the constant attack," said David, the spokesman for the JIDF, who asked that his last name not be published. He said he had received death threats since beginning his activities.

The JIDF formed in response to the second intifada in 2000 and functioned on a grassroots level, mainly through e-mail campaigns. The group then began operating on various Web sites to spread news about Israel and Jewish issues.

The IDF itself has also begun an Internet effort, making use of YouTube and a blog to post official army videos and information about the situation in Gaza. The site on YouTube had nearly 11,500 subscribers as of Sunday, and its videos had been viewed over 750,000 time.

"Throughout the years, we have tried to help shape public opinion with our own brand of Israel advocacy on-line, and it's very refreshing to see Israel taking an active on-line role," David said. "The videos on YouTube showing secondary explosions have had a major impact, as do the videos and photos of all the humanitarian effort."

Israel and the Jewish People have always faced bias in the media, he said, adding that anti-Semitism and a false perception of Israel as an aggressor have played a role.

Why is the IDF wearing Chef’s hats?

Photos of Israeli soldiers taken in Operation Cast Lead show them wearing big, floppy hats that look like Chef’s hats.

What’s the deal?

They’re for camouflage.

The hat—called a mitznefet in Hebrew—attaches to a regular combat helmet and obscures its rigid, round shape.

As the mitznefet flops about, it takes on an irregular form that’s harder to recognize in a shadow or out of the corner of your eye. The hat also protects against the sun and the moon, which might reflect off the surface of the helmet. A standard mitznefet consists of reversible mesh fabric, with a greenish woodland camouflage print on one side and a brown desert print on the other.

55 targets within 220 seconds - IDF Kick Ass

The Israeli attack on Hamas forces in Gaza on December 27th, hit fifty targets within 220 seconds.

The fifty Israeli aircraft assembled off the coast, and delivered a well rehearsed attack designed to take out Hamas targets before key commanders could get away.

Israeli intelligence had discovered Hamas plans for such an Israeli attack, which involved key Hamas personnel immediately dispersing to hiding places. These included hospitals, where the Hamas men would dress in staff uniforms and blend in. Other safe havens included nursery schools, and other places where the Hamas officials would be surrounded by lots of civilians at all times. Thus the tight timing for the Israeli attack, intended to catch the key Hamas personnel before they could disperse.

Hamas knew that the Israelis have an informant network in Gaza. The key to Israeli success in dealing with Palestinian terrorists has always been an informant network within the Palestinian community. Many of these Palestinian informants are doing it for the money. Israelis pay for information. They also use other inducements (help with the bureaucracy, medical care, etc). Palestinian terrorist organizations have been unsuccessful in their attempts to shut down the informant networks, and many innocent Palestinians have died simply because they were falsely accused of being informants.

In addition, the Israelis gain a lot of information via electronic intelligence work and UAVs that are constantly in the air over Gaza. Israel seeks to make the terrorists think that it's the gadgets, not informants, gathering the information. To the Israelis, inducing paranoia among the Palestinians is seen as a successful weapon. All this has helped keep the terrorists out of Israel for nearly five years now, something no one thought was possible.

The Israelis also have hundreds of police and military operatives who can pass as Arabs (their families came from Arab countries shortly after Israel was founded in 1947). These Israelis speak fluent Arabic (with a Palestinian accent), in addition to their Arab appearance. These agents dress as Palestinians and enter Palestinian areas to recruit and run Palestinian informants. At least in the West Bank. In Gaza, the Israelis use pro-Fatah Palestinians. At least a third of the Gaza population is still pro-Fatah, and continued Hamas pressure has not changed that.

The Israelis also make use of the phone system to avoid civilian casualties. For example, the bombing campaign after the initial attack was directed mostly at the thousands of rockets Hamas had stockpiled. Most of these were stored in civilian housing. This was a technique pioneered by Hezbollah in Lebanon. There, some homes would have a basement excavated, to provide more space for rockets. Israeli intelligence is still identifying these storage locations. When one is found, the Israelis will phone the home just before the attack and tell the civilians they have a few minutes to get out before the place blows up. In at least one case, the civilians were defiant, and went to the roof, believing that the Israelis would not bomb with women and children in plain sight. In response, the Israeli fighter came in low and fired some 20mm cannon shells right next to the building. The panicked civilians fled the building and the place blew up shortly thereafter.

IDF Air Force Sticking It To Hamas

Four months ago, Israel ordered a thousand of the new U.S. 250 pound Small Diameter Bomb (SDB, or GBU-39). Apparently these weapons arrived quickly, because many SDBs are being use in the Israeli air raids on Gaza.

The SDB is not cheap, Israel paid about $77,000 for each one. It was believed that Israel wanted this weapon not just for its precision, and low explosive (50 pounds) power, but also its ability to penetrate six feet of concrete. This would make it useful to take out Hezbollah bunkers and rocket storage sites in southern Lebanon, and similar facilities Hezbollah helped Hamas build in Gaza.

Two years ago, the U.S. Air Force finally got the SDB into service. The SDB was supposed to enter service in 2005, in the wake of the 2004 introduction of the 500 pound JDAM. But there were many technical problems with the SDB. That's because this was not just another "dumb bomb" with a GPS guidance kit attached.

The SDB had a more effective warhead design and guidance system. It's shape is more like that of a missile than a bomb (70 inches long, 190 millimeters in diameter), with the guidance system built in.

The smaller blast from the SDB results in fewer civilian casualties. Friendly troops can be closer to the target when an SDB explodes. While the 500, 1,000 and 2,000 pound bombs have a spectacular effect when they go off, they are often overkill. The troops on the ground would rather have more, smaller, GPS bombs available. This caused the 500 pound JDAM to get developed quickly and put into service.

The SDBs are carried on a special carriage, which holds four of them. The carriage is mounted on a bomber just like a single larger (500, 1,000 or 2,000) pound bomb would be. For Israel, this allows each fighter-bomber to take out up to four more targets per sortie.

The SDB is basically an unpowered missile, which can glide long distances. This makes the SDB even more compact, capable and expensive. JDAM (a guidance kit attached to a dumb bomb) only cost about $26,000. The small wings allow the SDB to glide up to 70-80 kilometers (from high altitude.) SDB also has a hard front end that can punch through several feet of rock or concrete, and a warhead that does more damage than the usual dumb bomb (explosives in a metal casing.) The SDB is thus the next generation of smart bombs.

There was never any point in building a 250 pound dumb bomb, as they would be too inaccurate to be useful. But it made sense to merge the guidance kit and the bomb itself. But the superiority of guided bombs is such that the next generation of heavier (500-2000 pound) smart bombs will probably be like the SDB.