Showing posts with label Islamic terrorist. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islamic terrorist. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Rangers Do It With Less Dying


by James Dunnigan
The U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment’s motto is “Rangers lead the way” and the 3,500 members of the regiment have been in constant action over the last decade doing just that. During a decade of action, the regiment has suffered 412 combat casualties, including 32 dead. This is less than half the casualty rate suffered by non-SOCOM (Special Operations Command) combat units, and is the result of better training and leadership in the ranger battalions. In particular, the rangers developed more aggressive and effective techniques for treating combat casualties, which substantially reduced the death rate. The rest of the army has adopted many of these techniques.


The Rangers usually deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan for three months at a time, and serve as special muscle for important operations. The rangers, who belong to SOCOM, often act as backup for Special Forces or Navy SEALs, but also carry out a lot of operations on their own. During a typical three month tour, the Rangers might average 3-4 missions (patrols, raids, etc) a day, each one resulting in 3-4 enemy killed and 7-8 captured (along with large quantities of weapons and documents). Other deployments might be more, or less, intense. Often the Rangers are brought in to help Special Forces with searches for Islamic terrorists. In these cases the Rangers will spend most of their time patrolling, or on stakeout, noting everything and developing a web of information that will catch the bad guys.

Although a Ranger Battalion rarely has more than 600 troops, on a typical tour, 15-20 percent receive medals (mostly Bronze Star medals with V device), while most will receive either Combat Action Badges (to recognize non-infantry troops who have spent at least a month in combat) and Combat Infantryman’s Badges (for infantry who have spent at least a month in combat). For each tour, 30-40 percent of the troops are in combat for the first time. After one of these deployments, a Battalion will usually spend 3-6 months at their base in the United States, before heading off for another overseas deployment (usually to Afghanistan, or somewhere else.)

The three Battalions of Rangers are commandos in the classic (World War II) sense. They are light infantry who are trained to perform many of the missions the Special Forces normally take care of (raids, pilot and equipment recovery) plus something the Special Forces normally avoids; light infantry operations (using a several dozen or more troops for an operation.)

The Rangers are America's largest emergency response military unit (the smaller one is Delta Force) that is ready to fly off to an overseas trouble spot in less than 24 hours. In peacetime, one of the three Ranger battalions was always assigned to this duty (spending one month being ready go on 18 hours notice) and two months off (doing intensive training.)


The 75th Ranger Regiment headquarters is at Fort Benning, Georgia. The 1st Battalion of the 75th Regiment (1/75) is stationed at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, the 2nd Battalion (2/75) is at Fort Lewis, Washington and the 3rd Battalion (3/75) is at Fort Benning, Georgia.

But "the Rangers" are more than the 75th Ranger Regiment. There is also the TRADOC (Training And Doctrine Command) Ranger Training Brigade, which consists of three more ranger battalions (the 4th, 5th and 6th) who train those who wish to join the ranger regiment as well those who are there just to become qualified as a ranger. This is an important distinction that is often misunderstood. 


There is a difference between those who are "tabbed Rangers" (authorized to wear the Ranger tab on their uniform) and those who are simply members of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Any physically fit infantryman (and troops in other job categories the Rangers need) can apply to join the 75th Ranger Regiment if they have already gone through parachute training ("jump school"). They will have to pass a physical fitness test first, as the standards at the 75th Ranger Regiment are very high and there's no point sending any volunteers if they are not up to the minimum requirements. Officers and NCOs in the Ranger Regiment, however, must have taken and passed ranger training.

The Rangers encourage promising new recruits to volunteer to try for Ranger duty from the beginning. That way, the new recruit goes to the two week jump school right after 14 weeks of basic and advanced infantry training and is ready to try out for the rangers. This involves eight week long RASP (Ranger Assessment and Selection Program). About half of the volunteers fail. Those who pass are now members of the 75th Ranger Regiment, but they are not "rangers." How can this be?

Simple, the Ranger training was always meant to identify and train the elite infantry leaders. The purpose of Ranger School, for its first 20 years (until the 1970s), was to try and provide one Ranger NCO per infantry platoon and one Ranger officer per infantry company. That goal proved impossible to attain. There just weren't enough qualified volunteers for the tough training. But young infantry officers, in particular, were encouraged to attend Ranger school. The Ranger tab helped one's promotion prospects enormously. Until the 1990s, Ranger School was open to anyone in the army who could pass the physical qualification test. In practice, the army wanted its hotshot infantry officers and NCOs to attend and eventually anyone not working in, or directly with, the infantry, was not allowed to try out for the school. 


Even so, about 20 percent of attendees are from other services (Marines, SEALs and Air Force Special Operations) and another 20 percent from foreign nations (many of which have their own Ranger schools, some of which are even harder to pass than the U.S. one.)

The Ranger School is a 61 day course designed to identify and train elite infantry leaders. The training goes on for about 19 hours a day, seven days a week. The attrition rate is about 60 percent. The school emphasizes mastery of basic infantry skills and the ability to lead troops under stressful conditions. Students for Ranger School arrive wearing uniforms devoid of rank insignia. Everyone is of equal rank during the 61 days of training, with everyone taking turns leading squad size units of their fellow students in various exercises. The Ranger School program emphasizes resourcefulness, physical toughness and the ability to think clearly while under extreme stress (and lack of sleep.)

Since its formation in 1974, up until September 11, 2001, the ranger regiment actually hadn't seen much action. But that has a lot to do with American political leaders’ reluctance to get involved in overseas military emergencies. And if such action is needed, using fewer troops (as in Delta Force, SEALs or Special Forces) is preferred. The rangers are seen as the ultimate strategic reserve. So when there is something really, really important that can only be taken care of with several hundred very well trained infantry, the rangers were ready to go. Thus in the last decade, the rangers have been heavily involved worldwide, carrying out counter-terror missions that need a bit more skill and daring than the average combat unit could provide.

Saturday, December 6, 2008

Islamic 'Facebook terrorists' pose new challenges, warns general

Link


'Facebook terrorists' pose new challenges,
warns general


Radicalised Islamic terrorists from the "Facebook generation" are working across national borders and creating unprecedented challenges for security forces, MPs have been warned.

A Bangladeshi military general has revealed that new generations of extremists are using social networks for terrorist activity.

Major General Muniruzzaman, a former military advisor and Chief of Staff to the President of Bangladesh, told MPs at a Parliamentary meeting on Tuesday evening that the young people from Asian communities in Britain are often more radicalised that their counterparts in South Asia.

He revealed that he would be writing a report next year examining ‘cross pollination’ with communities now living in the western nations and will be specifically studying the British Bangladeshi community and any possible links.

"What we have seen is that many of the diaspora population living in the West have become perhaps more radicalised than their home roots.
“So we are not only seeing roots exporting radicalism to diaspora living in other countries but we are also trying to see whether the diaspora of those living in other areas on other continents is taking radical thoughts back to their roots.

“So we need to see the cross-pollination routes - what level of radical ideology can be taken back, what has been transferred. We are also seeing a disturbing trend now - the typical theory of the madrassas no longer exists. The London bombers did not go to madrassas, the Glasgow bombers were highly educated. 9/11 terrorists were educated in North American universities. So a paradigm shift has taken place in the profiling of the terrorists.

"We are interested in studying the Facebook generation, to see how the Facebook generation is shifting radical thoughts from one country to another, " he said.

President elect Barack Obama said on Monday - following the attack by Islamic militants on India's financial center of Mumbai which killed 183 people - that militants based in the “safe havens” of South Asia represented the biggest threat to the United States.

General Muniruzzaman warned that his own country Bangladesh should not be ignored in any threat assessment, and he pointed to its growing political Islam and militant wahabism, and the “social stress” of the country, which is currently governed by a military-backed interim government . Elections have been scheduled or December 29 but have already been delayed several times.

He identified extremists groups operating in Bangladesh such as Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI), Hizb ut Tahrir, and referred to Fazlur Rahman, of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh (JMB) who was a signatory to the 1998 Al Qaeda declaration of war.

Although General Muniruzzaman refused to disclose any information about any front organizations those groups have in the UK, he said: “we haven’t had clear idea how money is funne l led into Bangladesh through various means. We haven’t really regulated the inflow of money.

“So in terms of counter terrorism financing we have lack of capacity, so I only hope there are loopholes that we have not been able to stop and we need to find them. “

Major General Muniruzzaman, who is President of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) has extensive field experience in United Nations Peace Support Operations and was selected by the UN Secretary General to lead the post election UN mission in Cambodia.

Monday, December 1, 2008

The Many Terrorists Of India

The recent Islamic terrorist carnage in India reminds everyone that India has been one the major victims of terrorism of late. Last year, Indian suffered over a thousand dead from terrorist attacks.

Over 2,000 died in 2006.

While Islamic terrorism, as in Mumbai, was a major source of deaths, it was not the only one.

The major source of Islamic terrorism in India is the Pakistani backed campaign to drive Indians, particularly non-Moslem Indians, out of the disputed, by India and Pakistan, province of Kashmir (actually Jammu-Kashmir, as the lower portion of the state, Jammu, is largely Hindu.) Kashmir, on the other side of a mountain range from Jammu, is largely Moslem, and Pakistan believes all of Kashmir (Pakistan invaded and seized northern Kashmir in the late 1940s) should be theirs.

Twenty years ago, Pakistan decided that terrorism was the only practical way to get Kashmir back. India was more powerful militarily, and had beaten Pakistan in every war between them. The terrorist groups, that have bases and training camps in Pakistani Kashmir, not only send terrorists across the border into Indian Kashmir, but have also been responsible for about two-thirds of the deaths, from Islamic terrorism, in the rest of India.

It was apparently Kashmir based terrorists who carried out the recent Mumbai atrocities.

There are several separate terrorist groups operating in Kashmir. These include; Lashkar-e-Taiba (apparently the organizers of the recent Mumbai murders), Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami and Harakat ul-Mujahedeen (the last two formerly operated in Afghanistan against the Russians during the 1980s).

There have been several thousand Islamic terrorists active in Kashmir (on both sides of the border) since the late 1980s. The numbers are kept down by the deaths of most terrorists who get into Indian Kashmir.

The Pakistani based terrorists has also caused the growth of similar, but much smaller, groups inside India (which has 150 million Moslems). The Kashmir terrorism campaign has largely failed, and the number of active terrorists there has been dwindling over the past few years.

This has apparently played a part it carrying out attacks elsewhere in India. Only some parts of the Pakistani government back these terrorists, as most Pakistanis realize that too much Pakistani based Islamic terrorism inside India could trigger a major war with India. Since both nations now have nuclear weapons, this could get very ugly. The Islamic terrorists don't care, as they are on a Mission From God, and whatever happens is God's Will.

Tribal separatists in northeast India are another major source of terrorist deaths. The northeastern tribal territories only became part of India when the British colonial government departed in 1947. The tribes resented this, as well as the growing flood of migrants from other parts of India. The terrorism was directed largely at these immigrants. There used to be over 5,000 active and armed separatists, but counter-terror operations, and an amnesty program, have reduced the number to less than a thousand. Many of the separatists have devolved into criminal gangs and bandits.

The third source of terrorism is in eastern India, where communist (Maoist) rebels seek to establish a communist dictatorship, in order to resolve the social and economic inequities in the region. There are 5-10,000 armed Maoists out in the countryside, where they battle counter-terrorism forces and locals who violently disagree with the Maoists goals and methods.

India uses local police, a special force (165,000 members of the Central Reserve Police Force), the army, and several intelligence agencies to battle their terrorism problems.

The Foreign Ministry has also been useful because of its efforts to get other nations to recognize these terrorist organizations as "international terrorists", and thus subject to sanctions and prosecution overseas. This has caused Pakistan increasing problems. The "Kashmir belongs to Pakistan" cause is very popular inside Pakistan, making it difficult for Pakistan to crack down on Pakistani terrorists that carry out operations inside India, and sometimes elsewhere in the world as well.

The backlash from the Mumbai atrocities, and Islamic terrorist attacks on the Pakistani government is putting more pressure on Pakistan to crush its domestic Islamic radical groups.

This is particularly true with the Taliban in Pakistan. This group is just the most recent manifestation of violent Islamic conservatism in Pakistan's tribal areas. Pakistan has always tried to compromise with domestic terrorist groups, but the recent Islamic violence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and India is forcing Pakistan to confront Islamic terrorists, and deal with the problem once and for all. That won't be easy, as a large minority of Pakistanis support the Islamic militants.

Saturday, August 2, 2008

Where Al Qaeda Excels

The movement of al Qaeda's main effort from Iraq to Pakistan does not involve large numbers, and the numbers have declined since the terrorists began urging new recruits to head for Pakistan. For several years, about a hundred foreign volunteers (usually for suicide type attacks) entered Iraq each month, brought in via an al Qaeda network in some Arab and European countries. Money is collected there, often under the guise of an Islamic charity, to pay for airfare, fees (some of the operatives along the way are basically mercenaries) and bribes (to get past border controls of countries trying to stop this traffic).

Now, only a few dozen al Qaeda recruits are getting to Pakistan each month. It's more expensive to get to Pakistan, compared to Iraq, and the government does not make it easy. There's also been a decline in cash contributions. Al Qaeda was beaten in Iraq, after years of saying they were winning. Al Qaedas mass murder campaign in Iraq killed mostly Moslems, and this was unpopular among potential donors. The violence in Iraq used the idea of "al Qaeda" to unite many very different Islamic militant groups, and the same concept is being used in Pakistan. Here there are tribal militias, operating as vigilantes against real or imagined sins against Islam. In the cities there are many different groups. Some are at war with another Islamic faction, others simply wish to impose their religious beliefs and practices on all other Moslems. But many do not want to be associated with al Qaeda, because of the groups reputation of violence towards Moslem women and children.

Local politicians (in Pakistan and Afghanistan) would like to blame much of the unrest on outsiders, and al Qaeda certainly fits the bill. But al Qaeda is a relatively small operation, and most of the Islamic radicals in the area are locals. Using religion as a tool to gain political and military advantage is an old problem, especially in Moslem countries. In general, Moslems like to play down this aspect of their religion, preferring to call Islam, "the religion of peace." But too many Moslem clerics, and ambitious politicians, are all too willing to exploit the militant and violent aspects of Islam. This is especially true along the Pakistan-Afghan border. But al Qaeda is a much smaller player in the region than its media coverage wound indicate. Al Qaeda is much better at playing the press than it is at doing anything else.

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Analyst warns of third Islamic terrorist wave, enabled by Internet






Analyst warns of third Islamic terrorist wave, enabled by Internet
By Greg Grant ggrant@govexec.com

Al Qaeda is not the central planning, recruiting and organizing force for global terrorism it once was, but has become more of a brand name that leaderless terrorist groups around the world assume to gain recognition and notoriety, according to a leading terrorist expert.

The third wave of terrorists comprises mostly "terrorist wannabes," said Marc Sageman, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, who was a CIA case officer in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

They are a post-Iraq terrorist generation made up predominately of Muslims in Europe who feel shut out of the labor market, said Sageman, speaking in Washington on Feb. 20 at an event sponsored by the New America Foundation. They become increasingly radicalized by shared group discontent and join the terrorist jihad in a quest for glory and heroism, he added.

These dissidents typically don't associate face to face, rather their interaction has shifted to Internet chat rooms and online forums, which act as "echo chambers" where anger intensifies and participants become more radicalized, Sageman said. The virtual world enables the natural dynamic of "in-group love and out-group hate," in which jihadists become more withdrawn from society and associate only with radical and like-minded thinkers.

The Internet also is transforming the demographics of the modern terrorist threat, he said, as younger people, who constantly troll Web sites, and women, traditionally excluded from political participation because of religious reasons, are able to become involved in activism. While the post-Sept. 11 security environment is much more hostile toward terrorist aspirants, the Internet permits scattered groups to connect virtually.

Sageman said the first wave of terrorists were early companions of Osama bin Laden, who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight Soviet invaders. Called Afghan Arabs, most being Egyptian, they are the surviving leaders of al Qaeda. Bin Laden only trusts and has contact with this hard-core group of original al Qaeda members. The second wave joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s, he said, and is made up mostly of disenfranchised Muslims from Europe. Both groups, which number around 2,000, remain isolated and hidden in the lawless Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

The third wave sprung up organically, linking virtually with other networks, but because of the war on terror they have been unable to travel to this region for al Qaeda training and resources. Far more terrorist plots originate with this latest wave, Sageman said, but generally, they are poorly planned and the terrorists usually are arrested before they carry out an attack.

The latest terrorist wave is largely a self-limiting threat, Sageman said, because it's made up mostly of bored, unemployed young people with fantasies of glory and thrills. That profile lacks the ideological commitment to jihad that is typical of the older al Qaeda generation. Feeling shut out of the local labor market, they turn to crime and, in many cases, join gangs. They typically lead a life of crime for about a decade and then turn to religion as a salvation, he added, proceeding down a path of radicalization and violence sparked by moral outrage.

Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist who examined the cases of nearly 500 known terrorists in his book 'Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century' (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), found no single characteristic that explains why somebody becomes a terrorist. The most common trait among terrorists is shared relationship. More than two-thirds of the cases he examined were either friends who associated at the local mosque and then joined terrorist organizations collectively or were relatives who joined the family business.

"Most small groups of jihadists are trusted friends, who have spontaneously self-organized, with no top down al Qaeda recruitment program," Sageman said. This pattern also was identified by Islamic scholar Olivier Roy in his book 'Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah' (Columbia University Press, 2004). He labeled it franchising. Groups organize based on local solidarities, such as neighborhood, family or tribe and take on the al Qaeda label, but with no actual ties to the organization."

The pool of potential Mujaheddin is composed of small clusters of close friends, relatives, worshippers and disciples, who are connected through strong bonds," Sageman said. "This group becomes self-sufficient and closes in on itself. This social isolation protects the group.

"Since the Sept. 11 attacks, terrorist arrests in the United States have targeted 60 people, he said. During the same period in Europe, terrorist arrests totaled 2,400. More Muslims there turn to terrorism than in the United States because most European countries are built on a notion of national essence, Sageman said, which can shut out other cultures. Muslims in Europe also face a tough job market and high unemployment, he said, factors that foster disenfranchisement, anger and radicalization.

In the United States, the idea of a national melting pot and the American dream tend to weaken the appeal of jihadism among Muslim Americans. The ones who migrate to the United States typically are university professors, engineers, physicians and business professionals who more easily enter the labor force. The average Muslim family in America makes about $70,000 per year, compared with the national average of $48,000, Sageman said.

Many warn of al Qaeda and its jihadist appeal spreading throughout the Muslim world. But Sageman said in every instance al Qaeda has attempted to shift from terrorism to governing, it has been rejected. He cited Algeria in the 1990s, Afghanistan in 2001 and most recently, the Anbar province of Iraq.

The result is a Taliban-like regime, such as the one that arose in Afghanistan in the 1990s, he said. The Taliban was rejected for its harsh measures and piety when a stronger armed movement, the U.S. military, arrived in 2001.

The idea of establishing an al Qaeda regime is not the reason people become terrorists, Sageman said, rather it's about the process of trying to become heroes and finding something appealing in their unsatisfying and boring lives.