Panel finds erosion of nuclear deterrence mission widespread at Defense

A special task force reviewing nuclear weapons management across the Defense Department found a "distressing degree of inattention" to the nuclear deterrence mission among senior military and civilian officials, said James Schlesinger, a former Defense secretary and chairman of the panel.

In a briefing at the Pentagon on Thursday, Schlesinger and other panel members released the Phase II Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, the final report of the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management.

An earlier report released in September 2008 (here here here) focused on shortcomings in Air Force nuclear stewardship.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates created the panel in June 2008 to uncover systemic problems in the handling of nuclear weapons and materiel after highly publicized failures in which Air Force pilots unwittingly flew nuclear bombs across the country and the Defense Logistics Agency erroneously shipped nuclear-related components to Taiwan.

U.S. allies have been especially concerned about the erosion of nuclear capability, Schlesinger said. Without confidence in U.S. capability, some of those allies could develop their own nuclear weapons, which raises the risk of nuclear proliferation, he added.

Leadership on nuclear deterrence must come from the White House and senior officials at Defense and the Energy Department, Schlesinger said. The task force recommended that the Obama administration "develop a strategic framework defining the unique role of nuclear weapons in deterring threats to the United States, our key interests and our allies." Such a framework could provide a foundation for the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review and Quadrennial Defense Review.

According to the report, "The decline in management attention to nuclear matters is evidenced by a dramatically reduced workforce, fragmentation of nuclear policy and guidance responsibility across the office, dilution of organizational focus because of proliferating missions, and relegation of nuclear-focused organizations to positions of lower authority."

"The remaining workforce lacks both depth and breadth of nuclear experience," the panel reported.

Among other things, the task force recommended that Gates establish an assistant secretary of Defense for deterrence in the policy office to consolidate nuclear oversight, which is now spread among dozens of Defense offices.

While Gates has not yet made any decisions regarding the recommendations, Schlesinger said, "I think that is very likely to happen and that there will be a concentration of authority in that office."

The task force also recommended that Gates review the mission portfolio of U.S. Strategic Command, the joint military organization that has responsibility for the nuclear mission. The command has nine major program areas, which limits the organization's ability to maintain a focus on nuclear deterrence.

The panel didn't prescribe how the command's mission portfolio should be restructured, but it did recommend that the command retain the nuclear deterrence, global strike and space missions, suggesting that other responsibilities could be moved elsewhere.

In its report on the Air Force, the task force pointed out that after the Cold War, the service reorganized in such a way that degraded the deterrence mission by shifting nuclear assets away from a single command organization. Within the new components the nuclear mission was diluted and lacked high-level advocates. The erosion of capabilities and expertise followed. A similar degradation of nuclear capability occurred Defensewide during the last decade, the panel noted.

Only in the Navy, where the nuclear mission remained focused within a single organization, has the commitment held relatively steady, Schlesinger said.

Even so, there has been "some fraying around the edges" of Navy capability, he said. "With all remaining nuclear weapons concentrated in the fleet ballistic-missile submarine force, a significant future challenge for the Navy will be an inevitable decline in nuclear weapons and policy expertise at the flag officer level among officers from other branches," the task force found. It made a number of recommendations aimed at compensating for the service's shrinking experience base.

Schlesinger and retired Air Force Gen. Michael P.C. Carns, a panel member, both made a point of praising Air Force leaders for taking significant steps to improve the service's nuclear capability.

"The value of our deterrent is not primarily a function of the number of our warheads, but rather of the credibility of our nuclear capabilities in the minds of those we seek to deter, dissuade or assure," the report said.

Air Force disciplines 15 officers in nuclear mishap

Air Force leaders on Thursday announced they had taken administrative action against 15 officers for their role in the shipment of four intercontinental ballistic missile nose-cone fuse assemblies to Taiwan in August 2006.

The mistaken shipment, which was only discovered earlier this year, was sent in response to an order for helicopter batteries, raising serious questions about how well the military is tracking and handling sensitive nuclear-related materiel.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates initiated an investigation into the matter, which led him to fire the top civilian and military Air Force leaders. He later named Michael Donley as acting secretary and Gen. Norton Schwartz as chief of staff, and in July ordered the two leaders to review the investigation to determine appropriate disciplinary actions against officers implicated in the report.

At a Pentagon briefing on Thursday afternoon, Donley and Schwartz said the punishments were necessary to restore accountability to the service's nuclear mission. Some officers have been removed from command or reassigned to other duties, essentially ending their careers. Air Force leaders asked other officers to remain in service to "be part of the solution," Donley said.

"These actions are administrative in nature but can carry with them substantial consequences for the careers of these officers, including their potential to command, to be promoted, or to retire in their current grade," he said. "We recognize the years of dedicated service that these officers have given, but we cannot ignore the breaches of trust that have occurred on their watch."

Among the generals sanctioned, Lt. Gen. Kevin Sullivan, deputy chief of staff for logistics, installations and mission support, received the most serious punishment -- a letter of reprimand. The letter said he failed to adequately address logistics policy deficiencies and take action to correct previously identified systemic problems in ICBM logistics. Sullivan also was cited for poor oversight while serving as commander of Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill Air Force Base in Utah.

Letters of reprimand are typically career-ending events. According to the Air Force, Sullivan has requested retirement.

Five other generals received letters of admonishment:

Lt. Gen. Michael Hamel, for failing to effectively exercise responsibility for ICBM system sustainment and for not correcting recurring deficiencies in engineering support of ICBM components while serving as commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center. Hamel had previously requested retirement.

Maj. Gen. Roger Burg, commander of 20th Air Force, for failing to exercise effective oversight of ICBM sustainment-related activities and for not identifying and correcting deficiencies in shipping and receiving sensitive components. Burg will remain in command to continue corrective actions he started.

Maj. Gen. Kathleen Close, commander of the Ogden Air Logistics Center, for not exercising effective command oversight of depot maintenance, engineering activities and materiel control of sensitive components; for not recognizing systemic weaknesses in supply chain management; and for failing to correct previously identified deficiencies. She also will remain in command.

Brig. Gen. Francis Bruno, for failure to identify and correct weaknesses in logistics management and maintenance support for ICBM components and for not correcting previously identified problems at the service's air logistics centers when he served as director of logistics for Air Force Materiel Command. He will retire Oct. 1.

Brig. Gen. Arthur Cameron III was admonished for not identifying and correcting problems in depot maintenance operations involving sensitive components, and for failing to correct previously identified discrepancies in materiel control and maintenance when he served as commander of the 309th Maintenance Wing at Ogden Air Logistics Center. He received a routine reassignment before any personnel actions were initiated.

In addition, five colonels received letters of reprimand for poor command oversight. All were commanders of units that contributed to the improper shipment to Taiwan, or units with deficient performance. Two have been removed from command, one of whom is retiring. The three other officers, who left their commands earlier, will remain in their current positions.

Three colonels, all commanders, received letters of admonishment. One was removed from command. Another was allowed to continue in command. The third was reassigned in a normal tour rotation and will remain in his new assignment.

The final colonel to be disciplined received a letter of counseling for failing to exercise effective command oversight in a unit not involved in the Taiwan incident.

"In holding these officers accountable we considered the needs of the Air Force," said Donley. Because some had vital knowledge and because "their ability to serve has not been compromised," they were asked to stay on and help restore accountability in the nuclear mission, he said.

Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in a statement, "The disciplinary actions announced today are regrettable, but are necessary to address recent leadership failures. The Air Force must now focus on improving its security culture to ensure that such incidents do not happen again."

USAF to strengthen inspections and expand training for nuclear mission

USAF say thank,
But, NO WAY !

USAF goofing up again !

For background see:
Five Generals To Be Disciplined Over Nukes

Air Force leaders have delayed making commitments to far-reaching organizational changes recommended by a task force on nuclear weapons management, but have agreed to a number of narrower reforms.

During a Sept. 18 summit at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, key leaders from the Air Force, other Defense Department agencies, the National Security Council, the Energy Department and RAND Corp., discussed ways to improve stewardship of nuclear weapons. Air Force officials agreed to consider a proposal for a significant reorganization at a meeting of senior service leaders in early October.

In a report earlier this month, the Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management, chaired by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, urged the Air Force to replace its Space Command with a Strategic Command, vested with authority and accountability for the nuclear mission. In addition, the report recommended all bomber aircraft be consolidated into a single force assigned to the Strategic Command.

As the single major command responsible for the nuclear mission, Strategic Command would advocate for resources, provide clear lines of authority and accountability, and ensure appropriate staffing and expertise at all levels of the nuclear mission, Schlesinger said at a Pentagon briefing earlier this month. The bomber force assigned to the command would provide trained forces for conventional missions as well as manage the nuclear deterrent mission.

USAF Capt. Michael Andrews said service leaders would talk about those changes during a three-day October conference at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio that will include the service's four-star generals and acting secretary Michael Donley.

But, in a statement released over the weekend, the Air Force outlined four reforms agreed upon at last week's summit:

The Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., will be expanded and given responsibility for all nuclear sustainment activities, including those at weapons storage areas in the continental United States. This change is intended to clarify ambiguity in the chain of command.

The nuclear inspection process will be strengthened and centralized, built upon common policies and procedures integrated with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Service leaders will consolidate and expand training within the Air Education and Training Command for security personnel assigned to nuclear duties.

A new headquarters office will provide singular focus on nuclear matters within the service.

The Schlesinger task force was highly critical of the Air Force nuclear inspection program. "Processes are not standardized across major commands, inspectors are not appropriately trained, and inspections are not sufficiently comprehensive and frequent," the report noted.

The task force was especially critical of the fact that inspections were pre-announced, creating little incentive for personnel to remain vigilant around the clock.

As a result of that criticism, the Air Force inspector general now is rewriting regulations to require all commands to conduct no-notice nuclear inspections," Andrews said.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates created the Schlesinger task force in June to review Air Force lapses in nuclear weapons management, as well as the other military services' nuclear inventory control procedures.

The review was sparked by the discovery earlier this year that forward-section assemblies used on Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles were erroneously shipped to Taiwan in October and November 2006. That discovery followed another serious incident in which an Air Force bomber crew mistakenly flew nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana in August 2007.

The Schlesinger task force found, "There has been an unambiguous, dramatic and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission and, until very recently, little has been done to reverse it."

That erosion of capability and apparent disinterest in addressing it led Gates to fire the Air Force chief of staff and secretary in June. Current Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz and acting Secretary Michael Donley have repeatedly said their top priority is to rebuild the service's nuclear expertise and accountability.

In July, the Air Force established its own nuclear task force, made up of about 30 subject matter specialists from across the service's nuclear enterprise. That task force is currently tracking more than 180 corrective actions and analyzing causes of the problems.

USAF goofing up again ! Five Generals To Be Disciplined Over Nukes

Defense Secretary Robert Gates will announce a range of punishments for at least five general officers and possibly several colonels for lapses connected with the nation’s nuclear weapons.

Several senior Air Force generals declined to comment about the disciplinary actions this afternoon at the Air Force Association’s annual conference. All the officers are reported to be from the Air Force.

A congressional aide confirmed the Defense Department told lawmakers yesterday about the impending disciplinary actions. The aide did not know the names of those to be punished. Sources declined to identify them until the punishments were officially announced.

A report by Navy Adm. Kirkland H. Donald, director of naval nuclear propulsion, into the nuclear enterprise detailed a loss of oversight from senior Air Force leaders and lowered performance related to the nuclear mission.

Gates had to intervene personally and ordered Donald’s review after sensitive nuclear parts were sent mistakenly to Taiwan and a B-52 bomber flew across the country carrying six armed nuclear cruise missiles.

Last week, a panel of august experts led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger said they had been surprised by the erosion of controls over nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War and recommended that Air Force Space Command be folded into a new Air Force Strategic Command and urged a range of other measures to ensure airmen dealing with nukes “feel they are part of an important mission.”

Bringing back something like Strategic Air Command is the biggest organizational and functional change recommended by the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons management, which was created by Defense Secretary Gates after several high profile cock-ups involving nuclear weapons or their components.

The creation of Space Command has meant that space had attracted “some of the glamour” and left missileers feeling like second tier players. Schlesinger noted that most officers, if they wanted promotions and a decent career path, had to become space qualified and stay in that slot. “Some of the glamour will now move back to the nuclear mission,” he said.

The panel also recommended adding about 2,000 people to the ranks of those Air Force personnel who deal with nuclear matters, Schlesinger told reporters. They also want a single bomber numbered air force created that is responsible for the traditional service responsibilities of organizing, training and equipping. It would be assigned to the new Air Force Strategic Command.

One of the panel’s main goals, aside from the primary goal of restoring a special sense of mission to those in the Air Force who deal with nuclear matters, is to restore confidence among America’s allies that the US nuclear deterrence means something and is reliable. Schlesinger said he thought restoring this confidence would take six months to a year.