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Russia on Friday unveiled a new fighter aircraft touted as a rival of the US F-22 stealth jet and developed amid the highest secrecy as part of a plan to modernize the armed forces.
The fifth generation fighter, manufactured by the Sukhoi company and known as the PAK FA, made a maiden flight of just over 45 minutes at the firm's home base of Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Far East region.
"The flight lasted 47 minutes during which all the aircraft's systems were tested. It was successful," Sukhoi spokeswoman Olga Kayukova. "This is the first time it has been unveiled."
Pictures broadcast on state television showed the fighter jet -- which has been kept closely under wraps for years -- flying at altitude and then landing on a snow-surrounded runway.
"The aircraft performed well in all stages of the flight programme. It is easy and comfortable to pilot," said Sergei Bogdan, the pilot for the flight, in comments published on the Sukhoi website.
The new jet has the capability of carrying out long flights above the speed of sound as well as simultaneously attacking different targets.
Russia is currently embarking on a major programme to re-equip its military, not least the air force which is still using largely Soviet-era equipment and suffers from frequent crashes.
The new fighter, which has been in development since the 1990s, is due to enter the armed forces in 2015, Russian news agencies said.
“Today we’ve embarked on an extensive flight test programme of the 5th generation fighter. This is a great success of both Russian science and design school.
This achievement rests upon a cooperation team comprised of more than a hundred of our suppliers and strategic partners. PAK FA programme advances Russian aeronautics together with allied industries to an entirely new technological level.
These aircraft, together with upgraded 4th generation fighters will define Russian Air Force potential for the next decades.
Sukhoi plans to further elaborate on the PAK FA programme which will involve our Indian partners. I am strongly convinced that our joint project will excel its Western rivals in cost-effectiveness and will not only allow strengthening the defense power of Russian and Indian Air Forces, but also gain a significant share of the world market”, - said Mikhail Pogosyan, Sukhoi Company Director General commenting on the launch of the flight test programme.
"There is no doubt that the plane is needed," the ex-commander of the Russian air force, Anatoly Kornukov, told the Interfax news agency.
"Our Su-27 and MiG-29 planes are good but have aged. They are 20 or more years old and it's time to have something as a replacement," he said.
He said the new plane could easily stand comparison with the US F-22, also a fifth generation stealth fighter.
"It's going to be no worse than an F-22. I've been in an F-22 and I know."
Russia's campaign to modernize its military has been marred by repeated setbacks with new equipment, above all a string of failed tests of its new Bulava sea-based intercontinental nuclear-capable missile.
Russia is currently embarking on a major programme to re-equip its military
The tactical success of the Israeli military incursion into Gaza over the past week confirms a lesson I noted after the five-day Russian conquest of one-third of Georgia in the Caucasus last August: Main Battle Tanks still rule ground war, whatever the high-tech, guerrilla-war and minimum-army enthusiasts say to the contrary.
In the first four days of its ground forces' incursion into Gaza, Israel inflicted an estimated 500 military fatalities on the forces of Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement. But the Israeli army forces involved suffered only five or six fatalities.
This obviously reflected the extremely poor military performance of Hamas so far. Hamas' military weakness has been in striking contrast to the very impressive performance against the Israelis of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite Party of God, in the mini-war in southern Lebanon in July 2006. On that occasion, Hezbollah forces were well dug in and they used improvised explosive devices very effectively against Israel's much vaunted, homemade Merkava (Chariot) Main Battle Tanks.
Hamas had had plenty of time to equip itself with IEDs and to train its cadres how to use them. Also, the densely populated urban maze of Gaza City should have provided plenty of opportunities to inflict significant casualties on the Israeli Main Battle Tanks. But so far Hamas forces have had negligible impact on them.
Part of the contrast obviously reflects the renewed emphasis on training, unit cohesion and sheer disciplinary toughness that Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his highly respected Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi have had upon the Israel Defense Forces -- Zahal.
But there is another factor as well: While tanks have many vulnerabilities in different aspects of modern ground and guerrilla war, it is impossible to conquer a country, win a full-scale battle or hold occupied hostile territory without them.
The striking success of Russian Main Battle Tanks in the five-day conflict with Georgia last August, like the current fighting in Gaza, proves once again how crucial tanks remain to the conduct of modern war.
In the former Soviet republic of Georgia, Russia used a concentration of its state-of-the-art T-90 Main Battle Tanks, which also have been sold in large numbers -- 657 in all -- to India, backed up by significant numbers of older, supposedly obsolete but still highly effective models, especially the more than a quarter-century-old T-72.
The failure of Hamas so far to come up with any tactical solution to the Israeli deployment of its venerable but still effective Merkavas. The Merkavas, like the old Soviet-era T-72 Main Battle Tanks the Russians used to such effect in Georgia, proved that masses of tanks don't have to be state-of-the-art technological wonders to be highly effective war winners. Concentrations of older models kept running through effective maintenance can get the job done quickly and cheaply.
The Russian army is changing. In addition to troop-size reduction, yet another reform is aimed at fundamentally changing personnel composition and structure, especially within the ground forces.
Until now, despite all recent reforms and cutbacks, the Russian armed forces largely remained a scaled-down version of the Soviet army, which was supposed to lead a full-scale war preceded by a general mobilization.
Under present circumstances, however, the probability of such a war is relatively low. In the case of a nuclear conflict, there will be no time for a general mobilization, while a local conflict can be won without resorting to such measures. So what will the Russian military look like after reform?
The main change will be a move from the current vertical chain of command of the Russian armed forces, a military district-army-division-regiment structure, to a military district-operative command-brigade regime, in order to increase efficiency by abolishing redundant elements. Mobile permanent readiness brigades, consisting of battalions, will be capable of operating tactical maneuver groups, either independently or together with other brigades under joint command.
In addition, each military district in the Russian Federation will establish rapid-response brigades that most likely will be formed out of airborne units.
Other important news is the plan to change the personnel composition of the Russian armed forces, including reducing the commissioned officers' numbers from the current more than 400,000 -- more than 30 percent of the current 1.2 million servicemen -- to around 150,000 -- 15 percent of the future 1 million-strong force. The cutback mostly will affect logistics and staff commissioned officers and generals, while the number of first and second lieutenants will increase from 50,000 to 60,000.
A reduction in commissioned officer numbers will be accompanied by a boost in the size of the sergeant corps. The sergeant corps will play a much larger role in the future Russian army. Well-trained and experienced professional sergeants will ensure fast and effective training of privates, both contract soldiers and conscripts.
Although the new military reform is to be finished by 2012, some unofficial sources have said that the main reduction will take place within the next year.
If this is true, a significant number of discharged officers from the Russian army will have to face the problem of civil readjustment. Official Russian government sources report, however, that the reduction will be done by attrition, by retiring commissioned officers who have exceeded their term of required service. This is difficult to believe, however.
The Russian armed forces lost 80 percent of its strength in the last 17 years, but a disproportionate number of officers remain. Now the government is planning a large scale purge of the bloated officer corps. Currently, the Russian military has about a million personnel (400,000 in the army itself, the rest in paramilitary units that are largely uniformed and armed like soldiers).
But there are 355,000 officers in this force. That's more than one in three, and includes 1,107 generals, 25,665 colonels, 99,550 majors, 90,000 captains, and only 50,000 lieutenants. With all that, some 40,000 officers positions are still vacant. The proposed reorganization would eliminate 20 percent of the generals, 65 percent of the colonels, 75 percent of the majors, and 55 percent of the captains. The number of lieutenants would increase 20 percent. The number of military organizations (about 2,500) would also be cut (by 80 percent) over the next four years. Most of these are reserve units, Cold War relics, containing only a cadre of officers. In the event of a major war, reservists (who are no longer available) would be called up to use the stockpiled equipment (also now missing.) The Stavka (general staff) will have its personnel cut 61 percent (to 8,500).
The senior officers (lieutenant colonel and above) will be retired, all others will be offered retraining. The money saved would go to training and promoting more NCOs, and enlisting more volunteer (or "contract") soldiers. The Russians want an all-volunteer forces, but have lacked the money to replace all conscripts with higher quality, and more highly paid, volunteers. Note that data on how many troops there are of each rank in the Russian military is still considered top secret stuff, and these numbers were recently released as a Defense Ministry official discussed reforms with the media. This was apparently done to reduce sympathy for the thousands of soon-to-be former officers who might go around complaining that the military is falling apart.
After World War II, Russia deliberately avoided developing a professional NCO corps. They preferred to have officers take care of nearly all troop supervision. The NCOs that did exist were treated as slightly more reliable enlisted men, but given little real authority. Since officers did not live with the men, slack discipline in the barracks gave rise to the vicious hazing and exploitation of junior conscripts by the senior, or simply stronger and more ruthless, ones. This led to very low morale, and a lot of suicides, theft, sabotage and desertions. Long recognized as a problem, no solution ever worked.
During the 1990s, when military budgets were cut by over two-thirds, most of the best officers got out, and went on to make their fortunes in the new market economy. That left a lot of career officers who saw no other job prospects. Many turned to corrupt practices to supplement their low military pay. Corruption got out of hand.
The hazing and corruption in the military is a complex issue. For one thing, Russia does not have military police to deal with this sort of thing. During the Soviet period (1921-91), the KGB kept an eye on criminal activity in the military, but was more concerned with loyalty and espionage. The violence and hazing in the ranks was not seen as a big problem. It is now, because Russians can vote, and the parents of young men getting abused while doing their conscript service, are making a lot of noise over this issue. Taxpayers are more interested in what the military is doing with their money.
For any meaningful change to occur in the military, there has to be a major upgrade in leadership throughout the force. The first step is to get rid of the most troublesome and least effective officers. Money for more NCOs and contract soldiers will have to come out of the existing personnel budget. Sacking most of the existing officers seems like the way to go for solving both of these problems.
